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Abstract
An exceptional dichotomy emerged within Oglala Lakota society
between 1851 and 1868. During this liminal early reservation period, as
buffalo numbers dwindled and tribal mobility diminished, the Oglala Lakota
developed a dynamic economic strategy founded on the creation of a tribal
cattle herd. They based their decision upon intimate environmental
knowledge, a clear understanding of the emerging regional cattle industry
initiated by white entrepreneurs, and their unfamiliarity concerning
agricultural pursuits exhorted by the American federal government. Cattle
formed not only the foundation of the Oglala’s reservation economy; they
provided an opportunity to maintain familiar cultural practices within the
milieu of the nomadic equestrian society.
Obstacles such as an unyielding demand by the federal government to
implement a farming economy, extensive competition from white ranchers,
limited access to regional or local markets, excessive institutional control by
Indian agents, and tribal factionalism failed to prevent the tribe from pressing
on toward its goal. Following the Dawes Act of 1887, and the subsequent
Sioux Bill of 1889 tribal leaders on Pine Ridge Reservation struggled to
thwart allotment. Ultimately unsuccessful, these leaders next strove to
prevent leasing of tribal lands to off-reservation cattle operations.
Unfortunately, during WWI the tribe sold most of it’s herd for the war effort
at the strong recommendation of the federal government and its agents. With
few cattle remaining on Pine Ridge leasing moved apace through the
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machinations of the off-reservation cattle interests eager to utilize tribal lands.
By 1920 conditions of economic impotence and poverty arose. This
pernicious situation remains relatively unchanged today.
Uniquely, this study fuses Lakota oral history and extensive archival
research within an ethnohistorical framework. Other topics addressed include
aspects of Oglala spatial relationships to boundaries, loci of power, and whites
both on and off the reservation. Moreover, Oglala connections to both
regional and national economic developments are examined in order to
provide a richer historical context. My work fills a tremendous void within
Lakota historiography and asks scholars to reexamine nascent reservation
periods within larger historical contexts as well as misconceptions concerning
Native American’s “resignation” to reservation life.
1
INTRODUCTION
During 1875 negotiations concerning the Lakota’s relinquishment of
the Black Hills to the United States Oglala Lakota Chief Red Cloud stated that
“for seven generations to come I want our Great Father to give us Texan steers
for our meat.”1 Brulé band Chief Spotted Tail stated that if the Lakota were
forced to surrender Paha Sapa then he desired a vast amount of money. “The
amount must be so large that the interest will support us…I will trade some of
it for stock to raise cattle…we want some good cattle every year.”2 These two
statements reveal the beginning of significant evolutions in Lakota political
economy during the early years of the tribes’ confinement on The Great Sioux
Reservation. Both Red Cloud and Spotted Tail understood that the familiar
buffalo-centered culture enjoyed by the Lakota was coming to an end. The
Lakota needed to create a new tribal economy if they wanted to maintain their
way of life autonomously within reservation boundaries. To this end cattle
came to occupy the center of economic hope in a world of restricted mobility
and marked by increased federal interference.
This study will examine the Oglala Lakota’s political economy during
the liminal period between 1750 and 1920 when the tribe experienced
dramatic cultural transformations. First, the tribe embraced an equestrian
nomadic lifestyle upon the northern Great Plains and subsequently tapped into
1 Robert W. Larson, Red Cloud: Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 192.
2 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1875-1876, Serial No. 1680, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1876) The Oglala’s council with the federal government’s representatives is found on
pp. 690-693.
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the greatest resource available within the thermodynamic ecology of the Great
Plains, buffalo. However, the tribe then faced the concomitant pressure of a
quickly expanding United States and the loss of the buffalo during the latter
half of the nineteenth century. Finally, as the Oglala came to grips with both
events they sought to maintain cultural continuity through the creation of a
self-sustaining communally owned cattle herds. This dissertation will provide
new insights into both Native American and Oglala tribal historiography.
The historiography of both Lakota specific studies, and more general
Native American studies, is filled with tribal and reservation monographs.
Early narratives pertaining to the Lakota, such as George E. Hyde’s 1937
classic, Red Cloud’s Folk, portrayed themes of tribal grandeur, military
victories, and ultimate defeat to ineluctable United States expansion.3 Grand
narratives such as this epitomized the consensus era of history dominated
early histories pertaining specifically to the Lakota, or Sioux, as they are more
popularly known. These works often related the stories of Lakota bands by
focusing on the tribe’s great leaders during the latter half of the nineteenth
century. While these monographs focused on these great Lakota chiefs they
sought to detail each band’s struggle for independence against the invading
white men. Stanley Vestal published, Sitting Bull: Champion of the Sioux, in
1932, while George Hyde introduced Red Cloud’s Folk in 1937, A Sioux
Chronicle in 1956, and Spotted Tail’s Folk in 1961.4 These books were all
3 George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1937).
4 Stanley Vestal, Sitting Bull: Champion of the Sioux (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1932); George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians (Norman:
3
well written, popular, and portrayed the Lakota as noble warriors struggling to
control events that inexorably carried the tribe towards destruction. However,
the end of the tribes’ power is noted to be an acceptable, if tragic, sacrifice in
the wake of American progress and the nation’s climb towards greatness.
Other authors sought to use an examination of one individual’s life as a
vehicle to reveal tribal history.
Stanley Vestal set out to rediscover the real story of Sitting Bull in,
Sitting Bull. At the time of the book’s publication the great chief possessed an
unflattering image in American History. In a beautifully written and
enjoyable style Vestal recounts the life of a great Hunkpapa Lakota chief. He
found Sitting Bull worthy of praise rather than vilification for his actions, and
wondered when the state of South Dakota would erect a memorial for its
greatest son. (That event is long overdue!)
In, Red Cloud’s Folk and A Sioux Chronicle, Hyde tells the story of
the Oglala Lakota between the mid-eighteen hundreds and 1890. The first
book examines the Oglala’s rise to dominance on the Northern Great Plains
until their crowning victory over Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn.
The second account picks up where the first left off, and looks at the early
reservation years and the hardships the tribe faced that led to the final
confrontation of Wounded Knee in 1890. Much like Vestal, Hyde tells an
exciting and gripping story meant to entertain as well as enlighten. Hyde’s
other work, Spotted Tail’s Folk, is written in much the same vernacular.
University of Oklahoma Press, 1937); George E. Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1956); and George E. Hyde, Spotted Tail’s Folk: A History of
the Brule Sioux (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961).
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However, the latter two works, published in 1957 and 1961, presented a more
objective picture of Indian-white relations.5 Despite this historiographic
evolution Native American’s perspective concerning history remained absent
from Vestal and Hyde’s works. Nonetheless, the Lakota were beginning to
lose the moniker of the “noble savage,” and be studied as fellow citizens of
the Great Plains rather than saints on horseback. This realignment of
historical perspective continued during the 1960s as historical scholarship
sought new avenues of exploration.
One such study emerged in 1963 in Robert Utley’s, The Last Days of
the Sioux Nation, which marked 1890 and the Battle of Wounded Knee as the
end of the Lakota tribe for two reasons.6 First, it was the tribe’s final military
action and resulted in a devastating defeat. Secondly, and more importantly,
Utley believes that the disintegration of the Ghost Dance religion provided the
United States a psychological victory over the tribe. The Oglala no longer
believed that they could return to their old ways once Wovoka’s predictions of
the great millennium proved false. Unfortunately, in this work Utley
presented Lakota history from a non-Indian perspective and implied the tribe
“vanished” after 1890. By doing so he unintentionally relegated both Lakota,
and all 20th century Native American History, to historical irrelevance. This is
understandable considering contemporary works of the time universally
viewed Indian history as existing only when they fought valiantly against
American westward expansion.
5 Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle, and Hyde, Spotted Tail’s Folk.
6 Robert M. Utley, The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963).
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Three decades later Utley published a fundamentally different study
concerning the Lakota, The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of
Sitting Bull. Utley’s work, along with Robert W. Larson’s, Red Cloud:
Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux, again used noted tribal leaders as a
vehicle to provide a richer and more balanced tribal history from an Indian
perspective.
While both authors provide their readers with a well-written and
sometimes fascinating account of Sitting Bull and Red Cloud’s lives they fail
to fully examine Lakota cultural. Missing from both manuscripts is an
examination of Lakota social structure and kinship relationships in relation to
both their relation to and influence on tribal political and economic strategies
within a reservation setting. Moreover, both studies fundamentally end their
stories shortly after the Ghost Dance revival and the subsequent Battle of
Wounded Knee. Utley deserves some leeway concerning this flaw because
Sitting Bull, the focus of his study, died shortly after the late November
conflict. As for Larson, he provides about ten pages of his final chapter to
Red Cloud’s life after 1890. This despite the fact Red Cloud lived until
December 10th, 1909 while maintaining his leadership role within the Oglala
Lakota the entire time.7
7 Robert Utley, The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull (New York: Holt
Press, 1993); and Robert W. Larson, Red Cloud: Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997). Interestingly, the subtitle of Larson’s study
provides a subtle example of the misunderstanding many historians cause within the general
public concerning the tribe’s name. The term “Lakota Sioux” is redundant. Sioux being the
Ojibwe name bastardized by the French to refer to the Lakota, and Lakota being the name the
tribe used to refer to itself. A more accurate subtitle would have been Warrior-Statesman of
6
The most recent monograph concerning the Lakota provides a
wonderfully argued thesis regarding the 1890 battle of Wounded Knee.
Jeffrey Ostler, in The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and
Clark to Wounded Knee, refutes the accepted belief that Lakota Ghost
Dancers developed a military aspect toward their ceremonies and sought to
defeat the whites through force of arms. In this work Ostler superbly provides
a narrative of events from a Native perspective. He employs a sound
theoretical framework to emphasize his extensive research, and in doing so
make an invaluable contribution to both Lakota and Native American
historiography. However, this work demonstrates a continued fascination
with the importance of Wounded Knee as being either the “end” of Lakota
history or the most notable turning point in Lakota history. Neither is
accurate. As my study will reveal the themes of identity, spatial perceptions
of power, and political economy reveal far more concerning the Oglala
Lakota’s early reservation existence.8
Oglala tribal identity emerged as a tremendously important issue as the
tribe sought to implement its new economic designs. A division occurred
between factions within the tribe based primarily upon blood quantum. Mixed
blood members of the tribe, often allied with white men married to Native
women, sought to redirect and control reservation economies. While this
bifurcation was not universally delineated by blood the division between
the Oglala Lakota, which refers to Red Cloud’s tribe, the Oglala, and his “national” affiliation
of Lakota. It is like saying “George W. Bush: President of America and the United States.”
8 Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded
Knee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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mixed bloods and full bloods remained a constant point of contention
throughout the period of this study.9
Dramatic cultural changes also occurred between 1750 and 1920
pertaining to Oglala concepts of both geographical space and its relation to
political and economic power centers. The Lakota’s westward migration to the
open expanses of the Great Plains, and their acquisition of the horse, reshaped
the way the tribe conceived geographic space.10 The mobility provided by the
horse greatly expanded their immediate view of the size of both the world
itself and their own territorial boundaries. One became much larger, while the
9 For an examination of the complexities and manifold effects of the topic of blood quantum
as a defining aspect of Native American culture and identity see, Pauline Turner Strong and
Barrik Van Winkle’s, “’Indian Blood’”: Reflections on the Reckoning and Refiguring of
Native North American Identity,” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 4, Resisting Identities
(Nov. 1996), 547-576; Alexandra Harmon’s, “Lines in the Sand: Shifting Boundaries between
Indians and Non-Indians in the Puget Sound Region,” The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol.
26, No. 4 (Winter, 1995), 429-453, explores Native American identity as juxtaposed against
neighboring Anglo society; the idea that Native American identity is both persistent and
constantly evolving is examined in both, Morris W. Foster’s, Being Comanche: A Social
History of an American Indian Community (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991) and
Loretta Fowler’s books, Arapahoe Politics, 1851-1978: Symbols in Crises of Authority
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982) and, Shared Symbols, Contested Meanings:
Gros Ventre Culture and History, 1778-1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); the
differing effects of blood quantum coupled with concepts of private property and material
culture in the development of tribal identity are revealed in Thomas Biolsi’s, “The Birth of the
Reservation: Making the Modern Individual among the Lakota,” American Anthropologist,
Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb. 1995), 28-53, and David Rich Lewis’s, “Reservation Leadership and the
Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865-1928,”
Ethnohistory, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 124-148; a superior study that explores the
concept of identity and its relationship to evolving Native American political economy in the
face of market capitalism is found in Brian C. Hosmer’s, American Indians in the
Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-
1920 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
10 For an noted study of Lakota cultural delineation before their migration to the Great Plains
see, Gary Clayton Anderson’s, Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the
Upper Mississippi Valley, 1650-1862 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); for a
insightful examination of the cultural evolution that occurred when Native American tribes
sought a nomadic equestrian way of life see, Elliott West’s, The Contested Plains: Indians,
Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); for an
account of the migration itself see, Richard White’s, “The Winning of the West: The
Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” The Journal of
American History, Vol. 65, No. 2 (September, 1978), 319-343.
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other could be more easily negotiated and thus flexible.11 The Oglala’s return
to the Black Hills, or Paha Sapa, meant the emergence of cosmological power
centers that were geographically fixed. At the same time tribal shamans
represented mobile conduits to of Wakan Tanka, or the Great Mystery, as they
sought to bring order out of chaos.12 Concurrently, economic and political
power became more diffuse as Oglala population spread across the
increasingly vast landscape. Confinement on a reservation significantly
altered geographical relationships and concepts regarding political and
economic power.13
11 For a general discussion that examines the inevitable evolution of spatial concepts during
the early reservation period see, James Taylor Carson, “Ethnogeography and the Native
American Past,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 49, No. 4, (Fall, 2002), 769-788; an overall context of
spatial theory is outlined in, Stephan Graham and Patsy Healey’s, “Relational Concepts of
Space and Place: Issues for Planning Theory and Practice,” European Planning Studies, Vol.
7, No. 5 (1999), 623-646, and Chapters 7-9 in Juan Cole’s, Sacred Space and Holy War: The
Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002); for an
early study concerning spatial continuity during a period of significant cultural and
geographical evolution see, Jesse O. McKee’s, “The Choctaw Indians: A Geographical Study
in Cultural Change,” The Southern Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (January, 1971), 107-141; an
examination of attempts by the United States government to control the Oglala through spatial
fixing can be found in Matthew G. Hannah’s, “Space and Social Control in the
Administration of the Oglala Lakota (“Sioux”), 1871-1879,” Journal of Historical
Geography, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1993), 412-432.
12 For studies concerning Lakota religion see, Raymond J. DeMallie and Douglas R. Parks,
eds., Sioux Indian Religion: Tradition and Innovation (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1987); Raymond J. DeMallie and Elaine A. Jahner, eds., Lakota Belief and Ritual
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991); Joseph Epes Brown, ed., The Sacred Pipe:
Black Elk’s account of the Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1953); and for a syncretic take on Christian-Oglala-Peyote religions see, Paul B.
Steinmetz, Pipe, Bible, and Peyote Among the Lakota: A Study I Religious Identity
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990); for more dialectical studies concerning
Catholicism and Oglala spirituality see, Clyde Holler, Black Elk’s Religion: The Sun Dance
and Lakota Catholicism (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Raymond DeMallie,
ed., The Sixth Grandfather: Black Elk’s Teachings Given to John G. Neihardt (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Michael F. Steltenkamp’s, Black Elk: Holy Man of the
Oglala (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993); and Linea Sundstrom’s, “Mirror of
Heaven: Cross-Cultural Transference of the Sacred Geography of the Black Hills,” World
Archaeology, Vol. 28, No. 2, Sacred Geography (October, 1996), 177-189.
.
13 Price, Catherine, The Oglala People, 1841-1879 A Political History (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1996).
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Other studies have begun to explore the evolution of political
economies as tribes made the transition to reservation life. Thomas Biolsi’s,
Organizing the Lakota, examines the political economy of the Brulé Lakota
on Rosebud Reservation during the New Deal. In his work he presents a
thesis of rapid tribal resignation to Office of Indian Affairs control because of
economic impotence of reservation Indians and increased technologies of
control. Such assessments minimize or ignore Native American’s
understanding and foresight regarding their future reservation existence and
their persistence in their realization.
Works such as, Parading Through History, by Frederick Hoxie, and
Melissa Meyer’s, The White Earth Tragedy, seek to provide a native
perspective to the transition from autonomous and independent Indian nations
to a culturally restrictive reservation life.14 Both of these studies brilliantly
demonstrate both cultural continuity and agency during these liminal periods.
However, Hoxie and Meyer, as well as others, overemphasize the abruptness
of this transitional process. As a result, early reservation decisions concerning
various tribes’ economic and political future appear either reactive or
determined by environmental factors, as Hoxie and Meyer respectively
portray. The most notable studies concerning the evolution of political
economy for tribes newly confined to reservations remain the classic work of
Gary Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind, first published in 1984,
14 See, Frederick E. Hoxie’s, Parading Through History: The Making of the Crow Nation in
America, 1805-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Melissa L.
Meyer’s, The White Earth Tragedy: Ethnicity and Dispossession at a Minnesota Anishinaabe
Reservation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
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and the more recent work of Brian Hosmer, American Indians in the
Marketplace, published in 1999. These monographs provide comprehensive
detail concerning the Dakota and Menominee/Metlakatlans’ transformation as
they faced confinement upon reservations. Both studies explore themes of
identity and economic evolution as the tribes fought to maintain their culture.
While these books provide important answers concerning the aforementioned
themes, there are many questions pertaining to early reservation life that
deserve exploration.15
My dissertation reveals that the Oglala Lakota developed and
implemented a reservation economic strategy founded upon the creation of a
tribal cattle herd. Their economic plan emerged because of both their recent
historical experience and their societal structure, and through reasoned
preparation. Through it they hoped to maintain social, political, and economic
structures and relationships within their equestrian nomadic culture.
Significantly, the Oglala strove to create a new life for themselves while
facing significant alterations concerning their perception of space and place as
it pertained to concepts of power and identity, and increased obstacles
presented by an assimilationist United States government.
This study is an ethnohistorical study of Pine Ridge Reservation from
1868 to 1920. I believe the most effective method for revealing the cultural
15 Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind; Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace; and
for further study of the influence of capitalistic marketplace influences see, Alice Littlefield
and Martha C. Knack’s, eds., Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical
Perspectives (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); and John H. Moore, “Kinship
and Division of Labor in Cheyenne Society,” in Alice Littlefield and Hill Gates, eds., Marxist
Approaches in Economic Anthropology: Monographs in Economic Anthropology, No. 9 (New
York: University Press of America, 1991).
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evolution on Pine Ridge during this period of societal metamorphosis is by
studying the economic challenges, options, and strategies of the Oglala
Lakota. Extensive research revealed both change and continuity with the
Oglala society that resulted from the truncation of the tribe’s nomadic way of
life and subsequent emergence of the reservation culture. This work, which
centers on the emergent cattle industry, will reveal that the Oglala responded
to economic dependency with flexibility, adaptability, and a desire to provide
for their own economic subsistence in order to maintain social and political
autonomy. Moreover, the Oglala strove to maintain kinship and band ties,
societal roles, and traditional leadership while concomitantly entering the
regional and national marketplace during this liminal period.
The theoretical framework for this work is based on ethnohistorical
methodologies and practices. This work employs an interdisciplinary
approach through the inclusion of several fields of study—history,
anthropology, ecology, geography, and spatial theory—in order to better
analyze and contextualize my findings and then present them from the Native
American point of view. Moreover, it ties such studies to larger historical
themes and movements throughout the United States during the same period
in order to incorporate Oglala history, and Native American history in a larger
sense, as part of the larger narrative of American history. More importantly,
this study tells the stories of individual inhabitants of Pine Ridge
Agency/Reservation through federal records and accounts and reveal the
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successes and failures, triumphs and tragedies, of Oglala Indians during these
fifty odd years.
This study will reveal how the Oglala used concepts and practices of
labor and capitalism to adjust to changing economic conditions and how that
in turn affected the Oglala’s cultural evolution within the reservation system.
It will also show how concepts of gender, class, space, and religion changed
as the federal government attempted to first socially and economically
assimilate and acculturate the tribe, and then marginalize and ostracize the
Oglala from white society and markets. The application of ethnohistorical
methodology concerning my specific topic remains unexamined in the vast
Lakota historiography. Moreover, this study will provide a historical narrative
and methodological model to demonstrate how Native Americans responded
to inevitable and wrenching cultural changes during such liminal periods.
Chapter One discusses the tribes transformation from a pedestrian
woodland tribe to an equestrian nomadic tribe of the Northern Great Plains
from 1750-1868. During the centuries prior to spatial confinement within
reservation boundaries the Oglala possessed an incredibly complex, flexible,
and yet well-defined relationships with the world in which all things were
unified by their possession of wakan, or power. Cultural order was
maintained, and chaos averted, by appeasing the myriad of wakan that
inhabited the world. These powers existed both within the physical realms
(horizontal geography) and metaphysical realms (vertical geography). Within
their “vertical geography” the Oglala viewed space around them as inhabited
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by beings of power stretching in all six directions. For example, the wakan of
the four horizontal directions possessed vitally important cultural qualities: the
west provided finality and power, the north wisdom, the east enlightenment
and rebirth, and the south innocence and youth.
As the Lakota entered the reservation era and saw the buffalo, the
foundation of their tribal economy, quickly disappearing they faced serious
and decisive choices concerning their future. How would they provide for
their survival and maintain their autonomy on the northern plains? For the
Oglala band the choice seemed clear, make up for shortages in buffalo
through the acquisition of cattle. But how and why did they come to that
decision, and did all bands of the Lakota react to mounting economic pressure
in a similar fashion? In order to answer this question one must examine both
their economic options and tribal experiences over the preceding century, and
compare it to another bands economic strategy during the period.
The core theme of this chapter states that the Oglala and Hunkpapa
chose very different economic strategies during the early reservation years
because of their very different historical experiences after the 1780s. The
answer lies both in their historical experiences during the 19th century and
their tribal structure. Lakota culture consisted of a loose confederation of
seven tribes, themselves made up of various bands whose societal foundation
consisted of patriarchal led family units called tiospaye.16 Despite sharing the
same language and culture these tribes operated independently of one another,
16 Tiospaye are “sometimes defined as flexible exogamous residential units organized around
a core of bilaterally related kin.” See Paul M. Robertson, “The Power of the Land: Identity,
Ethnicity, and Class among the Oglala, Lakota,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Union Institute, 1995), 4.
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which created a political atmosphere that promoted independent decision-
making.17 For example, after a brief flirtation with an agricultural way of life
near the Missouri River in the 1770s the Oglala advanced west with the Brulé
tribe in search of buffalo for an increased robe trade.18
As the Oglala moved west and south they removed themselves from
contact with sedentary horticultural tribes, such as the Arikara and Hidatsa,
and became ensconced within a nomadic buffalo-hunting milieu. However,
the Hunkpapa remained near the Missouri River until the 1840s, when part of
the tribe moved west to join in resting hunting grounds from the Crow. Most
of the Hunkpapa remained near the Missouri River and remained in close
contact with many sedentary agricultural tribes. Thus, by 1868 when the
second Treaty of Fort Laramie was promulgated the Oglala tribe very likely
had no living member that had any practical knowledge of horticulture. While
the Hunkpapa undoubtedly viewed farming as a viable option to counter the
dwindling buffalo numbers and an increasingly restricted nomadic lifestyle.
Nineteenth century tribal experiences greatly influenced the economic
strategies for the Oglala and Hunkpapa. The Hunkpapa, who experienced
intimate connections with sedentary horticulturalist tribes within their recent
memory, preferred farming as a reservation economic foundation.
Conversely, the Oglala, isolated from such sedentary societies since the
17 See, George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1937), 21. This text offers an outstanding history of the
Oglala, Lakota before 1877, their movements and inter and intra-tribal relations.
18 Richard White, “The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 65, Issue 2
(September, 1978) 319-343.
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1790s, overwhelmingly rejected a future of planting and harvesting as their
economic hope. Instead they sought more immediately familiar economic
strategies that involved riding herd and driving teams. Unfortunately, in the
end neither achieved its goal of economic self-sufficiency and independence.
Chapter Two explores the transitional period in Oglala culture between
1869 and 1876 when the tribe first understood the need to seek new economic
strategies in the face of reservation confinement and an increasingly intrusive
United States government. With the creation of the Great Sioux Reservation
the Lakota sought to maintain control of much of the northern plains and the
resources available within that vast region. However, as buffalo began to
disappear from the Northern Plains, the federal government, through a series
of treaties, accepted responsibility for providing the Lakota with an adequate
food supply.19 For the Lakota, cattle came to represent an opportunity to
continue their equestrian and nomadic way of life as a self-sufficient and
independent people while reaching an accommodation with the expansionist
and capitalistic United States. Despite the Oglala’s ability to adapt, they met
with many obstacles—including the ideology of assimilation and non-Indian
19The Statutes at Large, Treaties and Proclamations, of the United States of America, from
December 1867, to March 1869, Edited by George P. Sanger, Counselor at Law, Vol. XV,
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1869), 639. It was stated in the Treaty of Fort
Laramie, Article X, concluded on April 29, 1868 that, “each Indian over the age of four years,
who shall have removed to and settled permanently upon said reservation and complied with
the stipulations of this treaty, shall be entitled to receive from the United States, for the period
of four years after he shall have settled upon the reservation, one pound of meat...provided the
Indians cannot furnish their own subsistence at an earlier date.”
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cattle interests—in their attempts to create a tribal cattle herd and negotiate a
new way of life following the truncation of military options.20
Federal Indian policy, based upon assimilation ideology founded on
the superiority of the yeoman farmer and carried out by “reformers” such as
Richard Henry Pratt, negatively influenced the burgeoning Lakota cattle
industry. 21 For example, in 1865 the United States government agreed to pay
each individual Lakota, “at the rate of about fifteen dollars per head per
annum in view of the fact that the buffalo and other game, by means of which
20 The historiography pertaining to Native American economies has evolved significantly over
the last twenty years. Richard White’s dependency theory stated Indian economic
dependency upon the federal government stemmed from Native cultures introduction to the
market economy and the resultant commodification of land, labor, and tribal resources.
However, Brian Hosmer found within the Menominee and Metlaktlans a dynamic ability to
adapt to a changing market economy without losing their cultural identity. David Rich Lewis
also noted cultural adaptability in the face of an encroaching market economy for the
Northern Ute, the Hupa, and the Tohono O’odham. However, Lewis also noted that these
tribes found themselves severely restricted economically by their relegation to the periphery
of American society, the loss of their land and resources, and the government’s agrarian
Indian policy. Much like the tribes studied by Lewis, the Oglala sought to create a
subsistence economy that acculturated aspects of Native and American cultural constructs
while facing the same economic limitations. The works cited here are in order—Richard
White, Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the
Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Brian C.
Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the
Menominees and Metlaktlans, 1870-1920 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); and
David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog: American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian
Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). My study is also significantly
influenced by Peter Iverson’s, When Indians Became Cowboys: Native Peoples and Cattle
Ranching in the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), which
reveals that Native Americans used cattle ranching as a strategy to confront changing times,
how it was an attempt to redefine themselves as a culture while maintaining tribal identity and
individual self-esteem. However, while Iverson states, “cattle ranching emerged, therefore, as
a symbol of a new day,” (14) my study reveals the “new day” for the Oglala never found a
chance to burst forth and fulfill its promise.
21 Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974). See “Part Two” for a discussion of this
ideology and belief system. Frederick Hoxie proposes a fundamental shift in American
concepts pertaining to assimilation after 1880. He found a change from the desire for
complete assimilation and eventual homogenizing of races, to a new concept of coexistence of
diverse races, with Native Americans occupying a fixed place on the bottom of the new social
scale and on the periphery of American civilization. Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise:
The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1984); and David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the
Boarding School Experience 1875-1928 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), 39.
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these nomadic tribes subsist, are being driven from the country by the whites
who traverse it.”22 However, the federal government misguidedly favored
farming over ranching on the arid Great Plains. The federal government
stated in an 1865 Treaty that its policy toward the tribe centered on cultivation
rather than ranching despite environmental realities.23 For example, in 1865
the United States stipulated the Lakota promise not to impede tribal members
from pursuing agricultural interests. Moreover, the federal government
promised twenty-five dollars per person for Indians engaged in cultivation, ten
dollars more than Indians otherwise inclined. The treaty also promised the
Oglala if one hundred lodges gathered in one area for agricultural reasons the
U. S. must provide an agency and employ a farmer for their instruction.24
Events in the eastern United States also conspired to impede the
establishment of a viable Lakota cattle industry. The Depression of 1873
greatly increased the demand for gold in order to bolster a flagging economy
and further finance a growing Industrial Revolution. Such demands
ultimately led to Colonel Custer’s illegal expedition to the Black Hills in
1874, where gold was discovered. During an 1875 meeting to discuss
relinquishment of the Black Hills the Lakota evinced their own understanding
of the value of cattle and the future benefits offered by a tribal herd. The
United States offered $25,000 total for tribal hunting rights, the Oglala
22 Executive Documents, The House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1867), 5.
23 Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, 7-12.
24 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284, (Washington: Government Printing
Office), 5.
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demanded the equivalent of the money to be paid in cattle, horses, harnesses
and wagons. Chief Spotted Tail stated, “I want to live on the interest of my
money. (Received for the loss of the Black Hills)…I will trade some of it for
stock to raise cattle…we want some good cattle every year.” According to the
“Final Proposition of Council IV of 1875” the United States government
promised to pay the Lakota for the loss of the Black Hills, “$50,000 for ten
years to be paid in good American cows and other livestock, and in such
implements of husbandry as are convenient to stock-growing and as may be
deemed advisable by the President.”25 While these negotiations failed, the
United States later forced the Lakota to cede the Black Hills by threats of
withholding annuities and military action.
Early attempts of the Lakota to establish a tribal cattle herd failed in
the face of various governmental policies. Farming continued as the focus of
federal policy despite the local Indian Agent’s own objections. In 1875 Agent
J. J. Saville stated in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that,
“the primary question of civilization is subsistence. This question presents
peculiar difficulties in this country. If the Indians become self-supporting, it
must be by the same pursuits that the white people engage in, viz, stock-
raising.”26 Nonetheless, cattle continued to be supplied to the Lakota only for
slaughter in order to meet the government’s obligations. 27
25 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1875-1876, Serial No. 1680, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1876) 690-693.
26 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1875-1876, Serial No. 1680, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1876) 753.
27 Statutes at Large, 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 639.
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Chapter Three looks at the first concerted efforts of the Oglala to
create a self-sustaining communal cattle herd and the effects of further United
States governmental manipulation of Oglala culture between 1877 and the
Sioux Bill of 1889. During this period the Lakota experienced both increased
success at building a tribal herd and further obstacles to the herd’s stability
and growth. The numbers of tribally owned cattle steadily increased during
this period, both from breeding efforts and government issued stock, to
approximately 7,000 head by 1888. Agent V.T. McGillycuddy noted that the,
“Indians have almost invariably herded their cattle well, and have raised
young stock in considerable numbers.”28
However, new obstacles appeared to hinder the establishment of a
sustainable herd. These included increased factionalism between full blood
Lakota and “white-husbands” and mixed blood Lakota, the divergent aims of
these two groups.29 Full bloods wished to maintain a common herd to provide
for all Lakota, while the others increasingly sought personal gain at the
expense of the tribe. Many of the latter groups aided off-reservation white
cattle operations by trespassing their cattle on tribal lands. Moreover,
increased governmental control of tribal cattle operations sought to institute an
individually owned market based system on the reservation. The most
significant event to hinder tribal cattle operations occurred in 1889. The
28 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1879-1880, Serial No. 1910, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1880), 75, 104, 145, and 355.
29 “White-husbands” is a term I will use to replace the historic term “squawmen,” which my
tribe finds exceedingly offensive. I chose this term because the white men who married
Indian women to gain access to Indian lands, ration, and annuity rights were taking advantage
of both the situation and the tribe as a whole.
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Sioux Bill passed on March 2nd, due mostly to pressure from surrounding
white cattle interests, which reduced the Great Sioux Reservation by nine
million acres and separated the tribe onto six smaller reservations, with the
Oglala remaining in southwestern South Dakota on Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation.30
For the ceded land the entire Lakota nation received a twenty year
extension of the educational provisions of the 1868 Treaty, thirty new day
schools, farm equipment, $1,000,000 of excess money from ceded land sales,
and 26,000 head of stock cows and 1,000 bulls.31 The Oglalas’ share of stock
came to 7,520 cows and 300 bulls.32 The tribe’s request for such large
numbers of cattle revealed the vital role the Oglala hoped cattle might play in
their economic future.
Chapter Four details the Oglala’s attempt to thwart the allotment plans
of the federal government despite increased tribal division and economic
interference. Between 1890 and 1904 the tribe managed to postpone
allotment through various political and economic strategies. The disparity
between the goals of the full blood majority and a mixed blood minority
continued to widen during these years. The beef ration had been cut in half in
1886 because of a new census and many Indians, mostly full bloods, ate their
30 Frederick Hoxie argues correctly that western politicians as well as eastern reformers led
the drive for allotment in order to gain access to Indian land and resources. See, Hoxie, A
Final Promise.
31 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., 1888-1889, Serial No. 2637, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1889), LXXIII.
32 Letter received by Captain Penney from Commissioner D. Browning, March 13, 1895,
General Records, Box 17, Jan. 6, 1891-march 28, 1895, Subject Arrangement: Finance, RG
75, NARA-KC.
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beef issue. While in 1889 the number of tribally owned cattle stood at 10,968
head, by 1891 it dropped to 7,982.33 This decrease occurred because Oglala
often slaughtered their stock animals in order to survive, such as in 1890 when
the tribe was forced to eat 700,000 pounds of their own stock to survive the
winter.34 The loss of almost 3,000 head occurred predominantly in herds
owned by full bloods. The numbers also offer a view into the growing
economic disparity on the reservation between the two groups. The mixed
bloods and “advantage-men” owned 80% of the cattle on the reservation yet
made up only 20% of the overall population. Moreover, mixed bloods and
“advantage-men” received the lions share of governmental supplies and either
legally or illegally sought to control reservation resources supporting the cattle
herds, such as cedar posts, water, grazing lands, and wire.
Government Indian Agents and other bureaucrats exacerbated this
growing economic and social division, either knowingly or unwittingly, by
favoring “the more progressive” sorts of Indians, who were inevitably mixed
bloods operating in the regional market economy. Evidence of this appears in
letters, invoices, and receipts that reveal that not only were mixed bloods
better supplied but they also provided 75% of the Indian cattle sold to the
government to meet its ration obligations during this period. Nonetheless, the
Oglala as a tribe, both full blood and mixed blood, continued to either labor,
33 The 1889 herd size can be found in, Executive Document, House of Representatives,
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial No.
2725, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), 156. The 1891 herd size can be
found in, Paul M. Robertson, “The Power of the Land,” 56.
34 Executive Document, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong., 2nd sess., 1890-1891, Serial No. 2841, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1891), 50.
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raise stock or crops, and hunt in order to supplement the government’s
notoriously meager rations.
Chapter Five examines the last struggles of the Oglala on Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation to implement their economic vision. The final threat to
their vision emanated from the desire of the federal government to lease tribal
lands to off-reservation cattle businesses. Two economic developments
largely inform this era: the simultaneous threats of allotment and leasing on
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. The passing of the Dawes Allotment Act of
1889 had yet to greatly affect the Oglala on Pine Ridge before the Burke Act,
which declared that the Secretary of the Interior could deem Indians
“competent” and thus be granted fee simple title to their allotments. Shortly
following the Burke Act allotment on Pine Ridge moved at a greatly increased
rate because white farmers and ranchers desirous of Indian lands saw a golden
opportunity. Once and Indian was granted fee simple title to land he or she
could sell the land immediately, and avoid the 25 year trust period
implemented by the 1889 Dawes Act. As a result the Lower Brulé, Rosebud,
and Pine Ridge Reservations were soon divested of large tracts of land.
Allotment proceeded on Pine Ridge until the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934.
Despite many obstacles the Oglala remained dynamic agents of their own
futures throughout the early reservation era. They consciously sought to
implement a sustainable Lakota cattle herd as their new economic foundation,
and when thwarted by various obstacles they diversified their economic
strategies in order to provide for their tribe. The Oglala dynamically strove to
maintain both their culture and tribal identity through the establishment of a
sound reservation economy. And while they ultimately failed to maintain
economic and political autonomy within the reservation system their culture
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and tribal identity remain indelibly to this day.
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CHAPTER ONE
Coming Home: The Return to Paha Sapa, 1750-1868
Beginnings are important. Our beginning is a simple one: there was
only Inyan and Han, substance and blackness, one straining with the power of
Wakan Tanka (The Great Mystery) the other only darkness. Inyan then
poured his azure blood from his veins to create Maka, the earth. By the time
the Lakota people emerged from beneath Paha Sapa, or the Black Hills, the
world and its myriad powers and spirits and flora and fauna, already inhabited
the earth. As the tribe’s place of birth, the Black Hills, located in
southwestern South Dakota and northeast Wyoming, occupies a vital spiritual
and spatial place within Lakota culture. These dark and powerful peaks
marked both the geographical location of life’s genesis and the womb from
which the tribe sprang. In other words, these hills are both the Lakota’s
primordial mother and home. It is the conduit and place of cultural birth.
However, the emergence of the Lakota people upon the earth was a wrenching
experience, much like any birth experience.35
The Lakota, like the buffalo, existed originally in the heart of the earth.
Then one day Iktomi, the trickster god who possessed great wisdom and yet
greater mischief, sought to bring Pte, or people, to the surface. You see,
Iktomi grew tired of tormenting the animal peoples of the world. Their
reactions to his pranks failed to satisfy the jokester because they lacked the
capacity for embarrassment and humiliation. Humans seemed the perfect
answer. Iktomi sought out Tokahe of the human people, and promised him a
wonderful life in the world. As a demonstration of his credibility Iktomi had
35 James R. Walker, Raymond J. DeMallie and Elaine A. Jahner, eds. Lakota Belief and Ritual
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991) 50-54.
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wolves leave a quantity of meat and hides in a cave near the surface of the
earth and told Tokahe to partake in their sensual rewards. He convinced the
wolves to do this by promising never to torment them again with his malicious
pranks.
Once Tokahe partook in the meat and wore the furs he decided to take
his family to live on the surface. Iktomi promised to provide for the people
once they inhabited the earth. A debate ensued among the people, and finally
Tokahe convinced six other families to venture to the surface to enjoy their
new life. These seven families eventually grew into the seven tribes of the
Oćeti Śakowin, or “Seven Council Fires”, which made up the entire nation: the
Mdewakanton, Wahpeton, Wahpekute, Sisseton (Dakota), Yankton,
Yanktonai (Nakota), and Teton (Lakota).
Of course once Iktomi’s plan came to fruition he abandoned the Lakota
and reveled in their misery as they wondered the earth hungry and naked.
Fortunately for the people, Wazi and Kanka, or the wizard and the witch, took
pity upon the human people and showed them how to care for themselves in a
chaotic and troublesome world. As the humans wandered across the earth
much conflict existed between humans and other peoples, including the
buffalo. Centuries later an Oglala Lakota named Left Heron noted that during
this time “there was no social organization and the people ran around the
prairie like so many wild animals.”36
Thus ensued a time of great wondering as the Lakota left the region of
Paha Sapa in order to make a life for themselves above ground. According to
Lakota beliefs the tribe moved north and east, eventually reaching present day
36 Raymond J. DeMallie and Douglas R. Parks, eds., Sioux Indian Religion: Tradition and
Innovation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 30, 52.
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Canada and the eastern United States. From there the Lakota migrated to the
Ohio River Valley and Great Lakes regions near the headwaters of the Upper
Mississippi River. It is location that historians first find reference to the
Dakota tribe from observations of early fur traders. Spurred by a growingly
remunerative trade in furs the French ventured as far west as present day
Green Bay in search of pelts by 1639. There while trading with the Oupegon
(Winnebago) a Frenchman named Nicollet first heard of a powerful nation 18
days journey west called the Dakotas. Within several decades of this
encounter the Teton branch of the Dakota commenced their migration
westward across the Great Plains to the Black Hills, back to the place of their
birth. It would be a long and difficult journey, but one that led the Lakota to
the zenith of Native American iconoclasm within American historical
consciousness. However, most archaeologists and historians disagree
considerably concerning the Lakota’s place of origin.37
Contemporary academic studies argue that Siouan-speaking peoples
originally migrated across the Bering Straits between 9,000 and 12,000 years
ago. Recent studies also speculate that the groups that one day formed the
tribes of the “Seven Council Fires” once belonged to the periphery of the great
Mississippian Culture that dominated the Mississippi River valley and traded
actively with tribes from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains, and
from Canada to the Gulf Coast. This culture arose during seventh century and
lasted until the fifteenth century when a combination of resource depletion
and warfare (either internal, external, or both) ended the last and greatest of
37 Daniel Buck, Indian Outbreaks (Minneapolis: Ross & Haines, Inc., 1965) 11-15. See also,
Gary Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper
Mississippi Valley, 1650-1862 (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1997); and
Royal B. Hassrick, The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1964)
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the mound building societies.38
Upon the collapse of the Mississippian Culture a significant period of
tribal reorganization and regrouping occurred. Core societies closest to the
center of Mississippian Culture at Cahokia near present day St. Louis,
suffered the most wrenching adjustments. Out of the fragmentation of these
groups arose tribes such as the Natchez and Caddo, Apalachee and Alabamos.
Peripheral groups, those connected primarily through trade or language,
struggled against one another for regional resources once the great trade
network collapsed. These tribes included the Hodenosaunee (Iroquois
Confederacy) and Susquehannocks, and the Anishinaabe (Chippewa) and
Dakota (Sioux). During the centuries following the collapse of the
Mississippian Culture the Oćeti Śakowin are believed to have inhabited lands
just west of the Great Lakes region. What is agreed upon by both the Lakota
and historians is that following the Mississippian’s collapse the Dakota culture
of the “Seven Council Fires” developed a complex society well-adapted to
this region. There they established themselves as a significant presence in
what is today the state of Minnesota.39
It is important to note that the Oćeti Śakowin did not represent a true
national political entity. Historically, the Iroquois occupy the most familiar
model of political unity and connection at that level. The five tribes of the
38 Joseph B. Thoburn, “The Tropical and Subtropical Origins of Mound-Builder Cultures,”
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. 16, No. 3 (March 1938), 97-117; John R. Swanton & Roland
B. Dixon, “Primitive American History,” American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 16, No.
3 (September 1914), 376-412; Lyle Campbell, American Indigenous Language (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997), See chapter three for his discussion concerning Siouan
language patterns.
39 Thomas E. Emerson, Cahokia and the Hinterlands: Middle Mississippian Cultures of the
Midwest (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1991); John F. Scarry, ed., Political
Structure and Change in the Prehistoric Southeastern United States (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 1996); and Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., 500 Nations: An Illustrated History of
North American Indians (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 1994), 35-45.
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Iroquois Confederacy (Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk)
created a central council of 250 men who sought a political consensus on
decisions that affected the entire Iroquois Nation. This council was made up
of 50 men from each tribe who had to weigh the concerns of their tribe against
those of the entire nation. This type of political infrastructure and solidarity
never emerged between the seven tribes of the Oćeti Śakowin. Undoubtedly,
the tribes that comprised the “Seven Council Fires” consulted one another on
topics of diplomacy, warfare, and trade; they did not function as one nation.
Each tribe possessed the freedom to choose another path because no political
consensus was ever sought at that level. Instead, the “Seven Council Fires”
existed as a nation of people who shared a common language, religion,
history, and social structure founded upon kinship relationships.40
This complex and adaptable society operated within a stratified
political structure designed to provide both efficient economic production and
effective political protection from disparate outside groups. Both villages and
tribes formed councils to direct their affairs. Early historical records indicate
that tribal councils focused mainly on diplomatic relations with other tribes.
Council decisions required strong consensus among its members, usually
arrived at after long discussion. As one may imagine, a chief’s oratory skills
played a central role in his success or failure as a leader of his people within
this political framework. While it is worth noting that these accounts offer
glimpses only into late 17th and early 18th Dakota culture, it is doubtful
notable changes had yet occurred to political workings following contact with
Europeans.
40 The seminal work regarding the colonial era of the Iroquois Nation is, Daniel K. Richter’s,
The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European
Colonization (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992).
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Interestingly, most civil chiefs arose to their leadership position
through paternal descent. However, this hereditary turnover of power rested
solely upon each man’s individual societal skills. A young man being
groomed for power first needed to demonstrate his skills as a hunter and
warrior, and then as a leader of these enterprises. He must also show a
willingness to think first of the needs of his family and tribe over his own. To
provide for his family and protect them from danger were his primary duties.
Only after proving his worth in those tasks could he gain the ear of the tribal
elders who led the council.41
The political and social foundation of Oćeti Śakowin culture lay with
extended family units that, when they worked and lived together, formed
larger and more politically complex villages and tribes. At the village level
the councils of civil chiefs primarily discussed resource acquisition,
development, allocation, and distribution, as well as both intra and inter-tribal
diplomacy. At all political levels, extended family, village, and tribal, social
relationships connected and maintained both a strong group affinity and
identity. Blood, affinal, and fictive kinship ties provided reciprocal obligatory
ties that helped alleviate intra-tribal conflicts and engender a communally
focused outlook on life. This communal outlook aided considerably the
economic wellbeing of the tribe following the loss of the considerable trade
network that once emanated from Cahokia, the central and largest city within
the last and greatest mound building culture.
Undoubtedly influenced by the political economy of the Mississippian
Culture the Dakota developed a diverse economy founded upon trade, hunting
by men, and both gathering and nominal agricultural production by women.
41 Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind.
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The Dakota did not pursue agriculture more intensively because of the
consistent availability of corn and other crops through active trade networks
with tribes from both the Missouri River and Wisconsin areas. It is not clear
if these trade networks were remnants of the fallen Mississippian Culture or
newly formed regional links. In either case, this trade provided the Dakota
sufficient corn and other crops to make extensive horticultural pursuits
unnecessary to for the tribe.
Moreover, the ecological diversity of the region provided a wide
variety of hunting and gathering opportunities. Numerous lakes and rivers
yielded fish and waterfowl and the woods provided a bounty of game animals
such as deer, moose, bear, beaver, elk, rabbit, and more. As the men and boys
hunted the women gathered roots, nuts, berries, and during the early fall wild
rice and corn. This environmental variety also influenced the Dakota’s spatial
mobility.
Because each ecosystem yielded its bounty at a different time of the
month or year the Dakota remained perpetually on the move. One early
account by André Pénigault noted that the tribe was, “always wandering,” and
rarely settled in one spot for more than eight days.42 More significantly, the
tribe’s mobility allowed both flora and fauna time to recover their numbers
once the Dakota moved toward new territory. Once the Dakota entered the
market economy of the fur trade in the early eighteenth century their
willingness to travel gave them access to both more numerous and diverse
game. The Dakota widened their catch to include far more otter, mink, fisher,
raccoon, badger, wolverine, martin and fox. Unfortunately, the Dakota hunted
out most of the more valuable fur bearing critters within their territorial
42 Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind, 2.
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control by the late 1700s. By the early nineteenth century the vast majority of
pelts acquired by the tribe came from muskrats, which failed to provide
adequate resource exchange to significantly contribute to tribal sustenance.43
The Dakota tribe’s mobility and need for large hunting areas in which
to acquire sufficient foodstuffs may have expedited the geographical dispersal
of the original tribes of the “Seven Council Fires”: the Mdewakantons,
Wahpetons, Wahpekutes, and Sissetons (known collectively as the Santee or
Dakota) who remained near the headwaters of the upper Mississippi; the
Yankton and Yanktonai (collectively called the Nakota) who migrated to the
northern Great Plains territories in western Minnesota and eastern North
Dakota, and the Teton (the Lakota) who eventually moved westward across
the Great Plains and their eventual homecoming to the Black Hills region.44
During the period following the collapse of the Mississippian Culture
the Oglala Lakota, members of the Teton branch of the Siouan peoples and the
focus of this work, dwelt in the Ohio River Valley. The Lakota were
comprised of seven different tribes. These were the Oglala, Brule, Hunkpapa,
Minniconjou, San Arc, Two Kettles, and Sihasapa. It is the Oglala Lakota
who will be the subject of the remainder of this study. They were forced to
migrate westward by the wars prosecuted by the more organized and better-
armed Iroquois in the early seventeenth century.45 The Oglala then settled
near the headwaters of the Mississippi River. They remained in this region
until approximately 1670 when “abundant beaver and the ready food supply
43 Mary K. Whelan, “Dakota Indian Economics and the Nineteenth-Century Fur Trade,”
Ethnohistory, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), 246-276.
44Ibid; Richard White, “The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 65, No. 2
(September, 1978), 319-343.
45Herbert S. Schell, History of South Dakota (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968),
18.
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provided by the buffalo herds lured them into the open lands.”46
Continued migration of various bands of the “Seven Council Fires”
bolstered both the numbers and momentum of the Lakota westward move.
These bands sought both the new opportunities emerging on the plains and
safety and peace from continued pressure of both the Anishinaabe, formerly
referred to as the Chippewa, and Ohio River Valley migrants fleeing
continued Iroquois attacks. A devastating defeat at the hands of the
Anishinaabe in 1737 possibly provided even more incentive to other members
of the “Seven Council Fires” to seek the trading opportunities offered by
plains buffalo and beaver and the relative safety of the prairies. According to
French records, over 500 Dakota died in a three day battle with the better
armed Anishinaabe. Undoubtedly, facing such options many bands chose to
follow the Lakota migration west.47
However, the Lakota’s westward migration altered more than the
tribe’s geographical location. As the Lakota entered a new ecological and
environmental reality it led to significant political, social, and economic
changes within their culture. The acquisition of horse in the early eighteenth
century more than any other factor influenced much of the Lakota’s cultural
transformation. As the Lakota moved across the Great Plains tribal population
concentration dissipated as groups sought out the widely scattered buffalo
herds. This population diffusion led to a political decentralization. Lakota
political connections within the tribe, rooted in kinship relationships,
remained in place, but became more egalitarian as mobility became more
46 White, “The Winning of the West,” 322.
47 Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind, 47.
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necessary with the acquisition of the horse.48
As the Lakota transformed into an equestrian nomadic culture a
pastoral way of life became necessary. Horses, like the buffalo, needed to
move about almost constantly in order to find fresh grass and water after they
had denuded an area of those resources. More importantly, horses greatly
increased the tribe’s geographic mobility. They moved farther and faster than
they ever had before. This movement led Lakota political system to adapt to
new demographic realities. As smaller concentrations of Lakota spread across
the plains the chiefs lost physical connection to a significant portion of the
tribal population. As a result there was not a need or inclination to either
listen to or seek guidance concerning everyday life for tribal members. In
other words, the demographic transformation that occurred following the
migration from the Minnesota territory facilitated the evolution toward a more
egalitarian political structure.
The transformation to a buffalo centered economy fundamentally
altered the Lakota’s political economy. As previously mentioned, the tribe
became highly mobile as it shifted to a pastoral existence. However, the tribe
also divested itself from its agricultural trade network and put less importance
on the gathering or harvesting of the flora. The most significant practice that
the Lakota abandoned centered on their fall harvesting of wild rice and corn in
the months of September and October. This cultural transformation is most
vividly seen in the differences that developed concerning the naming of the
moons, or months, of the year. As demonstrated in Table No. 1, a clear
48 For information concerning the dispersal of horses on the Great Plains see, Pekka
Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Culture,” The Journal of American
History Vol. 90, No. 3 (December 2003), 833-862; and James F. Brooks, Captives & Cousins:
Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 2002), Chapters 5, 6.
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environmentally influenced demarcation developed between the Dakota who
remained in Minnesota territory and those who moved west onto the Great
Plains.
The most notable differences occurred in spring and fall during the
months of March, April, May, June, August, September, and November. All
of these months reveal a dramatic shift from a horticultural focused economy
to one centered on hunting buffalo. March shifted from a time of snow
blinding conditions to a time when buffalo give birth. The month of April
reveals a transportational change from canoe to horse. May changed
dramatically from agriculture, The Planting Moon, to a pastoral focused
month, The Moon When Ponies Shed. In June Strawberries are replaced by
the rendering of fat from buffalo carcasses. And finally, August and
September also marked a shift to pastoral, The Moon of Drying Grass and the
Moon When Calves Grow Hair, from an agricultural, The Harvest Moon and
the Moon when Rice is Laid up to Dry. Clearly, as the Lakota evolved they
moved away from the more hierarchical political system they employed
previously.49
49 For reference to Dakota moons see, Whelan, “Dakota Indian Economics and the
Nineteenth-Century Fur Trade,” 249-250; For Lakota moons see, Hassrick, The Sioux, 174;
and Walker, Lakota Belief and Ritual, 201-203.
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Table No. 1: Calendar Comparison
Gregorian Calendar Dakota Calendar Lakota
Calendar
January The Hard Moon Moon of Frost in
Tepee
February Raccoon Moon Moon of Dark
Red Calves
March Sore-Eye Moon Moon when
Buffalo Drop
Calves
April Moon when Geese Lay
Their Eggs
Or
Moon when Streams are
again Navigable
Moon of Red
Grass Appearing
Or
Moon when the
ducks come
back
May The Planting Moon Moon When
Ponies Shed
June Moon when Strawberries
are ripe
Moon of Making
Fat
July Moon when the Choke
Cherries are Ripe
Or
Moon when the Geese Shed
their Feathers
Moon when
Cherries are
Ripe
August Harvest Moon Moon of Drying
Grass
September Moon when Rice is Laid up
to Dry
Moon when
Calves Grows
Hair
October Drying Rice Moon Moon of Falling
Leaves
November Deer Rutting Moon Moon of the
Hairless Calves
December Moon when Deer Shed
Their Horns
Moon when
Deer Shed Their
Horns
Or
Tree Popping
Moon
It should be noted that sources sometimes disagree as to which
Gregorian months belong with which Dakota and Lakota moons. However,
the differences are in wording with the exception of sometimes switching the
Lakota naming for the months of December and January.
The devolution of the Lakota from a village or regional polity to a
family centered society inherently brought about a shift toward political
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egalitarianism. As a result of this political leveling Lakota bands became
more politically flexible and adaptable. Tiospaye (extended family units) or
bands possessed both the freedom to go their own way and choose their own
strategies as well as the option of uniting for coordinated action against
outside groups. For the Lakota’s perception of the world viewed people as
either kin or enemies.50
The Lakota’s bifurcated perception of the world made them
disagreeable neighbors for the tribes they came into contact with as they
migrated west. For the Lakota, in fact for all Oćeti Śakowin, the world was
comprised of either friends or enemies. Friends of the Lakota included only
those with kinship ties, such as the Nakota and Dakota, or those with whom
they traded. And the exchange of goods occurred only after first establishing
social bonds through gift giving and reciprocal exchanges. Tribes such as the
Otoe, Ponca, and Omaha enjoyed none of these positions and were forced to
flee either southward or westward in the face of the Lakota advance.51
Unfortunately for these tribes, the Lakota followed, settling in the
regions east of the Missouri River by the mid-eighteenth century. However, at
this time the powerful Arikara nation temporarily halted the Lakota’s
westward advance. These more sedentary peoples at first fled before the
Lakota during the first half of the century; however, bolstered by the
acquisition of horses and metal weapons they successfully withstood the
encroachment of the ambitious Lakota. The Arikara remained an obstacle to
westward expansion until a smallpox epidemic swept away approximately
50 Allen W. Johnson & Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging
Groups to Agrarian State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).
51 Raymond DeMallie, ed., Lakota Society (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 13-
15, 84-86. See also Whelan, “Dakota Indian Economics and the Nineteenth-Century Fur
Trade,” 246-276.
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80% of their population from 1772 to 1780. During the first half of the
eighteenth century the Oglala Lakota, who with the Brulé spearheaded the
Lakota advance, also obtained horses and began their journey toward western
legend. Notably, when the Oglala crossed the Missouri River they numbered
no more than twenty to forty lodges. Yet, “once across the Missouri their
small numbers did not deter them from pushing boldly out into the open plains
where they quickly obtained horses and were soon roving widely, hunting
buffalo, and fighting enemies on all sides.”52
Toward the end of the eighteenth century the Teton, Yankton, and
Yanktonais remained on the eastern prairies. They maintained relations with
the Dakota and attended their trade fairs, first at Blue Earth River and later at
the Yanktonai settlements near the James and Cheyenne Rivers. While trade
remained a significant part of Lakota political economy during this time the
tribe turned more consistently toward buffalo hunting as their primary
economic resource. They led a bi-annual existence centered on winter beaver
trapping and summer buffalo hunts. The Lakota quickly came to dominated
the territory east of the Missouri River, but well-armed and numerous
agricultural tribes blocked further westward advancement.53
The powerful Arikara, and their northern neighbors the Mandan and
Hidatsa, proved such a formidable obstacle that some bands of Lakota briefly
settled near the Arikara and farmed. Moreover, further south on the Missouri
River drainage the Omaha blocked a Lakota southern push. The Lakota
52George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1937), 21. This text offers an outstanding history of the
Oglala, Lakota before 1877, their movements and inter and intra-tribal relations.
53 White, “The Winning of the West,”; and Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains
Indian Horse Cultures,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 90, No. 3 (December, 2003),
833-862.
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continued to both trade for and raid for horses from these tribes; nonetheless,
they lacked the strength to force a corridor across the Missouri River.
Unfortunately for the sedentary agriculturalists, between 1780 and 1795 a
smallpox epidemic swept through the Missouri River Valley. It especially
devastated the more sedentary village tribes and as a result the Lakota pushed
the remaining few Arikara villages north and opened a wide path for further
westward migration.54
Shortly after the turn of the century French and Spanish traders
demanded more buffalo hides, which led the tribe to turn further away from
trapping and seek greater access to the vast buffalo herds of the northern
plains. The conflicts that arose between the Lakota and other regional tribes
evolved into a territorial war. As the Lakota turned more fully toward a
buffalo-centered culture they inherently required access to both fertile hunting
grounds and pasturage for their growing horse herds. For the Arikara,
Mandan, and Hidatsa this eventually meant a form of servitude to the
dominant Lakota tribes. For decades the Lakota demanded corn and other
agricultural products from these tribes with either no, or very little,
recompense. Moreover, after a rough introduction the Lakota found a new
ally in their move toward regional control.55
In September of 1804 the Lewis and Clark Expedition had a rather
tense meeting with a group of Lakota on the banks of the Bad River.
Unimpressed with the threats or demands of the expedition the Lakota Chiefs
firmly asked for tobacco and other goods. Tragedy was averted when the
54 Ibid.
55 White, “The Winning of the West,” 1978; and Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains
Indian Horse Cultures,” 2003. James O. Gump, The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation
of the Zulu and the Sioux (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
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Lakota Chief Black Buffalo allowed the American party to continue on its
way despite what the tribe viewed as rather meager gifts of tobacco and a few
medals and a hat. Despite this less than peaceful introduction the United
States eventually became close allies of the Lakota through both trade and
military aid. For example, the Lakota aided at least two punitive American
expeditions against the Arikara during the first quarter of the 1800s.
Moreover, in 1838 Joshua Pilcher, the upper Missouri agent for the United
States, sent his report to Congress claiming that no greater friend to the Untied
States existed within his jurisdiction.56
By the 1830s the Oglala and Brulé tribes reached the Black Hills and
formed an alliance with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe. The
Lakota continued to maintain access to American goods; the most important
being guns, powder and shot, through trade with the American Fur Company,
the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, or free traders. However, tensions on the
northern plains rose as the fur trade dwindled and competition between tribes
led to almost constant warfare over hunting and grazing territory.57
These tensions were exacerbated with the opening of the Oregon Trail
and flow of migrants across the Great Plains. The American settlers brought
disease and hunger to several bands of Lakota. By 1845 the Oglala
complained that the settlers had hunted out the buffalo north of the Platte
River. The United States government, hoping to lesson these growing
tensions and protect American lives purchased Fort Laramie from the
American Fur Company and turned into a military post. The United States
56 Stephen E. Ambrose, Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the
Opening of the West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 165-175; White, “The Winning of
the West,” 1978; and Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures,” 2003.
57 Robert W. Larson, Red Cloud: Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1997).
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Congress provided funds for a peace conference at Horse Creek in 1851, after
considerable lobbying from Colonel David D. Mitchell, in order to bring
peace to the region. Eight tribes, including the Lakota, Cheyenne, Arapahoe,
Shoshone, and Crow signed the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie. However, from
the Lakota perspective the treaty merely confirmed their territorial conquests
and did not require that they cease their expansion. As a result inter-tribal
warfare continued unabated.58
This shift toward almost constant warfare meant that warrior societies
and war chiefs gained considerable political influence within Lakota culture.
While the tribe’s social structure remained centered around the tiospaye the
flexible nature of this system allowed larger groups to gather either for the
purpose of defense or raiding. In these cases tribal war chiefs possessed
unusual power over these extended gatherings. Other cultural evolutions are
worth examining in relation to the Lakota’s migration to the Great Plains.59
As previously mentioned, as the tribe changed their geographical
location a concomitant evolution occurred within Lakota society itself. The
beginning of the eighteenth century saw dramatic shifts in Lakota economic
and political structure as the tribe migrated to the prairies and plains and
started hunting the vast herds of buffalo that occupied these grasslands. Prior
to this migration the Lakota occupied deciduous woodlands forests spider-
webbed with abundant waterways. The Dakota used canoes as their primary
method of transportation, and proceeded on foot otherwise. They harvested
wild rice, maple sugar, and corn, and hunted the disparate variety of game
animals that occupied headwaters of the Mississippi River. Furthermore, they
58 Larson, Red Cloud, 1997; and White, “The Winning of the West,” 1978.
59 Hassrick, The Sioux, 1964; Larson, Red Cloud, 1997; Catherine Price, The Oglala People,
1841-1879 A Political History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).
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possessed a stratified political structure where leadership was often hereditary.
After the western migration toward the Great Plains from Minnesota, the
Lakota could be characterized as loosely organized pastoral equestrian
nomadic hunters who depended upon vast herds of buffalo.60
From the period between 1750 and 1868 the Oglala people also
experienced dramatic changes within their material culture. In the mid-
eighteenth century the tribe used dog and human power to traverse the open
plains. With the acquisition and utilization of horses as beasts of burden the
tribe dramatically increased its range. An Indian pony could carry eight times
more than an Indian dog and travel three times farther in a single day. As a
result the tribe possessed the ability to greatly expand their material
possessions. Trade items acquired from various operations, including the
Hudson Bay Company, accumulated within Lakota families. 61
However, the most significant contribution made by the horse was as a
hunting tool. Mounted hunters provided the tribe far greater accessibility to
the vast herds of buffalo that roamed the plain’s oceans of grasslands. It was
during this century and a half that buffalo became the center of Lakota culture
and economy. Buffalo provided the tribes with food from the meat and
organs, shelter and clothing from its hides, and much more. Without the vast
herds of buffalo it is doubtful that the Lakota, or any other Great Plains tribe,
such as the Blackfoot or Comanche, would have possessed such great
numbers or power in their respective territories. It is also significant to note
60 Whelan, “Dakota Indian Economics and the Nineteenth-Century Fur Trade,” 246-276;
Kathleen Pickering, “Decolonizing Time Regimes: Lakota Conceptions of Work, Economy,
and Society,” American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, No. 1, New Series (March, 2004), 85-
97;Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind; Royal B. Hassrick, The Sioux: Life and Customs of a
Warrior Society (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964).
61 H. Clyde Wilson, “An Inquiry into the Nature of Plains Indian Cultural Development,”
American Anthropologist, (1963, vol. 65), 355-369.
42
that buffalo played a central role within Oglala religion, and the sudden loss of
the great herds undoubtedly brought about significant societal and
cosmological angst.
Interestingly, while cattle later were used by the Oglala to replace
buffalo as a food source, they never joined the phalanx of animals which
occupied Lakota religious beliefs and cosmology. Both the rapidity of the
Lakota’s loss of both the buffalo and their independence, coupled with cattle’s
association with whites, provided the tribe little opportunity or desire to find
religious significance within cattle. Nonetheless, with the addition of the
horse the tribe’s energy production and mobility increased dramatically, and
the Oglala grew more numerous and powerful. However, during this period
the tribe’s concepts of space and place, both spiritually and geographically,
evolved as well.
Oglala perception of space and place involved a complex duality
between the spiritual realm and the physical world in which the two both
affected, and were affected by, the other. Therefore, in order to more clearly
articulate this evolution one must differentiate between perceptions of
“horizontal geography,” or physical geography-power and identity, and
“vertical geography,” or the tribe’s religious and cosmological perceptions of
space and place. In order to reveal the changing aspects of “vertical” and
“horizontal geography” during the early reservation period one must first
explore Oglala concepts of space and place before the reservation years.62
62 The “schema theory” promulgated by Michael E. Harkin, in “Carnival and Authority:
Heiltsuk Cultural Models of Power,” Ethos, vol. 24, No. 2. (June, 1996), 281-313, brilliantly
delineates the duality inherent in many Native American cosmologies. In his essay he
presents a nuanced study of what he believes is a dialectical struggle between “sacred power”
and “power of authority or law.”
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During the centuries prior to spatial confinement within reservation
boundaries the Oglala possessed an incredibly complex, flexible, and yet well-
defined relationships with the world in which all things were unified by their
possession of wakan, or power. These powers existed both within the
physical and metaphysical realms. Within their spatial cosmology the Oglala
viewed the world around them as inhabited by beings of power stretching in
all six directions. For example, the wakan of the four horizontal directions
possessed vitally important cultural qualities: the west provided finality and
power, the north wisdom, the east enlightenment and rebirth, and the south
innocence and youth.63
Yet it was the vertical relationships to the sky and the earth the Oglala
viewed as possessing the most significance. For it was Inyan, the rock, who
bled himself dry to create the world, and Maka, the earth herself, who became
the mother and provider of all and from whose womb both mankind and
buffalo emerged, and Skan, the sky, who ultimately created the Lakota.64
Within this intricate cosmology the Oglala strove to find order within a
universe filled with chaos. They sought order from a deeper understanding of
Wakan Tanka, or the Great Mystery, universally defined by its
incomprehensibility.
63 Raymond J. DeMallie and Douglas R. Parks, eds., Sioux Indian Religion: Tradition and
Innovation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 79;
(http://wolf.mind.net/native/4dir.htm) Martin Red Bear, Sinte Gleshka Rosebud Reservation
Lakota University, from a beadwork design of the 1800s. While colors attributed to the four
directions vary from source to source the fundamental meanings of each indicates religious
homogeneity concerning their meaning within Lakota culture.
64 Raymond J. DeMallie and Elaine A. Jahner, eds., Lakota Belief and Ritual (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 50-54.
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Toward this end, the tribe turned to wicaša wakan, or shamans. These
Oglala spiritual leaders possessed a special connection to one or more aspects
of wakan, such as Tate, the father of the four winds. This connection enabled
the wicaša wakan to interpret and therefore placate, entreat, or please specific
wakan.65 What is notable culturally is that tribal dependence upon wicaša
wakan and the rituals, dances, and the ceremonies they provided required a
significant amount of cultural and cosmological flexibility. New methods of
appeasing wakan, gained by visions and vision quests, needed immediate
incorporation into Oglala spiritual frameworks.
The most notable example of this is the gift of the buffalo calf pipe
brought to the tribe by White Buffalo Women. This gift cemented a kinship
relationship between the buffalo and the Oglala, thus ending a period of
chaotic warfare between the two peoples. As the buffalo and Oglala united in
kinship much of the chaos in the universe was extinguished because the pipe
offered a direct connection to Wakan Tanka, and the power of the White
Buffalo Women herself was found in its smoke.66 Other significant spiritual
adaptations included the Sun Dance and Ghost Dance, each seeking to instill
order in a complex world. Black Elk elucidated this vertical relationship
clearly when he stated, “we know that we are related and are one with all
things of the heaven and the earth, and we know that all things that move are a
people as we.” As the Lakota were experiencing these dramatic cosmological
65 DeMallie and Parks, Sioux Indian Religion, 28-30.
66 Ibid, 31.
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and cultural changes during the years between 1750 and 1868, so to did
another rapidly expanding regional power.67
The recently formed United States of America came to occupy a
significant place within Lakota diplomatic discussions. Once the United
States gained independence from England it quickly and significantly
expanded its borders through treaties with both European and Indian nations.
(It should be noted that most treaties with Indian nations occurred either
through trade dependency or through the threat of military conquest). The
United States greatly expanded its borders while concomitantly developing an
Indian policy based on a complex combination of intellectual ideologies,
political developments, popular mien, and emerging anthropological theory.68
The beliefs and popular attitudes that would soon so greatly influence
the Oglala coalesced from decades, if not centuries, of European contact with
other indigenous tribes scattered across the Americas. By the turn of the
nineteenth century many American intellectuals believed that Native
Americans must be absorbed into white society, and ultimately through
miscegenation they might eventually become white skinned men and women.
This process entailed the transformation of barbarous heathens into sedentary
and industrious Christians. It mattered little to American policy makers what
disparate types of culture these various tribes might enjoy. Their existence
depended on accepting incorporation into white society. The ideas and
actions of American leaders who delineated early United States federal Indian
67 Joseph Epes Brown, ed., The Sacred Pipe: Black Elk’s account of the Seven Rites of the
Oglala Sioux (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), 79.
68 Frederick E. Hoxie redefined the historiography concerning the importance of policy
experts and reformers in shaping American Indian policy in the mid and late nineteenth
century by noting Indian policy derived from the broad landscape of American culture
experience in A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln:
The University of Nebraska Press, 1984).
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policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries evolved from a
seventeenth century intellectual movement in Europe.69
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries European
civilization functioned under the influences of the Enlightenment. Belief in
the attributes of science superseded those of religious dogma in the minds of
most European leaders. In the eyes of most occidental societies nineteenth
century western civilization represented the culmination of thousands of years
of human development. This firm belief in the superiority and righteousness
of western society led to the inevitable conclusion that any culture that
differed from theirs possessed inherent flaws. It also implied that the leaders
of western civilization possessed a moral obligation not only to themselves
but to their descendants to insure the Indians’ survival and inclusion into
western culture. And since Native American societies appeared hopelessly
inferior they by default must be aided in their evolution toward civilization.
But how did one go about repairing, or elevating, these unfortunate people?
One did so by reshaping Native Americans into a model of one’s own
citizens.70
In order to complete this seemingly benevolent and necessary task the
intellectual philanthropists needed to gain the support of the newly formed
69 Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974). See Part Two: Program for a discussion of
this ideology and belief system.
70 For leading studies concerning the ideological roots of race in America see, Barbara Fields,
“Ideology and Race in American History,” in, Region, Race and Reconstruction: Essays in
Honor of C. Vann Woodward, J. Morgan Kousser and James McPherson, eds. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982), 143-177; and Winthrop D. Jordan’s, The Whiteman’s
Burden: Historical Origins of Racism in the United States (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1974) and, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968); for an examination of race and
identity as a negotiated concept within a European/Native American context see, John Demos,
The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story From Early America (New York: Vintage Books,
1994) and, James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania
Frontier (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).
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government of the United States of America. This task was made easier by
the fact that most American intellectuals gained some form of political power
following the American Revolution. Thomas Jefferson for example, was a
great proponent of the transformation of native peoples into productive
American citizens. Because of the beliefs of Jefferson and his contemporaries
the federal government sought to create a system that would allow Indians to
evolve so they might one day join mankind’s march to perfection. In other
words Native Americans might survive, but only by forsaking their own
culture for another.
For most of the nineteenth century one word characterized Indian
policy and the goal of the federal government towards Native Americans—
assimilation. The American government pursued a policy that attempted to
transform Native American cultures into a mirror image of American society
centered upon the yeoman farmer as a model. Native Americans were
encouraged not only to pursue farming as a vocation but also to do so using
accepted European or American methods of horticulture. This meant that
tribes such as the Iroquois of the north, and the Creek of the south, who
already practiced extensive agricultural pursuits, needed to adopt new
methods of farming. However, this seemingly innocuous reorganization of
the physical labor needed to harvest an adequate crop entailed dramatic
cultural adjustments for Native Americans.
Tribes such as the Creek, Cherokee, and others maintained matrilineal
social systems. This cultural characteristic gave women control over both the
land and crops, which they controlled and tended respectively. This allowed
tribal women far greater political and economic influence than their Anglo
counterparts. For example, women of the Iroquois tribe made decisions about
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when and where to plant and harvest their crops, which effectively gave
control of the tribe’s economy to them. They also maintained the ability to
call their men to war in order to revenge an attack from a neighboring tribe,
options unavailable to white women. Men on the other hand were expected to
provide protection and meat for the tribe, and maintain diplomatic relations
with both surrounding tribes and then whites, occupations that often found
them away from home for extended periods.
White perceptions of Iroquois culture, heavily influenced by Euro-
centrism, were of lazy men who lay about the village while the women slaved
away in the fields. Interestingly, the popular conception that European women
did not work the fields along side their men has been refuted by studies from
such noted historians as Laurel Thatcher Ulrich. She noted that the lives of
frontier women in America were extremely arduous. Besides caring for the
children and home, spinning cloth, churning butter and the hundreds of other
difficult tasks associated with “women’s work” during that time, they also
carried seed and plowed fields when necessary. The hypocrisy of this
situation failed to influence European policy and the program of assimilation
proceeded. However, assimilation of Native Americans into European society
as yeomen farmers, or any other occupation, faced the insurmountable
obstacle of racism. Unfortunately, the malignant stain of racism would
prevent Native American assimilation in the manner proposed by such
philanthropists as Thomas Jefferson. The pall of racism, coupled with both
political and economic difficulties often present when two vastly different
cultures meet, would prevent the Iroquois, Cherokee, and eventually the
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Lakota from participating equally with whites in American society.71
By the mid nineteenth century United States Indian policy experienced
significant conceptual and practical alterations. The belief in the eventual
assimilation of Native American peoples evolved as Indian peoples showed
little or no interest in completely rejecting their own cultures in favor of
another. The reservation system was implemented in order to allow Native
Americans more time to more fully understand the benefits offered by the
superior American culture. It also acted as a method to both spatially and
physically control Native Americans and a tool to prevent native/white
interaction, which often led to conflict. Ironically, by isolating Native
Americans from western culture reservations actually served to reinforce
Indian identity rather than break it down. Later in the nineteenth century well-
intentioned “reformers” such as Richard Henry Pratt, who founded the
Carlisle Boarding School for Indians in 1875, and Henry L. Dawes, author of
the Dawes Severalty Act, attempted to complete the transformation of Native
Americans into American citizens72. Pratt and his fellow reformers believed
“that there was only one way for the Indians to survive the onslaught of
progress: they would have to be swallowed up in the rushing tide of American
life and institutions.”73
71 For details of Iroquois society and the roles women played see the texts by Matthew
Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-
Century America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 27-31, 65-74; and the classic work
of Anthony F.C. Wallace. The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books,
1969), 21-48. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich brilliantly depicted the complex economic roles early
American women played in A Midwife’s Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on Her
Diary, 1785-1812 (San Francisco: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1990).
72 For studies pertaining to federal Indian policy see, Francis Paul Prucha, The Great White
Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, 2 Vols.(Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1984); and Robert Trennert, Alternative Reservation Policy, 1846-51
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975).
73 David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding
School Experience 1875-1928 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), 39.
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During the period between 1750 and 1868 the Oglala struggled with
both an expansionist American nation who threatened their regional
hegemony and with the increasingly rapid destruction of their buffalo centered
culture. The first half of the nineteenth century saw two expansionist powers
coexisting peacefully. The Lakota saw their population grow to
approximately 20,000 and they emerged as the dominant native power on the
Great Plains. The tribe enjoyed the zenith of its regional power as it fully
evolved into an equestrian nomadic society whose political economy
depended upon the buffalo. However, this complex process did not take place
in a regional vacuum, for the attitudes and ideologies brought by the white
invaders played a crucial role in the political and economic actions of the
Oglala Lakota.74
As noted above, tensions on the northern plains rose significantly with
the opening of the Oregon Trail and the reduction in trade. As the Lakota
developed an increasingly influential military cultural milieu concepts of
masculinity altered. Men who demonstrated martial abilities increasingly rose
to positions of power. On one fateful day the men of the Lakota and the
United States military, itself possessed of large quantities of masculine
bravado, came to blows over a Mormon’s sick cow. On August 19th, 1854 the
agreeable relationship that existed between the United States and the Lakota
were shattered by a volley from Lt. John L. Grattan’s howitzer. The battle
that followed came to be known as the Grattan Massacre.75
74 Lakota population estimates vary, but 20,000 is probably a reasonable number considering
the tribe’s territorial and resource control. Jeffrey Ostler estimates 15,000 in, The Plains
Sioux, 2004; Richard White reported 20,000 Lakota in his study, “The Winning of the West,”
1978.
75 A superior examination concerning the confluence of concepts of masculinity was provided
by Stanley M. Despain in his paper, “With blood in her tracks and meat like rawhide,”
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch-American Historical
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The unlikely and foolhardy string of events that occurred to cause this
fight is worth noting. On August 18th a sick and footsore cow belonging to
Lar Domgaard, a Mormon migrant heading west, wandered away and was
subsequently killed and eaten by a Minniconjou warrior named High
Forehead. Mr. Domgaard sought recompense for his loss at Fort Laramie.
Despite considerably generous offers by the Brulé Chief Conquering Bear to
replace the cow with horses, Domgaard was unsatisfied. He called for the
arrest of High Forehead. However, as a guest in the Brulé camp and
Conquering Bear was powerless to turn him over to American authorities as
demanded. As a result of Domgaard’s obstinacy a young and inexperienced
officer was dispatched to arrest High Forehead. Lt. Grattan boldly headed to a
well-prepared and increasingly hostile camp of Brulé and Oglala warriors with
28 men, two howitzers, and a drunken hostile interpreter.76
Once again Conquering Bear offered to pay for the cow, and stated
that he could not order High Forehead to surrender. Grattan and Conquering
Bear argued for about 45 minutes. During this time about 200 or 300 Oglala
warriors moved around Grattan’s force and closer to the two howitzers. Then
unexpectedly, one of the infantrymen guarding the guns, undoubtedly scared
stiff, fired and wounded one of the Oglala horsemen. The shot led to the big
guns being discharged, with the rounds landing harmlessly over the camp, and
then a determined attack by the Lakota warriors. In the fight all 29 United
States soldiers died, along with the interpreter. The American reacted by
Association, August 5-8, 2004. Matt Despain is currently an instructor at The University of
Oklahoma and editor of the Chickasaw Cultural Journal. Also see, Paul N. Beck’s, The First
Sioux War: The Grattan Fight and Blue Water Creek, 1854-1856 (New York: University
Press of America, Inc., 2004); and R. Eli Paul’s, Blue Water Creek and the First Sioux War,
1854-1856 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).
76 Ibid.
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eventually sending a force against the offending tribes, which ultimately
resulted in the Battle at Blue Water Creek in 1856. Thereafter, relations
between the United States and the Lakota deteriorated.77
Over the next dozen years the two expansionist powers fought one
another in two significant campaigns. The first was the Sioux wars along the
Platte River road in 1864-65, which led to an ineffectual treaty signed by very
few Lakota chiefs.78 The second conflict was the Bozeman Trail Wars, or
what came to be known as Red Cloud’s War, from 1866-68. The central
concern of the Lakota involved the establishment of the Bozeman Trail, which
led from the Oregon Trail to the newly discovered Gold fields of Montana.
Moreover, Forts C.F. Smith, Phil Kearny, and Reno quickly appeared in
Lakota territory in order to protect the miners flocking to Montana by way of
the Bozeman Trail.79
Oglala forces led by Red Cloud and Old-Man-Afraid-Of-His-Horses,
accompanied by a young Crazy Horse, isolated the Bozeman Trail forts by
camping within several miles of them and preventing re-supply. The Oglala
under Red Cloud’s leadership, and bolstered by a contingent of Northern
Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe, camped very near Fort Phil Kearny. On
December 21st, 1866 a wood gathering party from the fort came under attack.
Colonel Henry B. Carrington, after considerable pleading, sent Captain
William Judd Fetterman out to rescue the party with a force of about 80 men.
Despite orders not to pursue the Indians beyond Lodge Trail Ridge Captain
77 Ibid.
78 Executive Documents, The House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1867).
79 For accounts of Red Cloud’s War see, George E. Hyde, Spotted Tail’s Folk: A History of
the Brulé Sioux (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 133-141; and Larson, Red
Cloud, 1997, 74-104.
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Fetterman gave chase to a small number of warriors who taunted him from a
short distance. As his command became stretched thin, his infantry could not
keep up with his cavalry; his men came under attack from a concealed force of
Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe warriors. Within thirty minutes the entire
detachment was slain in what the Lakota refer to as the Battle of the Hundred
Slain. Captain Fetterman fell under the club and knife of American Horse,
who knocked him down and then cut his throat as he lay on the cold prairie
ground.80
Over the next year and a half the United States sought to end the
hostilities many easterners believed started because of continued American
pressure on the tribe. Moreover, the expansion of railroads across the west
soon made the Bozeman Trail obsolete. As a result, the United States agreed
to shut down the trail and close the forts when Red Cloud made that a
condition of peace. In the spring of 1868 the Lakota, Cheyenne and Arapahoe
gathered to meet with an American peace commission. The result was the
creation of the Great Sioux Reservation.
The Treaty of Fort Laramie, which was promulgated on April 29,
1868, established The Great Sioux Reservation that occupied the western half
of the present state of South Dakota, parts of Wyoming, Montana, and
Nebraska, with the eastern boundary located at the Missouri River. The tribe
maintained hunting rights within the reservation boundaries and, “the right to
hunt on any lands north of the Platte, and on the Republican Fork of the
Smoky Hill River, so long as the buffalo may range thereon in such numbers
as to justify the chase.”81 The Lakota seemed to have gained the assurance of
80 Ibid.
81 The Statutes at Large, Treaties and Proclamations of the United States of America, from
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cultural continuity and power. However, the Lakota’s future rested upon their
ability to procure sufficient buffalo to remain self-sufficient. At the time this
sticking point seemed irrelevant because the Lakota had spent a century
perfecting their way of life.
Unlike many neighboring sedentary agriculturists whose societies
developed and still maintained a more hierarchical organization, as the Oglala
moved onto the Great Plains they formed a loose confederation which allowed
the Lakota people greater flexibility and maneuverability for following the
herds of buffalo, which in turn kept the tribe well fed. Kinship relationships
and reciprocity within the tiospaye, and the tribe as a whole, came to control
the economy.82 One gained respect and status within the community by
providing food, clothing, and shelter for your family and others within your
tribe, not by the accumulation of material possessions for mere individual
gain. Thus, the economic process remained subservient to social structure and
labor. For a period of approximately 100 years the Lakota developed and
enjoyed this equestrian nomadic lifestyle that allowed them to tap more
efficiently into the thermodynamic system of the Great Plains, specifically the
harvesting of the vast herds of buffalo. However, this way of life disappeared
with the buffalo and the emergence of reservation life.83
By the mid-1860s much of the northern buffalo herd had already been
eliminated within reservation boundaries and the federal government had
taken steps to alleviate the problem. In 1865 the United States government
Dec. 1867, to March 1869, Edited by George P. Sanger, Counselor at Law, Vol. XV, (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1869), 639.
82 For the juxtaposition of nomadic versus agricultural northern plains tribes see, Preston
Holder, The Hoe & the Horse on the Plains (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press,
1970).
83For a more detailed examination of Lakota economic structure see, Gump, The Dust Rose
Like Smoke, 1994; and White, “The Winning of the West,”; and, Anderson, Kinsmen, 58-76.
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agreed to pay each individual Lakota, “at the rate of about fifteen dollars per
head per annum in view of the fact that the buffalo and other game, by means
of which these nomadic tribes subsist, are being driven from the country by
the whites who traverse it.”84 Special United States Indian Agent J. P. Cooper
further indicated the severity of the dwindling bison herds on August 27, 1868
when he requested that all Indians north of the Platte River be sent
immediately to Fort Randall for supplies. He noted that, “the great danger
now is that the scarcity of buffalo in that region will compel the Indians to
commit depredations in order to live.”85
Many factors influenced the rapid disintegration of the northern bison
herd, the most critical being the increased hide trade brought about by the
development of a chemical tanning process that dramatically increased the
demand for buffalo hides.86 Furthermore, the invention of the paddlewheel
boat provided the necessary transportation for shipping the heavy buffalo
hides to eastern markets. Over 110,000 hides flowed down the Mississippi
River by the 1840s. Only a decade earlier the number was closer to 25,000
hides. Other factors included natural mortality, Indian subsistence hunting
and market hunting for robes, wolf predation, possible disease introduction
from cattle, and a warmer drying climate trend. The shift to generally milder
winters, brought about by the end of the Little Ice Age, meant increased
hardships for many Northern Plains tribes who relied upon well-established
84 Executive Documents, The House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1867), 5.
85 Executive Documents, The House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., 1868-1869, Serial No. 1366 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1869), 711.
86 William A. Dobak, “Killing the Canadian Buffalo, 1821-1881,” Western Historical
Quarterly 27 (Spring 1996, No. 1), 33-52.
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hunting patterns.87
As winter came to the Great Plains the buffalo often sought both
forage and shelter from the winds and deep snows in familiar river valleys.
This migratory pattern of the buffalo allowed the tribes to predict the
movements of the great herds accurately and easily procure a large winter
supply of meat. However, as the climate changed and winters became less
severe the buffalo no longer sought food and shelter in these river valleys.88
Furthermore, the encroachment of white settlers into traditional buffalo
watering areas and the bison’s natural migratory habits caused widely
scattered herds had that roamed over the Northern Plains to coalesce into
much larger herds.89 The mobility of these larger herds increased as they
consumed the forage in an area more rapidly than the previously scattered
herds. Therefore, the developing situation of large mobile herds moving
about the plains in unpredictable patterns created sporadic hunting success
throughout the Great Plains. For Oglala tribesmen newly confined to the
Great Sioux Reservation this meant eventual economic disaster.
In the decade following the promulgation of the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie many Oglala continued to pursue their familiar buffalo-centered way
of life in the northern regions of their territory. There they lived far away
from the prying eyes of white men. However, Red Cloud and other leaders
eventually came to realize that continued pressure from the United States and
87 For a fascinating examination of the Southern Plains herds see Dan Flores’s, “Bison
Ecology and Bison Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800-1850,” The Journal of
American History 78 (September 1991, No. 2), 465-485.
88 For a detailed examination of this phenomenon see Richmond Clow’s, “Bison Ecology,
Brule and Yankton Winter Hunting, and the Starving Winter of 1832-33,” Great Plains
Quarterly (Fall 1995, vol. 15), 259-270.
89 Douglas B. Bamforth, “Historical Documents and Bison Ecology on the Great Plains,”
Plains Anthropologist: Journal of the Plains Anthropological Society, (February 1987, Vol.
32, Number 115), 1-16.
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the continuing decline of buffalo meant that a new economic strategy needed
to be found for reservation life. By the end of that decade the Oglala turned
toward cattle as answer to their growing economic difficulties.
58
CHAPTER TWO
“Some Good Cattle Every Year”: Genesis of Cattle in Oglala Culture,
1868-1876
On a cold winter day in December of 1871 the herd came under attack.
Some of the beasts ran wildly across the Dakota prairie in a mad attempt to
escape the Oglala hunters, while others milled about in confusion. The
bellows of the wounded and frightened animals mixed with the shouts of the
mounted hunters to create a primordial cacophony that mingled with the
cloudy breath of the men, horses, and beasts, and rose into the brisk winter air.
Upon this contentious theater of the Northern Plains the great ungulates fell,
brought down one after the other by determined hunters, pierced by arrow or
bullet, until the entire herd lay still.
Once the men completed their violent task the women came to skin
and butcher the animals. The hides were stripped from the beasts’ flesh and
much of the offal, such as livers and kidneys, devoured on the spot. When the
Indians had eaten their fill, they prepared and then stored the remainder for the
coming winter months. This scene undoubtedly played itself out countless
times in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the Oglala Lakota
developed into one of the most successful nomadic hunting groups on the
Northern Plains. What set this event apart from previous hunts is the fact that
the prey animals were not buffalo. They were government issued steers
provided to the Oglala at Red Cloud Agency.90
90Office of Indian Affairs to U. S. Indian Agent J. W. Daniels, Dec. 16, 1871, General
Records, Box 2, RG 75, KC. The letter instructs Daniels to employ and supervise the Indians
in the slaughter of government cattle for the purpose of packing the meat for future use. The
cold weather was believed to enhance the effort by preventing the meat from becoming
spoiled.
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The three years following the signing of The 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie found the Oglala divided. After 1868 the tribe for the most part
continued to live by hunting buffalo and raiding unlucky neighbors.
However, buffalo numbers continued to fall and many bands looked
increasingly toward the federal government for support. In May and June of
1870 Red Cloud, once granted permission, went to Washington, D.C. to
discuss perceived treaty violations involving both the lack of quality and
quantity of annuity payments and white travelers on the Oregon Trail. He also
hoped to ease tensions with the people of Wyoming. When he returned in late
June Red Cloud found his fellow Oglala impatiently waiting to trade robes for
needed goods. Apparently the Lakota continued to raid their long-time
enemies the Crow and regional tensions remained high.91
That fall the United States Army received $100,000 to provide goods
such as food and clothing to the tribe, but the agents asked that the agency be
moved in exchange. This was agreed upon and over 6,000 Oglala moved to
the new location about 32 miles downriver from Fort Laramie on the upper
bank of the North Platte River in the spring of 1871. There the tribe waited
for the promised goods, without Red Cloud who was upset he did not pick the
new location. Red Cloud stayed away from the agency until March of 1872.
In his absence many Oglala adapted to the new economic situation in an
interesting manner.92
They did so by continuing to hunt either the Republican River to the
south or on the Powder River to the north but then they returned every five
days to receive their rations. The Oglala adapted. Most of the tribe returned
91 Larson, Red Cloud, 135-140; Hoxie, Parading Through History, 100-104.
92 Larson, Red Cloud, 145-146.
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to their buffalo centered culture; however, many incorporated new economic
strategies in an attempt to maintain cultural continuity while simultaneously
taking advantage of much needed rations. These strategies included
continuing their equestrian nomadic lifestyle by hunting buffalo and drawing
rations, and hunting government issued steers as noted at the top of the
chapter. By 1872 Red Cloud and several other band chiefs camped within the
near vicinity of Ft. Laramie in order to take advantage of the United States
government’s promised issue of goods and food. These reservation Oglala
sought proximal control and benefit from the goods delineated by the 1868
Treaty. Such control reinforced their leadership positions by demonstrating
their ability to provide for their people. However, when issue goods arrived
late or in lesser quantities than promised these same leaders lost respect and
influence with their people.93
In relation to this strategy the most important provision of the treaty,
other than the establishment of boundaries, involved providing the Agency
Indians with beef and flour if they could not procure it themselves. The 1868
Treaty of Fort Laramie stated in Article X that,
each Indian over the age of four years, who shall have removed to and
settled permanently upon said reservation and complied with the
stipulations of this treaty, shall be entitled to receive from the
United States, for the period of four years after he shall have settled
upon the reservation, one pound of meat and one pound of
flour...provided the Indians cannot furnish their own subsistence at an
earlier date.94
Red Cloud told the emissaries of the United States that he would remain
93 Larson, Red Cloud, 143-144. In this chapter Red Cloud’s followers, or the “hangs around
the fort Indians,” will be referred to as the “reservation Oglala” for the purposes of
clarification concerning the disparate Oglala bands.
94The Statutes at Large, Treaties and Proclamations, of the United States of America, from
December 1867, to March 1869, Edited by George P. Sanger, Counselor at Law, Vol. XV,
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1869), 639.
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peaceful in the summer of 1872, and he meant to keep his word. And in order
to do so he needed to provide for his people. While their spatial proximity to
the fort reinforced the band leaders’ political control of their followers it also
gave the federal government a significant amount of influence over these
bands through the power to observe, judge, and punish either with the threat
of force or the stoppage of goods. Nonetheless, under these circumstances the
“hangs around the fort” Indians sought to maintain as much cultural continuity
as possible. The result was the “hunt” previously described. To these Oglala,
this strategy seemed preferable to seeking the diminishing herds of buffalo
and the possibility of conflict with the United States.
However, for the federal government, the beef ration was merely a
stopgap measure to provide the tribe with enough nourishment until the
Oglala could learn to support themselves as individual family farmers.
Moreover, the Oglala perceived cattle as a temporary substitute for buffalo
until their numbers increased. Therefore, few attempts were made to supply
the Oglala with breeding stock to create their own herds. Instead the
government issued steers in order to meet their treaty obligations to provide a
beef supply for the tribe and the Oglala “hunted” the steers as they had
buffalo. However, the government’s supply of beef inevitably failed to meet
its treaty obligations or the tribe’s needs.95
According to the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty the government agreed to
provide each tribal member with one pound of beef and flour per day, or
approximately thirty pounds of beef per month. In a nine-month period from
September 30, 1867 to June 30, 1868 the federal government issued 145,551
95 Statutes at Large, 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 639.
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pounds of beef to approximately 6,000 Oglala, Brule, Northern Arapaho, and
Northern Cheyenne around the Red Cloud Agency.96 This came out to about
twenty-four pounds of beef for each tribal member for a nine-month period, or
about .09 pounds per day. It should also be noted that the number of pounds
issued to the tribe was counted in gross poundage, or what the cattle weighed
on the hoof. Once a steer is slaughtered and processed for consumption the
actual poundage of edible beef is cut by an average of two-thirds. Further loss
could occur because of shrinkage, and spoilage, which would reduce post-
processed beef by another 10% to 50%. Moreover, cattle weighed upon
arrival, but not slaughtered immediately often lost hundreds of pounds over
the winter yet still appeared on the roles at full weight, and steers that died
over the winter also counted as issued beef. This sporadic compliance to the
treaty by the United States convinced many “hangs around the fort Indians” to
spend the summer months hunting buffalo.97
Nonetheless, several factors worked increasingly against the tribe’s
ability to procure the needed buffalo so critical to their society, both
nutritionally and culturally, thus making the tribe dependent upon the federal
government for their means of survival. For example, further hunting
limitations were placed upon the Oglala during this crucial period of cultural
adjustment. Despite the Treaty of Fort Laramie’s declaration of hunting rights
in 1868, the tribe hunted buffalo only with permission of the resident Indian
agent. Indians that hunted without the agent’s authorization risked being
labeled hostile and then subjected to punishment. Consequently, buffalo hunts
96 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., 1868-1869, Serial No. 1366, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1869), 709.
97 Paul M. Robertson, “The Power of the Land,” 82-85.
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occurred less frequently and became far less successful following the creation
of the Great Sioux Reservation. In one of the only documented accounts of a
successful Oglala buffalo hunt beyond 1868 by reservation Indians, Indian
Agent J. W. Wham reported issuing two months worth of ammunition for a
hunt on the Republican River in mid-September 1871. The Indians requested
that no whites accompany them on that hunt, yet sub-agent Yates went along
despite their objections. The same report noted that the Oglala killed large
numbers of buffalo on that particular hunt.98
The primary reason that buffalo hunts happened with less regularity is
that authorization from Indian agents and subsequent support from the federal
bureaucracy remained unpredictable. In the fall of the next year the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, F. A. Walker, notified J. W. Daniels, the Red
Cloud Agent, that Little Wound had organized a hunting party for a second
time without permission. The Commissioner stated that the War Department
had been notified and instructed to bring him and his party back to the agency.
The government was reticent to allow the hunts and provide the needed
ammunition the hunts because the tribe continued to prosecute raids against
neighboring tribes such as the Crow and Pawnee. The United States feared
this conflict might grow to include whites as well. These economic
impediments, such as decreased buffalo herds and increased government
interference, greatly discouraged the organization of hunting parties following
1868. As a result, leaders such as Red Cloud began to look increasingly
toward government issued cattle to provide for their peoples sustenance.99
98 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1871-1872, Serial No. 1505, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1872), 1118-1119.
99 Commissioner of Indian Affairs F. A. Walker to Agent J. W. Daniels, November 5, 1872,
General Records: Correspondence received from the Office of Indian Affairs, Indian
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The Oglala looked toward cattle as a supplement supply of meat
because they easily replaced buffalo within the Northern Plains environment.
This region was, and remains, primarily suited for the care and raising of
livestock in the absence of native grazers and large predators. The climate,
grasses, and soil combined to create an environment that is particularly
adapted for ungulates such as buffalo and cattle. The predominant soils found
within the 1868 reservation boundaries consisted of prairie soils, lithosols and
shallow soils, and a small amount of chernozem soils located only in the
extreme southeastern tip of the reservation. Lithosols and shallow soils
consist of “an imperfectly weathered mass of rock fragments, largely but not
exclusively on steep slopes,” which are more commonly referred to as either
sandhills or badlands. Chernozem soils are “dark-brown to nearly black soils
of cool and temperate, subhumid grasslands.”
However, it is the prairie soils that consist of the “very dark brown
soils of cool and temperate, relatively humid grasslands,” that are home to the
rich and nutritious short grasses such as grama and buffalo grass that buffalo,
elk, deer, antelope, and cattle thrive upon.100 Bouteloua gracilis, or blue
grama grass is a native perennial in the northern Great Plains. It not only
produces highly nutritious summer forage, it also provides excellent winter
pasture as it retains its protein content if allowed to cure while standing.
Buchloe dactyloides, or buffalo grass, is also an outstanding source of
nourishment and forage for herbivores of the Great Plains. Its
warehouses & special agents, chronological arrangement, Feb. 24, 1871-Dec. 31, 1877, Box
2, RG 75, NARA-KC.
100 The information and quotes pertaining to soils was obtained from the chart titled
GENERAL PATTERN OF GREAT SOIL GROUPS: THE WHEAT BELT in a text by Ladd
Haystead and Gilbert C. Fite, The Agricultural Regions of the United States (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), 180-181.
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growth begins in late spring and continues all summer. The forage is
attractive to all classes of livestock. Buffalo grass becomes
established rather easily, and spreads vigorously under use. It
withstands prolonged heavy grazing better than any other native grass
in its region of adaptation; on ranges severely grazed every year, it
often survives as a nearly pure stand.101
When the soil conditions and flora are mixed with an annual yearly
rainfall of under twenty inches per year it creates an environment conducive to
the development of a regional cattle industry once the indigenous wild grazers
and their predators are removed. However, while environmental conditions
informed Lakota economic strategy to some degree other factors greatly
influenced Oglala economic strategies during the early years of reservation
life.102
The area included in the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, which
established The Great Sioux Reservation, occupied the western half of the
present state of South Dakota, parts of Wyoming, Montana, and Nebraska,
with the eastern boundary being the Missouri River. The tribe maintained
hunting rights within the vast reservation boundaries and, “the right to hunt on
any lands north of the Platte, and on the Republican Fork of the Smoky Hill
River, so long as the buffalo may range thereon in such numbers as to justify
the chase.”103 However, as previously mentioned much of the northern
101 W. A. Wheeler and D. D. Hill, Grassland Seeds: A Handbook of Information About the
Grass and Legume Seeds Used for Forage, Pasture, Soil Conservation and Other Turf
Planting in the United States (New York: D. Van Norstrand Company, Inc., 1957), 562, 579-
580.
102 The average annual rainfall in South Dakota between 1882 and 1960 was 19.12 inches per
year. This average included regions of Eastern South Dakota that were not part of the Great
Sioux Reservation and receive a higher average rainfall per year than the reservation. For the
reservation created in 1868 the average rainfall was closer to 16 inches per year than 19,
which demonstrates why the attempt to cultivate this region using dry farming methods failed.
Herbert S. Schell, History of South Dakota, 11-12.
103 The Statutes at Large, Treaties and Proclamations of the United States of America, from
Dec. 1867, to March 1869, Edited by George P. Sanger, Counselor at Law, Vol. XV, (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1869), 639.
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buffalo herd had already been eliminated from the reservation and the federal
government had already taken steps to alleviate the problem.
As early as 1865 the United States government agreed to pay each
individual Lakota, “at the rate of about fifteen dollars per head per annum in
view of the fact that the buffalo and other game, by means of which these
nomadic tribes subsist, are being driven from the country by the whites who
traverse it.”104 Special United States Indian Agent J. P. Cooper further
indicated the severity of the dwindling bison herds on August 27, 1868 when
he requested that all Indians north of the Platte River be sent immediately to
Fort Randall for supplies. He noted that, “the great danger now is that the
scarcity of buffalo in that region will compel the Indians to commit
depredations in order to live.”105
The United States government indicated even before The 1868 Treaty
of Ft. Laramie that it favored farming over ranching for the Oglala, despite the
arid and unpredictable environment of the Great Plains. The federal
government had already stated in the 1865 Lakota Treaty that its policy
towards the tribe, as with the vast majority of tribes in the United States,
would be the promotion of cultivation over ranching. As previously noted,
contemporary American ideals saw the independent farmer as the model for
American citizenship and the foundation of American democracy. Therefore,
the goals of United States’ policies designed to assimilate Native Americans
into white society often forced Indians to adopt the role of farmer despite the
104 Executive Documents, The House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1867), 5.
105 Executive Documents, The House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., 1868-1869, Serial No. 1366 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1869), 711.
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environmental realities.106
Federal actions to promote farming over stock raising took many
forms. In this 1865 agreement the United States stipulated that the Lakota
must promise not to impede members of the tribe from pursuing agricultural
interests. Moreover, the federal government promised twenty-five dollars per
tribal member for those engaged in cultivation of the soil, ten dollars more
than for those Indians who pursued other interests. The treaty also promised
the Oglala that if one hundred lodges gathered in one area for agricultural
reasons then the U. S. must provide an agency for that group and employ a
farmer for their instruction.107 Further reports of Red Cloud Agency Indian
Agents indicated that they found it difficult to implement this policy. This
dichotomy between federal and local decision-making is clearly seen in the
Red Cloud Agent’s report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1870. He
stated that
it will be understood that teaching the Indians the art of cultivating the
soil is attended with many difficulties in this locality…on account of
location of the lands allotted to them for agricultural purposes, which,
owing to the frequency of droughts and visits of the grasshopper, make
the failure to produce a crop nearly a certainty.”108
Despite the agent’s on-cite experience and recommendations the federal
policy of assimilation maintained that in order for the Indians to develop
successfully into proper American citizens they must adopt farming as their
primary way of life.
Not surprisingly, the Northern Cheyenne experienced a similar
106 Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, 7-12.
107 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284, (Washington: Government Printing
Office), 5.
108 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 41st Cong., 3rd sess., 1870-1871, Serial 1449, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1871), 685.
68
struggle between bureaucrats in Washington who promoted agricultural
pursuits and a local agent who envisioned stock raising as the tribe’s best
chance for economic independence. The temporary agent at Tongue River
Indian Reservation, a Private George Yoakam, requested in 1882 that of the
money earmarked for rations on the reservation forty percent go towards the
purchase of cattle. He hoped that within ten years the tribe would be able to
support itself through the cattle industry. Nonetheless, an Indian Inspector,
M. R. Barr, instead recommended that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
appoint a permanent Indian Agent, one other than Private Yoakam, one who
understood farming. Despite the military’s classification of the Northern
Cheyenne as “prisoner of war,” authorities hoped to settle the tribe in the
Tongue River valley in accordance with the Indian Homestead Act of 1875,
which provided Indians benefits similar to the Homestead Act of 1862.109
However, the dichotomy between federal policy makers and local
agents concerning the future tribal economy of the Oglala was not the only
problem found within the infrastructure of the federal Indian bureaucracy.
Indian agents in the field were often temporary and differed greatly in their
opinions concerning tribal economic opportunities. This is evident from the
agent’s reports of 1873 and 1874. In 1873 agent J. W. Daniels stated that
despite Chief Red Cloud’s opposition he believed that the tribe would soon
begin to push toward agriculture as a way of life.110 The very next year a new
agent, J. J. Saville, stated that, “agriculture can not be depended upon as a
means for support for these Indians. The valley of White River and adjacent
109 Svingen, The Northern Cheyenne, 35-43.
110 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 43rd Cong., 1st sess., 1873-1874, Serial No. 1601, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1874), 611.
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hills produce a fine grass…(and) stock-raising must be the main pursuit in this
country.”111 The situation was becoming polarized because the local
environmental conditions influenced local Indian Agents to pursue stock
raising as the principle means of Oglala self-sufficiency. Meanwhile the
federal government’s rigid policy of Indian Americanization, which hoped to
create good United States citizens by turning tribal members into Jeffersonian
yeoman farmers, ignored the environmental realities.
As hunting became more restricted and unsuccessful the tribe
depended more and more upon the United States for sustenance. Agent
Daniels wrote to the Commissioner in his yearly report of 1873 that the hostile
Chief Red Cloud and his followers
come to these agencies starving and enemies, and received the same
kind care that was given to those who had been here for years when
they first came in they sent their soldiers to get rations that they might
taste white man’s food without his knowing of it, but after a few issues
they came to acknowledge their dependency.112
In his 1874 report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs newly appointed
Indian Agent J. J. Saville related how he instructed an independent feeling
Oglala who had caused trouble “to the fact that the buffalo were almost all
destroyed, and as soon as they were gone the Indians would be helpless.”113
Clearly, Oglala leaders no longer maintained the ability to provide needed
food and shelter for their followers. This development undoubtedly led to a
breakdown in kinship relations and aspects of societal reciprocity. Economic
111 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 43rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1874-1875, Serial No. 1639, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1875), 560.
112 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 43rd Cong., 1st sess., 1873-1874, Serial No. 1601, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1874), 612.
113 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 43rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1874-1875, Serial No. 1639, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1875), 560.
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realities began to dominate tribal decision-making and social structures.
The federal government’s actions of restricting the tribe’s movements
and hunting practices also hoped to prevent conflicts between the Lakota and
other tribes in the region, and the ever increasing population of whites moving
into the region. On May 16th, 1874 Little Wound’s band again failed to
receive permission to hunt on the Republican river from the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, despite their 1868 treaty rights, because of the Oglalas’ cruel
and unjust treatment of the Pawnee the previous year. The Commissioner
referred to the Oglalas’ ambush and defeat of a Pawnee hunting camp on the
south shore of the Platte River in the summer of 1873, which the Oglala
considered their hunting territory. In the ensuing battle over a thousand
Lakota warriors killed almost two hundred Pawnee.114
Two days later Agent Saville received another letter from the
Commissioner stating that in spite of the tribe’s legal right to make the hunt
no passes or permits would be issued because the hunt would, “terrify the
settlers and get the Indians into trouble.”115 However, the still somewhat
autonomous Oglala organized and conducted an extended buffalo hunt that
fall near the Republican River in spite of federal opposition. Unfortunately
the several thousand Indians managed to procure only one hundred buffalo
and an unspecified number of cattle that fall. That winter was extremely
severe, and snowstorms in January and February blocked supply trains and
prevented the beef contractor from supplying the Red Cloud Agency. Many
Indians went hungry and those nearer the agencies begged for whatever food
114 Royal B. Hassrick. The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 78.
115 Commissioner E. P. Smith to Agent J. J. Saville, May 16 and 18, 1874, General Records,
Correspondence received from the Office of Indian Affairs, Indian warehouses & special
agents, chronological arrangement, Feb. 24, 1871-Dec. 31, 1877, Box 2, RG 75, NARA-KC.
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was available. In the spring the tribe returned to the Red Cloud Agency, “with
the sad realization that they had been on their last buffalo hunt.”116
The federal government also continued to provide far less beef than
Indian agents requested. In 1875 Indian Agent J. J. Saville stated in his report
that it would take 14,782,500 pounds of beef to feed the Oglala, and Northern
Cheyenne around Red Cloud Agency because each steer shipped was
producing only 300 net pounds of beef. The government contracted for only
nine million pounds. For a population of about six thousand Indians, nine
million gross pounds of beef would provide anywhere from 250 to 500 net
pounds of beef per person for that year. The amount Saville asked for would
have produced from 410 to 820 net pounds of beef per person. The
impending Treaty of 1877 increased the beef ration from one, to one and a
half pounds of beef per day. Unfortunately, the government continued to use
gross poundage delivered as the measuring system towards meeting its
responsibilities, and thus fell far short of its treaty obligations.
With an understanding of the region’s productive capabilities and the
tribe’s recent historical experiences it seemed increasingly clear to Red Cloud
and other Oglala leaders that stock raising provided the best hope for the solid
economic foundation. The tribe understood the need to achieve economic
self-sufficiency if they hoped to maintain cultural continuity. Economic
independence might provide the political and social power needed to resist
American assimilationist policies. Moreover, some of the Red Cloud
Agency’s Indian Agents also understood clearly that the development of a
cattle industry was crucial to the tribe’s economic independence. In 1875
116 George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1937), 229.
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Agent J. J. Saville stated in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
that, “the primary question of civilization is subsistence. This question
presents peculiar difficulties in this country. If the Indians become self-
supporting, it must be by the same pursuits that the white people engage in,
viz, stock-raising.” From June 27th to 29th of the same year a council was held
to discuss the tribe’s relinquishment of the Black Hills and all hunting rights
in that area.
During the course of this meeting the tribe clearly demonstrated its
understanding of the value of cattle in this region and the future benefits that
could be derived from the establishment of a tribal herd. The United States
offered the tribe $25,000 total for their hunting rights, and the Oglala said that
if such a decision came to pass then they wanted the equivalent of the money
to be paid in cattle, horses, and harnesses and wagons. Chief Spotted Tail
stated, “I want to live on the interest of my money. (received for the loss of
the Black Hills) The amount must be so large that the interest will support
us…I will trade some of it for stock to raise cattle…we want some good cattle
every year.” According to the “Final Proposition of Council IV” the Lakota
were to receive from the United States government for the loss of the Black
Hills, “$50,000 for ten years to be paid in good American cows and other
livestock, and in such implements of husbandry as are convenient to stock-
growing and as may be deemed advisable by the President.”117
However, the treaty failed to guarantee that the federal government
would in good faith fulfill its obligations. On August 10th of that same
117 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1875-1876, Serial No. 1680, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1876) Agent Saville’s comments pertaining to stock-raising are found on p.753. The
Oglala’s council with the federal government’s representatives is found on pp. 690-693.
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summer in a meeting between the Lakota Chiefs and a committee
investigating fraud at the Red Cloud Agency Chief Little Wound complained
that, “the wagons had not come yet; the cattle and horses had been delivered,
but the cattle were small and the horses were wild and could not be broken.”
Clearly, either the Indian agent in the field or the suppliers did not intend for
the Oglala to partake fully in the burgeoning regional cattle industry. Further
insights into the troubles the tribe would face in its attempt to build an
economy based upon ranching was provided by the Chairman of that
committee, the former Governor of Missouri Thomas C. Fletcher, who opened
that June meeting of 1875 by admonishing the Oglala to, “learn the white
man’s way of agriculture and husbandry.”118
By 1875 the Oglala Lakota’s life as a nomadic hunting group that lived
and depended upon the great herds of buffalo was rapidly nearing an end.
Colonel George Armstrong Custer’s Black Hills Expedition of 1874
confirmed the existence of large gold deposits in the Lakota sacred mountains.
As miners poured into the region the United States government sought to
negotiate the Lakota’s surrender of their beloved Paha Sapa. The flood of
whites to the region increased tensions, especially in the minds of Wyoming
citizens. As the Black Hills issue simmered hotly Red Cloud ignored the
issue.119
At the time Red Cloud, the preeminent Chief of the Oglala at that time,
found himself locked into a struggle for power with the Agent, J.J. Saville.
Red Cloud traveled to Washington, D.C. again in 1875 in order lay claims of
corruption at Saville’s doorstep and thus obtain a new agent. Red Cloud
118 James C. Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1965), 192-193.
119 Larson, Red Cloud, 165-169.
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succeeded eventually, Agent Saville resigned while in Washington defending
himself, and finally left his post on December 3, 1876, but the Black Hills
issue awaited Red Cloud upon his return.120
In the fall of 1875 the Allison Commission, led by Iowa Senator
William Allison, held a conference to discuss the tribe’s surrender of the
Black Hills. While these negotiations ultimately failed to resolve the conflict
the negotiations revealed the tribe’s changing perspective concerning the
importance of cattle in Lakota political economy. As noted at the beginning
of this chapter both Red Cloud and Spotted Tail demanded that cattle be made
available to the Lakota for their subsistence.121
These contentious debates hardened the hearts and strengthened the
resolve of many Lakota to refuse any demands for the Black Hills and
continue their traditional way of life. As reports reached the east of Lakota
intransigence concerning the issue President Grant sought for a way to take
the Black Hills without violating the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. In the end
he issued a demand that all Lakota return to their agencies by January 31st,
1876, or be declared hostile. He did so knowing full well that the Lakota
tribes had already made winter camps and could not, nor would not, obey such
an order. The result was the summer campaign that resulted in the pyrrhic
victory of the Lakota Nation over Colonel Custer’s forces at the Battle of the
Little Bighorn.122
After Colonel Nelson A. Miles chased Crazy Horse throughout the
winter of 1876-77, and drove Sitting Bull across the border into Canada a new
Peace Commission arrived to settled the Black Hills issue. The Manypenny
120 Ibid, 167.
121 Ibid, 186-194.
122 Ibid, 198-204.
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Commission, led by former Commissioner of Indian Affairs George W.
Manypenny, proved far more effective in settling the dispute for several
reasons. The most important of which is that they ignored Article 12 of The
1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie concerning the required signatures of ¾ of all
adult Lakota males for any future treaties. With Red Cloud in attendance an
agreement was reached pertaining to the disposition of the Black Hills.123
In The Treaty of 1877 the Oglala gave up the western third of their
reservation, which included the Black Hills, and their hunting rights west of
the Black Hills in exchange for federal assurance that they would not be
removed to Indian Territory in Oklahoma. This agreement of 1877 stated that
the, “Indians do hereby relinquish and cede to the United States all the
territory lying outside the said reservation…including all privileges of
hunting.” The tribe undoubtedly continued to kill buffalo when the
opportunity presented itself but the federal government no longer allowed the
Lakota freedom or means to pursue the ever-dwindling herds of bison. The
decreased spatial mobility brought about by the treaty, coupled with a greater
awareness of the economic crisis that loomed ahead if buffalo numbers
continued to drop, led the reservation Oglala to seek an alternative economic
foundation based upon cattle.124
It is also worth noting that the promulgation of the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie, which created The Great Sioux Reservation, and the subsequent
Treaty of 1877, set in motion a significant evolution in Oglala spatial
123 Ibid, 205-213.
124 The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from December, 1875, to March
1877, and Recent Treaties, Postal Conventions, and Executive Proclamations, Vol. XIX
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1877), 255. The federal representatives ignored
Article XII of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie by not obtaining three fourths of adult male
signatures for its ratification.
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perceptions. For the first decade following the treaty the tribe still enjoyed
access to the Black Hills and its geographical power centers. However, with
the discovery of gold in the Black Hills and the subsequent renegotiations that
resulted in the Sioux Treaty of 1877 the tribe was separated from the center of
their cosmological universe. The United States government, in an effort to
contain and control the tribe, and isolate it from white settlers, desperately
sought to “fix” the Oglalas’ geographical location.
The spatial struggle for control between the United States and the
Oglala appeared most markedly over efforts by the federal government to both
continually attempt to move the agency to the Missouri river and take a
census. Between the summer of 1871 and 1878 the agency moved four times.
From its location 32 miles south of Fort Laramie it moved to a location on the
White River near Camp Robinson in northwest Nebraska. In 1877 the Oglala
were forced to move the agency to the Missouri River near the mouth of
Medicine Creek after the Sioux War of 1876-77. The tribe returned to their
preferred territory in the west in 1878 when the agency made its final move to
White Clay Creek when it became known as Pine Ridge Agency.125
In the winter of 1873-74 Agent J.J. Saville sought to count the Oglala
despite adamant Oglala opposition. His attempt almost got him killed. Agent
Saville left the agency to count the tribe only to find himself surrounded by a
group of rather unhappy warriors and escorted back to the agency where he
was rescued from an untimely execution by Red Cloud and Little Wound.
However, the Oglala soon learned that the census might prove an avenue to a
125 Larson, Red Cloud, 140-223.
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greater issue of rations. The higher the population, the more goods issued. As
a result, a census was completed by Saville in the winter of 1874-75, and
Agent Saville counted 9,339 Oglala at Red Cloud Agency, as well as over a
thousand each of Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe. Undoubtedly,
these numbers were inflated. A more accurate count finally occurred over a
decade later, but in the meantime the Oglala utilized the census to gain access
to a larger number of issued rations. However, this does not mean the tribe
received an adequate food supply as previously noted or that such concessions
did not provide the federal government increased spatial control over the
tribe.126
The United States government sought spatial control in order to
observe, judge, and then enforce assimilationist policies. These polices
included eventual bans on tribal rituals, dances, and ceremonies the tribe
viewed as vital in maintaining cultural order and stability within an
increasingly chaotic world. The Oglala unable to access important
geographical conduits to Wakan Tanka, and hindered from performing
ceremonies designed to maintain cultural stability and strength, faced a crisis
within their concept of “vertical geography.” Eventually, this crisis would
include the introduction to the new spiritual power of Catholicism. The
spiritual crisis created by the imminent loss of the tribe’s cosmological
universe concerned the tribe greatly. Yet the economic crisis created by the
126 Ibid, 156-159.
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loss of hunting grounds and opportunities dominated the tribe’s thoughts and
actions concerning reservation existence.127
The decision to turn toward a cattle centered economy seems obvious
when one understands the environmental conditions of the region and the
pastoral lifestyle of the Oglala. However, there are several important
questions that require examination concerning the Oglala’s evolving political
economy. The following are questions historians have so far failed to address
in regard to the liminal period of cultural transition to reservation life for
Native American groups unused to such confinement. What other factors than
the environment led the Oglala Lakota to increasingly center their reservation
political economy on cattle after 1877? Were there other options? And if so
what ultimately led the tribe to choose cattle as their economic foundation
within the reservation system?
Oglala historical experiences during the eighteenth century and the
first half of the nineteenth century provide insights into why the tribe
developed an economic strategy based increasingly upon cattle following the
1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. Moreover, a comparison between Hunkpapa
and Oglala early reservation economic strategies illuminates Oglala decision-
making processes. An 1880 special government census made at Standing
Rock Reservation, as well as Agent’s reports for both Standing Rock and Pine
Ridge Reservations during the same period reveal startling contrasts in
economic strategy between the Hunkpapa and Oglala. It is this contrast that
opens a window into the differing factors that shaped Agency/Reservation
survival strategies for two of the tribes within the Teton branch of the Lakota
127 Matthew G. Hannah, “Space and social control in the administration of the Oglala Lakota
(Sioux), 1871-1879,” Journal of Historical Geography, Vol. 19, No. 4, (1993), 412-432.
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Nation. These two tribes, with the same language, culture and recent history
of both violent expansion, and resistance to American expansion, chose very
different economic strategies with the hope of achieving the same end, that of
economic self-sufficiency and stability.
For the Hunkpapa of Standing Rock Agency in 1880, farming seemed
to offer the most acceptable, and perhaps best, chance for economic
independence. Thirty out of forty-five families farmed an average of 5.2 acres
of land per family and had done so for an average of 2.6 years, while only one
family killed seventeen buffalo and four deer. These same families also lived
in log houses; while non-farming Hunkpapa and all Oglala lived in lodges.
Moreover, the 30 Hunkpapa families that farmed owned 124 cattle, 78 horses,
378 domestic fowl, and kept 121 dogs. They also grew 215 tons of hay, 663
bushels of corn, 47 bushels of potatoes, and two families grew pumpkins and
melons.128
The most successful agriculturalists were Crow Feather, 42, and his
wife Elk, 37. They had lived for eight years near Grand River in a log house,
on a 160-acre allotment without patent, and had worked the land for three-
years. The had three daughters, Grey 22, Pretty White Buffalo 10, and Red
Medicine 6, and two sons, Lone Man 5, and One They Pray To age 2. As a
family they cultivated 13 tons of hay and 45 bushels of corn on six acres.
They owned three horses, six chickens, four cattle and kept four dogs.
128 Ibid.
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Moreover, Crow Feather had accepted “civilized” dress for the last four years
and dressed his eldest son Lone Man in a like manner for two years.129
On the other hand, the Oglala overwhelmingly rejected government
pressures to farm and instead put their faith in hunting, herding stock cattle, or
engaging in wage labor. According to the 1880 special census, of the 95
Oglala families that lived near Standing Rock Agency 63 engaged only in
hunting, which brought the tribe 2,793 buffalo and almost 400 deer, while
none farmed.
A comparison between Hunkpapa and Oglala survival strategies comes
into sharper focus when one compares the annual Agent’s reports for the two
tribes from 1879 to 1881. In 1879 the new Agent, J.A. Stephan was very
optimistic concerning the future of farming on Standing Rock. He noted that
rainfall had increased for the last seven years and grasshoppers had
disappeared over the last two years. While only 706 acres were under
cultivation he believed 1,200 more would soon be plowed. The Hunkpapa
seemed eager to farm, with 122 heads of households agreeing to accept claims
of 80 acres each, both north and south of the agency on the Missouri River.
He hoped that since wheat farming was going so well around Bismarck it
might catch on with Standing Rock Indians as well. Agent Stephan reported
an abundant crop of 25,000 bushels of corn.130
129 Ibid.
130 Report of Agent J.A. Stephan to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 21, 1879,
“Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” in Report of the Secretary of the Interior
Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at
the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Sixth Congress, Vol. 1 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1879) pp. 152-156, population figures come from pp. 336-337.
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What is striking about the 1879 Agents’ reports for Standing Rock and
Pine Ridge is the disparity between the percentages of Indians engaged in
horticultural pursuits. Agent Stephan’s report showed 595 families at
Standing Rock engaged in agriculture, and at an average of 4.15 per family
that accounts for the entire Indian population of 2,583. The same year at Pine
Ridge only 200 Oglala families engaged in agriculture, or about 912 out of a
population of 7,250, or 12.6% (See Table No. 2).131
Table No. 2: Comparison of Pine Ridge and Standing Rock Agency
Agricultural Production and Stock Ownership, 1879-1881.
Pop-
year
Acres
Farmed
Families
Farming
Bushels
Corn
Bushels
Vegetables
Tons
Hay
Cattle Income
Freighting
PR
1879
7,250 1,500 200 500 4,150 2,000 2,500 $41,000
SR
1879
2,583 706 595 25,000 13,175 1,060 651 0
PR
1880
7,200 1,800 500 800 4,160 2,100 3,500 0
SR
1880
2,611 1,581 385 36,000 10,580 2,069 660 0
PR
1881
7,200 2,000 625 1,000 5,250 2,700 4,500 $41,382
SR
1881
2,637 1,486 553 8,000 5,200 3,000 1,206 0
All figures come from Agents annual reports to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs.
The Oglala farmers fared poorly their first year. They broke 1,500
acres of ground but cultivated only 500 bushels of corn, 4,150 bushels of
vegetables, 2,000 tons of hay and 300 pounds of oats and barley. However, in
1878 the Oglala began freighting agency supplies from Rosebud Landing on
the Missouri River, some 200 miles away, with 100 wagons issued by the
government. Agent V.T. McGillycuddy stated that at first they had trouble
131 I calculate my numbers from the 1880 special census, which averaged for the Oglala 4.56
individuals per family and for the Hunkpapa 4.16 individuals per family.
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controlling the teams but by 1879 they had 300 wagons in use, 50 of which
were purchased by the tribe with freighting proceeds. They hauled over
2,000,000 pounds of freight and earned over $41,000 in cash during the
year.132 Clearly, the Hunkpapa at Standing Rock chose farming as their
economic strategy toward accommodation with agency life, while the Oglala
for the most part rejected farming despite significant pressure from misguided
government officials.133
Agent reports for 1880 and 1881 reveal a continuation and expansion
of the same economic patterns and strategies. In 1880 Indians at Standing
Rock farmed a total of 1,581 acres, over double from the year before, and had
raised 36,000 bushels of corn, 10,580 bushels of vegetables, and over 2,000
tons of hay.134 At Pine Ridge the number of acres cultivated increased a mere
300 acres during the same period, from 1,500 to 1,800, and yielded just 4,160
bushels of vegetables, 2,100 tons of hay, and negligible crops of corn, oats,
132 Report of Agent V.T. McGillycuddy to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 15,
1879, “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” in Report of the Secretary of the
Interior Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of
Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Sixth Congress, Vol. 1
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879) pp. 143-146, population figures come from
pp. 336-337, Pine Ridge agricultural figures come from pp. 354-355.
133 The Oglala were pushed toward farming in order to create Thomas Jefferson’s vision of
the yeoman farmer, which was believed would allow Indians to become “civilized” and thus
become assimilated into Anglo-American culture, see, Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction:
Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1974); For other citations of government pressure on the Oglala to farm see, Executive
Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 44th
Cong., 1st sess., 1875-1876, Serial No. 1680, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1876) pp. 690-693; Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-1867, Serial No. 1284,
(Washington: Government Printing Office), 5; and Executive Documents, House of
Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 48th Cong., 2nd sess., 1884-
1885, Serial No. 2287, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1885), 81-82.
134 Report of Agent J.A. Stephan to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 1, 1880,
“Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” in Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Interior on the Operations of the Department for the Year Ended June 30, 1880, Vol. 1
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880) pp. 382-383.
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and barley. However, the Oglala increased their herd of cattle from 2,500 in
’79, to 3,500 in 1880.135
The following year proved less fortunate for the Hunkpapa. In 1881,
while still farming 1,486 acres the Standing Rock tribes experienced severe
storms, and both hot winds and hot weather that killed many crops. That year
their efforts yielded 8,000 bushels of corn, 5,200 bushels of vegetables, and
3,000 tons of hay, a significant drop from the year before.136
In 1881 the Oglala at Pine Ridge faired much better. Between 700 and
800 young Oglala men were employed in freighting, and they hauled over
2,000,000 pounds of freight and earned $41,382 in cash. Agricultural efforts
on Pine Ridge again proved minimal, bringing in 5,250 bushels of vegetables
and 2,700 tons of hay on 2,000 acres of land. Their cattle herd increased to
4,500 from 3,500, and would continue to grow in the years to come.137 In
1883 the Oglala cattle herd numbered 5,500.138 And by 1889 the herd reached
10,968 strong.139 The Hunkpapa and Oglala clearly chose different economic
survival strategies for reservation life (See Table No. 3 below). So again,
135 Ibid.
136 Report of Agent J.A. Stephan to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 7, 1881,
“Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” in Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Interior on the Operations of the Department for the Year Ended June 30, 1881, Vol. 2
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1882) pp. 115-118, 352-353.
137 Report of Agent V.T. McGillycuddy to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 1,
1881, “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” in Annual Report of the Secretary of
the Interior on the Operations of the Department for the Year Ended June 30, 1881, Vol. 2
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1882) pp. 102-108, figures for cattle and crops
come from pp. 352-353.
138 Report of Agent V.T. McGillycuddy to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 19,
1883, “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” in Annual Report of the Secretary of
the Interior for the Fiscal year Ended June 30, 1883, Vol. 2 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1883) pp. 346-347.
139 Executive Document, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial No. 2725, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1890), 156.
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what led two such closely linked societies, tied together both in language and
culture, to choose such divergent economic paths?
Table No. 3: Percentage of Oglala and Hunkpapa engaged in
horticulture, 1879-1881.
Total
Population
Families
Farming
Average Family
Size x Families
Farming
Percentage
of Tribe
Farming
Pine Ridge,
1879
7,250 200 4.56 x 200=912 12.6%
Standing
Rock, 1879
2,583 595 4.15 x 595=2,469 95.5%
Pine Ridge,
1880
7,200 500 4.56 x 500=2,280 31.7%
Standing
Rock, 1880
2,611 385 4.15 x 385=1,598 61.2%
Pine Ridge,
1881
7,200 625 4.56 x 625=2,850 39.6%
Standing
Rock, 1881
2,637-Not
counted 2,719
“prisoners”
553 4.15 x 553=2,295 87.0%
The “average family size” is derived from calculations from the 1880
special census. The Oglala averaged 4.56 per family on that census. The
Hunkpapa averaged 4.15 per family.
The answer lies both in their historical experiences during the 19th
century and their tribal structure. Lakota culture consisted of a loose
confederation of seven tribes, themselves made up of various bands whose
societal foundation consisted of patriarchal led family units called tiospaye.140
Despite sharing the same language and culture these tribes operated
independently of one another, which created a political atmosphere that
promoted independent decision-making.141 For example, after a brief
140 Tiospaye are “sometimes defined as flexible exogamous residential units organized around
a core of bilaterally related kin.” See Paul M. Robertson, “The Power of the Land: Identity,
Ethnicity, and Class among the Oglala, Lakota,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Union Institute, 1995), 4.
141 See, George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1937), 21. This text offers an outstanding history of the
Oglala, Lakota before 1877, their movements and inter and intra-tribal relations; see also,
White, “The Winning of the West,” 321.
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flirtation with an agricultural way of life near the Missouri River in the 1770s
the Oglala advanced west with the Brulé tribe in search of buffalo for an
increased robe trade.142
Between 1800 and 1820 the Oglala and Brulé hunted mainly between
the Cheyenne and Teton Rivers and along the White River.143 By 1825 they
moved south toward the Platte River, and west toward the Powder and Tongue
Rivers in search of buffalo. During this period the Oglala and Brulé battled
other nomadic equestrian societies, such as the Kiowa, Crow, and formed
alliances with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne. Between the 1830s and 1870s the
Oglala and Brulé proceeded west to the Big Horn River and south to the
headwaters of the Republican and Smokey Hill Rivers.
As a result, the Oglala experienced no direct contact with the more
sedentary agricultural tribes that inhabited the Missouri River valleys, such as
the Mandan, Hidatsas, Arikara, Ponca and Omaha after 1790. The only
sedentary tribe the Oglala encountered during the 19th century was the Pawnee
along the Republican and Smokey Hill Rivers by the 1840s. However, their
meetings were the product of raids, which provided little chance for cultural
exchange.144
The Hunkpapa, for much of the 19th century, chose a different course.
While the Oglala moved south and west in the late 18th and early 19th century,
the Hunkpapa remained near the Missouri River. By 1830, together with the
Yankton, Yanktonais, and other Saone tribes, the Hunkpapa dominated the
142 White, “The Winning of the West,” 324.
143 Ibid, 327n.
144 Ibid, 333-335, 337-339.
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Missouri River trade. They either traded with or raided such sedentary
agricultural tribes as the Arikara, Ponca and Omaha. During this decade they
also began to expand both north and south along the Missouri River, both to
obtain horses needed for hunting and war, and to more completely control
both trade and hunting options of the sedentary tribes who still farmed the
Missouri River valleys. Dominance over such tribes allowed the Hunkpapa to
both obtain, either through trade or raiding, carbohydrates such as corn and
beans, and expand their trade supremacy along the Missouri River. In fact
such constant and inexorable pressure from the Sioux led the Arikara to
abandon their villages along the Missouri River and settled near the Skidi
Pawnee in Nebraska and Kansas in 1832.145
It was not until the 1840s when part of the Hunkpapa moved west of
the Missouri River. They traveled west in order to help other Lakota,
including the Oglala and Brulé, rest hunting grounds from the Crow. During
the 1840s other bands of Hunkpapa moved north along the Missouri River
into Canada where they fought with Metis, Plains Crees, and Assiniboines for
access to the dwindling buffalo herds.146 From the 1850s on both the
Hunkpapa and the Oglala experienced a growing and inevitable conflict with
the United States. They saw the buffalo disappearing in ever increasing
numbers, and they felt the pressure of white expansion. Both tribes enjoyed
145 Ibid, 329, 331, 333; Saone is a term to describe the five Teton groups that did not expand
west with the Oglala and Brulé—the Hunkpapa, Minniconjou, Sans Arc, Two Kettles, and
Blackfeet, White, “The Winning of the West,” 321; see also, Edward A. Milligan, Dakota
Twilight: The Standing Rock Sioux, 1874-1890 (Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press,
1976), 4. This book is poorly written and subjective but contains some useful information
pertaining to Standing Rock.
146 Ibid, 337-338.
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victories, and they both experienced irreversible defeats. And by the 1870s
many Oglala had settled near an agency, first near Fort Laramie and then Fort
Robinson. The Hunkpapa did the same near Fort Yates.
Clearly, despite linguistic and cultural constants, the Oglala and
Hunkpapa experienced very different cultural interactions during the 19th
century. The Oglala migrated west in the 1790s; thus, they were both
insulated from agrarian influences, and isolated within a cultural milieu of
nomadic hunting societies such as the Cheyenne and Crow. It is more than
likely that by the 1870s few if any Oglala remained who had interacted with
an agrarian culture. As a result the Oglala rejected the unfamiliar economic
strategy of farming in favor of a tribal cattle herd and the economic freedom
afforded them from income provided by wage labor in the freighting business.
Concomitantly, the Hunkpapa were consistently exposed to both the
workings and benefits derived from native communities who farmed. The
Hunkpapa had either traded with or raided a significant number of sedentary
tribes, such as the Arikara and Omaha, throughout the 19th century. This
contact almost certainly convinced some Hunkpapa band chiefs to seek
economic stability and independence through the cultivation of the soil rather
than other options. One such band chief of the Hunkpapa, Thunder Hawk,
started farming in 1874, and two-thirds of his followers did likewise shortly
thereafter. By 1880, the year of the special census, Thunder Hawk and his
family worked seven acres, which yielded a crop consisting of 8.5 tons of hay,
21 bushels of corn, and 12.5 bushels of Potatoes. He also owned two horses,
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five cattle, three pigs, 24 chickens, and kept 11 dogs. Moreover, his was the
only family on the census who was not wholly or partially supported by the
government.
This comparison demonstrates clearly that 19th century tribal
experiences greatly influenced the economic strategies for the Oglala and
Hunkpapa. The Hunkpapa, who experienced intimate connections with
sedentary horticulturalist tribes within their recent memory, preferred farming
as a reservation economic foundation. Conversely, the Oglala, isolated from
such sedentary societies since the 1790s, overwhelmingly rejected a future of
planting and harvesting as their economic hope. Instead they sought more
immediately familiar economic strategies that involved riding herd and
driving teams. Unfortunately, in the end neither achieved its goal of economic
self-sufficiency and independence.
An examination of the experiences of the Northern Cheyenne at
Tongue River Reservation in southeastern Montana demonstrated similarities
concerning the economic evolutions that occurred in Oglala culture. First of
all, the Northern Cheyenne were close allies of the Lakota and often lived and
fought beside them during the zenith of their regional power. In fact a
contingent of 517 Northern Cheyenne resided on Pine Ridge Reservation as
late as 1890.147 These two tribes shared considerable cultural characteristics.
They both enjoyed the equestrian nomadic way of life that depended upon the
buffalo for its economic continuation. Both tribes consisted of a loose
confederation of extended family groups tied to one another by a shared
147 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong.,2nd sess., 1890-1891, Serial No. 2841, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1891), 50.
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language and history. And finally, they closely resembled each other in dress,
mannerisms, and even adopted some words of the others language into their
own vocabulary.
A striking example of this similarity occurred on May 28, 1877 in
Darlington, Oklahoma. On that date a group of Northern Cheyenne arrived on
the Southern Cheyenne reservation in Indian Territory after being removed
from the Northern Plains. Upon arrival Little Rogue, a Southern Cheyenne,
gestured at his Northern brethren and asked, “What are the ‘Sioux’ doing
here?” The Southern Cheyenne failed to recognize their Northern brothers as
part of their own culture, and they expressed no joy at this forced reunion.
The two divisions of the Cheyenne continued to bicker at one another until the
Northern Cheyenne under the leadership of Dull Knife and Little Wolf fled
the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency. Eventually, after much hard travel and
privation, Dull Knife’s band found sanctuary with the Oglala at Pine Ridge.
Their descendents made up the contingent of Northern Cheyenne the inhabited
Pine Ridge for the next thirteen years.148 The Northern Cheyenne inhabiting
Pine Ridge later joined other bands of their own tribe on the Tongue River
Indian Reservation in southeastern Montana.
Moreover, other factors demonstrate clearly the relevance of a
comparison of the Oglala at Pine Ridge the Northern Cheyenne at Tongue
River Indian Reservation. For example the Northern Cheyenne also faced
problems from a white community hostile to their very presence at the Tongue
River. Surrounding cattle interests campaigned for the tribe’s removal to
Indian Territory throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The
148 Orlan J. Svingen, The Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, 1877-1900 (Niwot,
Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1993), 19.
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cattlemen hoped to gain valuable grazing lands for their ever-growing herds
and rid themselves of possible economic competition.149 The white man’s
fear of economic competition, especially from a defeated and seemingly
inferior foe, hindered both the Oglala and the Northern Cheyenne tribes’
ability to participate equally in the expanding capitalistic economic system of
the United States.
Nonetheless, while the Tongue River Reservation contained only
460,000 acres by 1900, an increase of 204,000 acres since 1884, and fewer
than a thousand Northern Cheyenne, they too hoped to gain economic
independence through a tribal cattle industry. By 1880 the Northern
Cheyenne had branded their small herds and according to General Nelson
Miles they took as much pride in their cattle as they did any of their other
possessions.150 Unfortunately, the almost mystical, and certainly mythical,
image of the independent yeoman farmer as the backbone of a democratic and
free nation offered an unyielding blueprint for the assimilation of Native
Americans into American society.
And as with the Oglala, the Northern Cheyenne in Montana were
encouraged to farm rather than raise cattle. For each tribe the goal of
establishing a self-sustaining communally owned cattle herd to serve as the
foundation of a new reservation economy faced difficulties. Nonetheless, as
the 1870s drew to a close the reservation Oglala sought to maintain their
political and social infrastructure through economic independence from the
United States. Independence represented by the bawl, pungency, and shape of
149 Ibid., xxi, 30-36, 81.
150 Ibid., 29, 145.
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another ungulate of the Great Plains, the cow.151
The hunt referred to at the top of this chapter demonstrated one
method used by the Oglala to hold on to familiar methods of meat
procurement, which entailed the active pursuit and killing of the prey animal
from horseback. However, the federal government later successfully ended
that particular manner of slaughtering and butchering of the Oglala tribes’
issued beef because of its “barbarity.” Moreover, other Oglala techniques
used for the care and distribution of stock following the Treaty of 1877, which
promoted Oglala cultural continuity, faced significant governmental
intervention. This occurred because American society did not readily accept
deviation from emerging cultural beliefs concerning the market economy,
property, and individualism. As a result, the United States government would
eventually force the Oglala to work within American concepts concerning
cattle ranching and farming.152
Ultimately, the fact that the federal government turned loose hundreds
of steers for the Oglala to hunt in a familiar, or “traditional,” manner
represents more than a fascinating example of the United States-Indian
relationship. It demonstrated the beginning of economic change that forever
altered Oglala tribal culture. For although the Oglala knew of cattle and oxen
before this period, predominantly from settlers who crossed Lakota territory
heading west, bovines were never more than a target of opportunity in raiding
or hunting to supplement a diet based almost completely on buffalo meat.
However, as buffalo began to disappear from the Northern Plains, the federal
151 Ibid, 31.
152For an in-depth study pertaining to the origin of Western American cattle ranching see the
seminal work of Terry G. Jordan, North American Cattle Ranching Frontiers: Origins,
Diffusion, and Differentiations (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993).
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government, through a series of treaties, accepted responsibility for providing
the Lakota with an adequate food supply. After this development the
relationship between the Oglala and cattle evolved into something quite new.
Cattle progressed from a target of convenience to a replacement for the
quickly diminishing buffalo herds. However, the steers and cows supplied to
the tribe meant more than replacement protein. For the Lakota, cattle
represented both an opportunity to continue their equestrian and nomadic way
of life as a self-sufficient and independent people, and a vehicle that could
revolutionize not only their economy, but their culture.
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CHAPTER THREE
From Buffalo to Beeves: Cattle as a Vehicle for Cultural Continuation,
1877-1889
The Lakota experienced wrenching cultural changes in the years
following the loss of Paha Sapa in the illegal treaty of 1876. The vital
relationship to Wakan Tanka and the spirits of their birth disappeared with
their exclusion from their religious center. The severing of this connection
profoundly affected the Lakota’s expectations for the future. Already the tribe
saw signs of a strained relationship with the buffalo. The earth no longer
seemed to give birth to buffalo in abundance; the White Buffalo Woman’s gift
appeared to be in danger. In an effort to provide for a future without buffalo,
a concept never considered just a brief decade ago, the Lakota in general, and
the Oglala in particular, turned to the raising and herding of cattle as a viable
option for continued economic self-sufficiency.
In the eyes of many Oglala leaders the establishment of a large
communal herd of cattle offered the best opportunity for the continuation of
their pre-reservation society based on equestrian nomadism. Cattle offered a
chance for the tribe to remain mobile and horsed as they followed their herds.
Moreover, the eventual exchange, or gifting, of cattle for bride prices and
various societal services, such as healing or for ceremonial success, promised
another avenue for cultural continuation during the reservation era. Much like
the horse before them, cattle stood ready to take a place among the tribe’s
pantheon of animals possessing power, or wakan.153
Furthermore, once established, communally and individually owned
cattle herds might act as both a buffer and a link between Oglala and white
153 James R. Walker, edited by Raymond J. DeMallie and Elaine A. Jahner, Lakota Belief and
Ritual (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 167-168.
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society. By providing economic stability cattle might act as a buffer against
American cultural hegemony and dominance while simultaneously linking the
tribe to western culture as they ensconced themselves within the regional
cattle industry. However, the Oglala tribes’ vision concerning their economic
future faced considerable obstacles.
During this liminal early reservation period, as buffalo numbers
dwindled and tribal mobility diminished, the Oglala Lakota developed a
dynamic economic strategy founded on the creation of a tribal cattle herd.
They based their decision upon intimate environmental knowledge, a clear
understanding of the emerging regional cattle industry initiated by white
entrepreneurs, and their unfamiliarity concerning agricultural pursuits
exhorted by the American federal government. Because the Oglala, along
with the Brule, spearheaded the Lakota migration south and west across the
Missouri River the tribe unintentionally insulated itself from agricultural
societies and thus rejected American governmental demands to institute an
economy based upon farming. Moreover, the American government’s failure
to fulfill its 1876 treaty obligations pertaining to the beef issue acted as further
impetus in the decision to establish a tribal cattle herd.
An example of the tribe’s economic desperation was revealed in 1879,
and again in 1881. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied Young-Man-
Afraid-of-His-Horses permission to hunt the Yellowstone and Upper Missouri
rivers because of the possibility of conflict with settlers. This denial occurred
because the Oglala sometimes targeted surrounding ranches during their
intermittent hunting forays. The tribal hunters allegedly killed some of the
neighboring ranchers’ cattle, stole horses, and forced herders to surrender food
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and ammunition.154
The Wyoming Stock Growers Association complained to Governor
Hale of Wyoming concerning this matter in 1883. The Association noted all
of the above infractions and added that the Indians offered up their women for
prostitution in exchange for food. The WSGA also noted that most of the
offending hunters possessed passes issued by the local Indian Agent. The
white members of the WSGA undoubtedly exaggerated greatly in regards to
these alleged charges in order to gain federal support in limiting Indian access
to what the ranchers considered their grazing lands.155
However, the fact that some of the tribe’s hunts targeted cattle
indicates that the Oglala could not find, or lacked access to, the remnant herds
of bison that disappeared from the Great Plains by 1885. It further
demonstrates that the tribe was sufficiently hungry to risk hostilities by taking
white men’s stock, and their own fledgling tribal herd remained insufficient in
size to provide for their needs. The tribe’s association with the buffalo was all
but dead, and cattle would soon replace the great shaggy beasts of the Plains
not only as the tribe’s primary source of sustenance, but as the foundation of a
new tribal economy.
Moreover, when one compares the actual beef issue to the proscribed
treaty amounts it becomes clear why the Oglala eagerly sought to implement a
more reliable economic tribal strategy. For example, in order for the federal
government to comply with the Treaty of 1876, each tribal member counted
154 Letter received by Agent V. T. McGillycuddy from Commissioner Hayt on October 25,
1879, General Records, Box 3, Jan. 1, 1878-Dec. 26, 1879, RG 75, NARA-KC, and Letter
received by Agent McGillycuddy from Commissioner H. Price on Oct. 20, 1881, General
Records, Box 5, April 26, 1881-June 6, 1882, RG 75, NARA-KC.
155 Letter received by Agent McGillycuddy from Commissioner Price, Nov. 13, 1883, General
Records, Box 6, June 12, 1882-Dec. 1883, RG 75, NARA-KC.
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on being issued 1 ½ pounds of meat per day, which when multiplied by 365
days, averaged out to 548 pounds of beef per. In an examination of the
recorded beef rations during the seven-year period from 1879 to 1885,
calculations pertaining to the average ration per person revealed that each
tribal member received somewhere between 175 to 350 net pounds of beef per
year. (See Table No. 4) 156
However, those numbers were skewed by the fact that the beef was
weighed on the hoof, not after being slaughtered. Thus, one may assume that
beef poundage actually supplied fell well below what the government
promised. The higher figure assumed no spoilage, shrinkage, or loss of any
kind after processing, while the lower figure allows for a 50% rate of loss. As
the last column in the table indicates the beef rations for this period failed to
meet the individual 548-pound yearly requirement by at least 200 pounds a
year. Not surprisingly, the Oglala concomitantly accelerated their efforts
toward building a cattle herd in order to provide economic self-sufficiency.
156 These numbers were compiled from an agency record book entitled, Weigher’s Returns of
Beef Cattle, March 29, 1879-June 26, 1886, Administrative Records, Box 754, RG 75,
NARA-KC. This ledger also contains the dates received, the numbers of steers received for
each date, the total weight received for each date, and the names of the sellers who delivered
the cattle to the agency.
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Table No. 4: Federal Beef Rations to the Oglala Lakota, 1879-1885.
Year Tribal
Population
Gross Pounds of
Beef Issued
Net Pounds
of Beef
Available
Net lbs
of Beef
Per
Person
1879 7,000 7,522,807 2,482,526 178-355
1880 7,200 7,988,712 2,636,275 183-366
1881 7,500 8,753,332 2,888,589 193-385
1882 7,500 7,430,282 2,451,993 163-327
1883 7,800 8,280,262 2,732,487 175-350
1884 8,300 8,055,075 2,658,175 160-320
1885 7,649 7,941,438 2,620,675 172-343
Avg. 7,564 7,916,028 2,638,676 175-350
Note that the net poundage for each year was probably somewhat lower than
presented because all calculations were based upon the weight of the cattle
when they arrived at the agency. I was unable to take into account weight
losses caused by winter forage difficulties and deaths. The population figures
are compiled from Indian Agents’ Reports to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs. The information provided concerning the pounds of beef issued was
compiled from an agency record book entitled, Weigher’s Returns of Beef
Cattle, March 29, 1879-June 1886, Administrative Records, Box 754, RG 75,
NARA-KC. This ledger also contains the dates received, the numbers of steers
received for each date, the total weight received for each date, and the names
of the sellers who delivered the cattle to the agency.
Faced with both a shrinking land base and buffalo population
following the Treaty of 1876 the tribe moved quickly to raise a substantial
cattle herd. Tribal leaders proactively examined each beef issue for any
young heifers or cows mingled amongst the steers and gathered unbranded
stock on the reservation to augment government issued cattle. By 1879 the
Oglala as a tribe owned 1,622 head of stock cattle. Agent V. T.
McGillycuddy predicted that cattle afforded the tribe their best chance for
growing a self-supporting economy. As per the Treaty of 1876 the
Department of the Interior issued 500 cows and heifers and 22 bulls, all of
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which possessed at least 1/4 blood American stock. 157 (American stock
meant non-Texas longhorns indigenous to Spain and brought up through
Mexico to Texas).158 These additional cattle brought the total herd number up
to 2,500 by the end of the year.159
American stock, such as Herefords, offered more meat because of their
stockier builds. Texas longhorns possessed rather lean characteristics, being
comprised mostly of hide, horn, and bone. However, longhorns tended to
resist harsh conditions more effectively than most other breeds and their
narrower frames made for easier births, which meant fewer losses during
calving season. Interestingly, the Oglala realized the benefits of non-Texas
longhorn stock several years before neighboring white run cattle outfits.
James Haft and William H. Bayless, both originally from Kansas, first brought
a herd of shorthorn cattle to the region in 1882, three years after the Oglala.160
McGillycuddy found that the stock had been well cared for, despite
predictions that the cattle would all be slaughtered and eaten immediately.
Felicitously, the tribe had managed to save 100 cows from the summer beef
issue to bolster the herd. He stated that, “Indians have almost invariably
herded their cattle well, and have raised young stock in considerable
157 Report of the Secretary of the Interior; Being Part of the Message and Documents
Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the
Forty-Sixth Congress, Vol. 1, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1879), 354-355.
158 For an in-depth study of Western cattle ranching origins see the seminal work of Terry G.
Jordan, North American Cattle Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiations
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993).
159 Report of the Secretary of Interior, 46th Congress, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
affairs, 354-355.
160 Bob Lee and Dick Williams, Last Grass Frontier: The South Dakota Stock Grower
Heritage (Sturgis: Black Hills Publishers, Inc., 1964), 108-109.
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numbers.”161 Poignantly, the report identified two problems that continued to
haunt the Oglala Lakota throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
The first pertained to the emerging domination of the tribal cattle
interests by “white husbands.”162 These “white husbands,” white men who
married Lakota women, sought to obtain the rights and advantages meant to
provide Indians with an equal economic footing within the surrounding white
communities. These white men and their mixed blood descendants came to
dominate ranching efforts on the reservation for generations. They reached
this position for two reasons. First, they understood and could manipulate the
market system of the whites more efficiently than the Oglala. They moved
with ease with a market system designed to reward those who strove for
personal goods and property.
Conversely, traditional Lakota culture marginalized a man desirous of
accumulating personal wealth for its own sake. Actions such as this
demonstrated a willingness to place personal gain and prestige over the needs
of one’s tiospaye and tribe. Focus on individual concerns and material wealth
hindered tribal efforts to grow a communally, or tiospaye, controlled cattle
herd. As will be discussed shortly, further impediments arose to hinder the
Oglala’s economic strategy designed to maintain cultural integrity.
“White husbands” enjoyed close association and mutual connections
with both off-reservation cattle interests and Indian Agents and Farmers as
161 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1879-1880, Serial No. 1910, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1880), 75, 104, 145, and 355.
162 I use the term “white husbands” to replace the offensive term “squaw men.” The term
“squaw men” will remain as is if used in a quotation; however, “white husbands” is more
historically accurate and assessable to readers.
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they sought to achieve their goal of individual wealth and power. Such
conflicting worldviews and relationships clearly placed the Oglala at an
economic disadvantage when in direct competition with “white husbands”
concerning the future of reservation cattle interests. This was true whether it
meant access to regional political and economic power centers or tribal
resources such as land, water, and fencing materials. Furthermore, “white
husbands” could make business decisions without asking permission from an
Indian Agent. And within the capitalist system the ability to make timely and
independent business decisions is not only beneficial it is necessary in order to
compete in the marketplace, or in the case of the Oglala, to sustain a herd
large enough to provide for the tribe’s needs.
The second difficulty brought to light involved the illegal trespass of
outside cattle interests on reservation land. Agent McGillycuddy provided an
example of both difficulties when he noted that
the squaw-men assume that by marriage they have all the rights of full-
blooded Indians, and they endeavor to exercise these rights not only in
possession of cattle themselves, but also in ranging and pasturing upon
Indian reservations large herds belonging to other white men; and
when the removal of such cattle is attempted by the agent, the squaw-
men claim property in them under fictitious bills of sale.163
This practice of trespassing on tribal lands for free pasturage became so
blatant that by 1884 between 700,000 and 800,000 head of cattle illegally
grazed on the Great Sioux reservation.164 Bob Lee noted in, The Last Grass
Frontier, that “it was illegal to run cattle on the reservation at that time
too.”…”Cattlemen who pushed their herds onto the Pine Ridge reservation
(sic) risked losing beef to the Indians, but the danger wasn’t a serious obstacle
163 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1879-1880, Serial No. 1910, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1880), 75, 104, 145, and 355.
164 Schell, History of South Dakota, 243-247.
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for outfits with crews of well-armed cowboys.” 165 Clearly, the Oglala cattle
owners faced difficult economic handicaps in their struggle to compete in an
ever-intrusive market economy or establish viable herd numbers needed to
sustain the tribe. In an all too familiar refrain federal Indian policy dictated on
one hand that the Oglala alter their entire culture by adopting the precepts of
capitalism, such as private property, individual avarice, the accumulation of
material goods, and privately owned rather than communally owned cattle.
While on the other hand the surrounding white cattle industry, and the “white
husbands” on The Great Sioux Indian Reservation, attempted to exclude the
tribe from full participation in the market economy.
A brief comparative examination of Northern Cheyenne cattle interests
revealed a similar, if more malevolent, problem concerning off-reservation
cattle trespass. In southeastern Montana white cattlemen who allowed their
stock to graze illegally on the Tongue River Indian Reservation hoped to
foment a conflict between Indians and whites. They hoped such a conflict
might bring about the Cheyenne’s removal to Indian Territory. White
cattlemen also claimed that Cheyenne warriors burned their ranges, and
frequently killed their cattle. While these charges proved false and the
ranchers’ efforts eventually failed, the constant attack upon the tribe’s right to
remain on the reservation negatively impacted its economic growth. The
federal government hesitated to approve allocations for rations or cattle for the
Northern Cheyenne on the chance that the charges proved factual. Financial
support for the tribe was delayed for years as government inspectors and
Special Agents arrived on site to determine the validity of the accusations.166
165 Lee and Williams, Last Grass Frontier, 108.
166 Svingen, The Northern Cheyenne, xxi, 30-36.
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For the Oglala Lakota the problem of cattle trespass remained centered
on economic competition rather than possible relocation. Despite these
significant obstacles the tribe managed to increase its herds. In agent
McGillycuddy’s report to the Commissioner in 1880 he noted that the number
of cattle owned by tribal members rose to 3,500 with the help of a summer
issue of 1,000 head of stock cattle. Unfortunately, records are unclear as to
what percentage of the herd fell under “white husbands” or mixed blood
ownership and what percentage belonged to the full blood tribal herd. Agent
McGillycuddy provided only the total reservation herd size in his reports. He
also noted in June of 1880 the tribe’s excellent care of stock cattle issued and,
“in fact, these Indians taking naturally, as they do, to stock raising and
herding, this would seem to offer the most feasible and practical method of
making them eventually self-supporting.” Moreover, McGillycuddy found the
idea of a sustainable agricultural system for the Oglala unrealistic.167
However, the most fascinating aspect of the report lies in
McGillycuddy’s theory about why Chief Red Cloud resisted any tribal
acceptance of agriculture or herding. He correctly believed that Red Cloud
feared a loss of power and influence within the tribal political organization.168
Because of the tribe’s concentration near the agency the political structure of
the Oglala became much more centralized, which gave leaders such as Red
Cloud more power than tribal chiefs moving with loosely knit tiospaye bands.
Before 1880 the Oglala political structure centered on multi-band councils
167 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., 1880-1881, Serial 1959, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1881), 162.
168 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., 1880-1881, Serial No. 1959, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1881), 162-163, 382-383.
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made up of chiefs from the tiospaye, or extended family bands, that strove to
gain a group consensus before undertaking any significant political decisions.
These decisions included discussions on whether or not to send diplomatic
forays to surrounding tribes or whites, or whether or not to raise a large war
party to attack an enemy tribe. The important point to note is that individual
chiefs possessed no dictatorial powers, and that they only influenced the
council through their reputation as a leader and oratory ability. The council
continued to debate such issues until a consensus was reached.169
However, by 1880 the Oglala chiefs such as Red Cloud and Spotted
Tail garnered far more influence within the tribe. This occurred both because
of consolidation of the tribal population around Pine Ridge Agency, and the
tribe’s societal crisis. The Oglala political framework allowed for fluidity of
decision-making based upon necessity. For example, as the tribe moved from
one location to another it was vulnerable, so the wakiconza (camp
administrator) briefly held great decision-making power in the tribe. And in
times of military crisis, such as the conflict with United States soldiers in the
late 1870s, the blotahunka (war party leaders) gained in political influence and
power. In other words, incessant warfare during the nineteenth century
provided the militaristic segment of Oglala political structures more everyday
power and control over larger segments of the tribe. The result is especially
paradoxical when one considers that from the early 1840s the United States
government’s central political objective in regards to the Oglala centered on
the reduction of the chief’s influence within the tribe. The United States
government hoped to more easily control tribal decision making by modifying
169 Catherine Price. The Oglala People, 1841-1879 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1996), 2-6, 172,173.
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the political structure of the Oglala.170 However, as the tribe consolidated
around the Agency tribal members looked increasingly to their chiefs for
guidance in how to interact with the whites.
Yet as the tribe began to spread out on the reservation in order to
practice cattle ranching the chiefs lost much of their influence over the
majority of tribal members. What is most interesting is the fact that as the
Oglala people scattered throughout the river valleys to raise livestock and
plant a small garden they began to readopt the traditional political structure of
the tiospaye. The tribe became more decentralized as small family units
started to make decisions concerning their lives without the chief’s input.
While the political and social organization of the tribe more closely resembled
its earlier structure, the same could not be said for its economic delineation.
While tribal members scattered over the reservation in order to farm small
plots or raise a few head of cattle they found themselves increasingly alienated
from their economic beliefs in kinship relationships and reciprocity, which
previously informed their economic practices. For a Lakota warrior the
appearance of generosity equaled that of his bravery in the eyes of the
community. Generosity most often revealed itself in the social custom of the
giveaway. A giveaway bolstered a warrior’s position within the tribe because
it allowed him to reaffirm his kinship relationships and acknowledge his debts
to others by giving away his possessions. The more a man gave away, the
higher his status within tribal society.
As previously noted, a warrior’s ability to provide for his extended
family was closely linked to his ability to achieve greater social, economic,
and political power. For example, in order to gain higher status warriors often
gave away entire horse herds and many fine garments produced by their
female relatives. The ability of a man to give away such garments revealed
the esteem with which his female relatives held him, for they would not create
such beautiful clothing for a man who failed to provide for their every need.
170 Ibid, 172.
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In fact the women’s creation of such garments did more than enhance her
status and that of her provider; it helped maintain the vitality of kinship
relationships within tribal society. For example, during the 1870s and 1880s
as the male members of the tribe lost access to many means of obtaining
social status, such as warfare and raiding, they increasingly felt emasculated.
What is most fascinating is that as the social and economic structures of
kinship relationships and reciprocity faced external threats during the 1880s,
the women of the tribe greatly increased their production of fine garments in
an attempt to maintain these methods of economic redistribution.171
As one might imagine, the idea of a giveaway ran counter to American
concepts of good old-fashioned capitalism, and this practice fell quickly out of
favor with Indian agents determined to instill this new economic belief.
Consequently, giveaways occurred more infrequently, which further degraded
the role of kinship relationships and reciprocity within Oglala society.
By 1883 approximately 7,800 Oglala inhabited the region around Pine
Ridge Agency on the Great Sioux Indian Reservation, most dispersed
throughout the creek bottoms, some as far as forty miles from the agency.
The number of cattle owned by tribal members grew to 5,500, yet agent
McGillycuddy was concerned about the continued issue of beef rations. He
felt that although most cattle owners on the reservation provided good care for
their stock, many others neglected their cattle or simply ate them because they
believed that the United States would simply provide more.172 What he failed
to take into account was the deficiency of the beef issue, and thus the
171 Marsha Clift Bol, “Lakota Women’s Artistic Strategies in Support of the Social System,”
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 9 (1985, No. 1), 33-51.
172 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 48th Cong., 1st sess., 1883-1884, Serial No. 2191, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1884), 92-93, 346-347.
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hardships many tribesmen experienced, especially during winter. As early as
1880 “white husbands” and their kin exerted control over a large segment of
reservation cattle. They often purchased issued cattle from full bloods with
the permission of the Indian Agent because “white husbands” possessed the
competency for such business transactions. Those full bloods who killed and
ate their few issued cattle, or sold them to “white husbands” or mixed bloods,
enjoyed few other options.
The following year McGillycuddy’s report to the Commissioner
revealed a new impediment to the establishment of a self-sustaining cattle
herd when he noted that farming efforts increased in the river valleys.
McGillycuddy also stated that he hoped for a “more systematic and enlarged
effort.” 173 This new emphasis on reservation farming occurred because of
federal directives concerning ongoing Indian assimilation policies. Such
policies, which trace their roots back to Thomas Jefferson’s philanthropic
efforts, were designed to assimilate Native Americans into American society
as yeomen farmers, the foundation of Jefferson’s vision of a liberal
democracy.
As a result of the new directives Agent McGillycuddy embraced, at
least rhetorically, a new economic strategy for the reservation. He planned to
divide the reservation into four farming districts with an agency farmer
overseeing each area. The four farming districts created: White Clay Creek,
Wounded Knee, Porcupine Creek, and Medicine Root Creek districts seemed
to McGillycuddy capable of supporting a population of about 2,000.
However, McGillycuddy failed to understand that the Oglalas’ method of
173 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 48th Cong., 2nd sess., 1884-1885, Serial No. 2287, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1885), 81-82.
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river valley farming offered the only feasible way to cultivate crops in this
arid and unyielding region.
Without access to irrigation “more systematic and enlarged efforts” of
farming were doomed to failure. The irregular weather patterns of the
Northern Great Plains provided occasional years of abundant rain and crops,
but eventually the yearly rainfall dropped below twenty inches a year. This
unpredictable pattern of rainfall prevented the effective establishment of long-
term dry farming in this region. Moreover, frequent visitations by
grasshoppers, prairie fires, and hot dry winds precluded any productive
horticultural pursuits. Hay proved the only consistent crop able to yield
significant benefits for the tribe. Not surprisingly, these hay crops fed
reservation cattle during hard winters.
Clearly, the ecosystem of the region surrounding Pine Ridge Agency
was best suited for the development of a tribal economy founded upon the
care and raising of cattle. The soils, grasses, and yearly rainfall all combined
to create an environment appropriate for large herbivores such as cattle, and
prohibitive to the industry of farming. This is evidenced not only by the
natural world but also by the economic system established by the surrounding
white communities. A system based on ranching. As the Oglala realized that
the federal government cared little about meeting its’ treaty obligations
concerning meat rations the tribe sought to begin its’ own cattle operation.
Yet as the tribe attempted to establish a reservation economy sustained by
ranching, it met with resistance from whites both on and off the reservation.
“White husbands” competed with Indians for access to reservation lands and
markets for their beef, while white ranchers who ringed the Pine Ridge
Agency, and the entire Great Sioux Reservation for that matter, boldly
108
trespassed their herds on reservation pastures. Despite these difficulties the
Oglala had established an inchoate reservation economy by the early 1880s
that hinged upon the success of their burgeoning tribal herds. Unfortunately,
the tribe’s budding cattle industry would experience more set backs and
institutional controls in the following decade.
As the 1880s progressed the cattle industry emerged as the core of the
emergent Oglala reservation economy. Agent McGillycuddy clearly
illustrated this point when it 1884 he stated that stock-raising went as “well as
could be expected, many of the better class of Indians now owning respectable
sized herds, breaking in steers for work purposes, and occasionally selling the
increase to neighboring settlers, when in the opinion of the agent the same is
advisable.”174 Moreover, the Oglala began to cooperate and coordinate with
ranchers in Nebraska and the Black Hills area in gathering and returning
winter strays. This amicable interaction is noted as being a welcome change
from the previous practice of stealing each others’ stock whenever possible. It
also demonstrated both groups’ willingness to cooperate when the result was
mutually beneficial. Despite this advantageous development, the stock owned
by tribal members remained at approximately 5,500.175 Interestingly,
McGillycuddy’s remarks above pertaining to a “better class of Indians,” and
his intimation to his power over tribal decision-making, offer insights into the
developing economic transformations within the tribe and his own
unquestionable power on the reservation.
When he refers to a better class of Indian he is describing the
174 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 48th Cong., 2nd sess., 1884-1885, Serial No. 2287, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1885), 81-82.
175 Ibid., 350-351.
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fomentation of an economic division within the tribe itself. This division
often, but not always, formed along the lines of mixed bloods and squaw men
versus the full blood majority. Mixed blood cattle owners invariably
possessed larger herds than the full bloods despite being a distinct minority.
Moreover, the terms “mixed blood” and “full blood” began to denote more
than a difference in blood quantum. The terms evolved into a denotation for
education and economic opportunities, and fundamentally, whether one’s
cattle interests either furthered one’s personal success or the tribe’s.
The statement, “when in the opinion of the agent the same is
advisable,” seems innocuous enough but it is an example of the overwhelming
power wielded by reservation agents. The agent, not the individual Indians
themselves, decided if a particular tribal member could sell his excess stock
for profit or sustenance. In a biography of McGillycuddy’s life, his second
wife noted that
at this time there was probably no more autocratic position under the
United States government than that of an Indian agent at a remote
agency. The governor of the territory had no jurisdiction over the Pine
Ridge agent. Though the Sioux Reservation was in Dakota, it was not
properly a part of it. Approximately fifteen hundred miles from
Washington…the Pine Ridge agent ruled four thousand square miles
populated by eight thousand Indians.176
This situation gave “white husbands” and surrounding white cattlemen a
distinct advantage in the regional market place, as they possessed the freedom
to make timely and independent economic decisions concerning their
operations. Moreover, most mixed bloods and “white husbands” operations
occupied spaces nearest the agency’s power centers. This spatial proximity,
coupled with carefully nurtured relationships with agency personnel and off-
176 Julia B. McGillycuddy, McGillycuddy Agent (London: Humphrey Milford; Oxford
University Press, 1941), 5-6.
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reservation outfits, meant greater access to reservation resources. Most often
these resources included grazing lands, water, and fencing and building
materials.
A letter received in 1886 by Agent McGillycuddy from the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Honorable H. Price, further evidenced
the restrictive and unequal competitive environment that the Oglala cattlemen
competed under. In reference to surplus cattle (or cattle numbers beyond a
maximum sustainable breeding herd) raised by the Oglala, Commissioner
Price instructed Agent McGillycuddy to put an end to the selling of these
cattle by the tribesmen. Price also stated to McGillycuddy that, “your Indian
police should be on the alert to prevent the sale of these stock cattle, unless
when the sale is made with your full knowledge and consent.” Commissioner
Price went on to say that “if they (meaning the Oglala) persist in selling their
cattle, unless with your consent and under your personal supervision, that they
will be placed on the list of Indians not deserving any further aid from the
government in that direction.”177
The Commissioner’s paternalistic memorandum demonstrated the
increasingly restrictive economic environment the Oglala labored to overcome
in order to implement their original economic strategy. It revealed something
more remarkable as well concerning spatial relations on Pine Ridge
Reservation. In 1886 the Great Sioux Reservation covered most of western
South Dakota and parts of North Dakota, nearly 22,000,000 acres. However,
most tribal populations were concentrated within a forty-mile radius of each
agency. This left an enormous amount of land sparsely populated and
177 Letter received by Agent V. T. McGillycuddy from Commissioner Price on March 5, 1884,
General Records, Box 7, Jan. 2, 1884-April 22, 1886, RG 75, KC.
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unevenly patrolled by tribal line riders. In 1886 the total number of tribally
owned cattle reached 4,927. That year the Oglala calved 1,043 head,
purchased 114, and obtained 405 by issue from the federal government. What
seems out of place when one examines the productive capability of the
reservation is any discussion at all of “surplus” cattle with such a relatively
small herd for such an enormous area. Clearly, the Lakota did not control
access to a significant portion of their reservation. Instead, competing cattle
operations, both off-reservation and “white husband” outfits, gained access to
valuable grazing lands and marginalized the Lakota herds on their own
reservation.
The prevention of the tribe from the creation of a communally owned
cattle herd, participation in the regional cattle market, and dislocation from
tribal lands placed them under a severe economic handicap. Surrounding
white cattle operations sold, slaughtered, moved, and cared for their herds as
the local market economy dictated. They trespassed cattle in staggering
numbers and paid little for the risk. Tribal operations on the other hand
remained under the strict control of the Pine Ridge agency Indian Agents.
These agents, and not the Indians themselves, shaped the burgeoning tribal
cattle herds. Thus the Oglala seemed caught in a vise, with the federal
government promoting unrealistic agricultural and economic practices on one
side, and the autocratic Indian agent, whose decisions affected the direction
and effectiveness of the developing reservation economy, on the other. The
original dream of establishing a tribal cattle herd in order to maintain cultural
continuity suffered significant impediments by 1886. Unfortunately, further
obstacles emerged during the second half of the decade.
In 1885, agent McGillycuddy’s final year on Pine Ridge, he requested
112
that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs put an end to the issue of beef rations
on the reservation. He believed that in order for the Oglala to become either
independent workers or individualized families they needed to be forced to
work for their food. Moreover, he believed that the beef issue was wasted
upon the tribal dog population, estimated at between 30,000 and 40,000 dogs.
Ironically, McGillycuddy reported an increased interest in cattle for the year,
but the number of stock cattle decreased from the previous year’s total of
5,500 to 4,927. This occurred because the beef issue failed to provide for the
tribe’s subsistence. As a result many tribesmen were forced to slaughter cattle
in order to survive.
McGillycuddy noted that while Red Cloud’s band killed and ate their
issue of stock cattle, more industrious members of the tribe sold 300 head of
3-4 year old steers for $9,000. Again, this is an example not only of the
scarcity of issued beef but also of the economic divisions that appeared during
this period between Red Cloud’s “full bloods” and “white husbands” and their
mixed blood descendents. That same year McGillycuddy proudly noted that
farming output quadrupled, and he credited his four agency farmers for the
increase. Yet according to his report only 1,788 acres had been tilled, which
was 22 acres less than reported in 1880!178 In this instance Agent
McGillycuddy clearly fell victim to the bureaucratic practice of shaping
reports to please one’s superiors.
As the 1880s progressed the reservation farming enterprises developed
by Indian Agents fell on hard times. Oglala efforts at farming under the
direction of agent H. D. Gallagher faired poorly in 1887, with only 1,801
178 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 1885-1886, Serial No. 2379, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1886), 261-264, 596-597.
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acres under cultivation. Although Gallagher noted that Red Cloud’s people
“are certainly beginning to understand the importance of making some effort
in the direction of farming,” he also reported that drought killed almost every
crop on the reservation.179
Nonetheless, according to the report the tribe worked diligently in an
effort to make the farming programs succeed despite such dramatic failures.
Again, the surprising determination of the federal government to promote
farming traced its genesis to Jeffersonian ideals pertaining to the importance
of yeoman farmers and the symbol they represented concerning “civilization”
and “democracy.”180 Indian policy demanded tribes adopt American dry
farming techniques in order to achieve successful assimilation. While this
model succeeded to some degree in areas of sufficient rain, and was
successfully adopted by eastern tribes such as the Creek and Cherokee, it
failed to account for plagues of grasshoppers, prairie fires, and a scarcity of
rainfall. The harsh environmental realities of the region eventually shattered
the hopes of well-intentioned bureaucrats who held fast to their belief that dry-
farming on the reservation offered the tribal members their best chance at
economic independence. But this provided little solace to the Oglala forced to
divert their energies to agriculture rather than cattle. Moreover, the
environment dramatically altered the direction of regional cattle operations the
following winter.
The summer drought, and the severe blizzards that followed during the
179 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1887-1888, Serial No. 2542, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1889), 123-124.
180 Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974). See Part Two: Program for a discussion of
this ideology and belief system.
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winter of 1886-1887, proved to be disastrous for the free-range cattle industry
in this region. Each operator strove to maximize herd size and increase profits
during the boom years between 1880 and 1886. This led to massive
overgrazing and a subsequent paucity of winter grasses. Traditionally, during
the winter free range ranchers allowed cattle herds to roam freely in search of
fodder and shelter in the protected river valleys and creeks. This technique
developed regionally in 1868, “the year a treaty was concluded at Fort
Laramie with the troublesome Sioux.”181 Normally, surrounding cattle outfits
gathered anywhere from 10,000 to 75,000 head each spring. This roundup
consisted of 23 wagons, 2,500 head of horses, and 325 men representing about
fifty outfits in the area. However, they rounded up only 3,000 head of cattle
during the spring roundup of 1887.
This practice of overgrazing, coupled with a dry summer and a severe
winter, left as many as ¾ of the area’s outfits, “to the wall with a seventy-five
to hundred percent ‘kill’ of their range stock.”182 The grass had failed to
replenish itself because of the lack of rainfall, and the deep snows prevented
cattle from finding the little forage that remained. At the time of agent
Gallagher’s report to the Commissioner in 1887, the number of tribally owned
stock cattle stood at 6,278 head, up from 4,927 in 1885 despite the killing
winter.183 Remarkably, the Oglala stock cattle fared very well in comparison
because of the tribe’s practice of providing the herds with winter stores of hay.
Unfortunately, the next year saw a dramatic reversal of fortunes for both the
181 Lee and Williams, Last Grass Frontier, 22.
182 Bert L. Hall, Roundup Years, Old Muddy to Black Hills (Pierre: State Publishing Co.,
1956), 276.
183 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1887-1888, Serial No. 2542, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1889), 464-465.
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tribal and white cattle interests.
In 1888 an event occurred that at the same time greatly decreased the
prospects of the Oglala tribe’s cattle interests in the region and greatly
increased the surrounding white cattlemen’s future economic security. The
Sioux Bill of April 30, 1888, reduced the Great Sioux Reservation by
9,000,000 acres and scattered the separate tribes of the Lakota among six
smaller reservations. Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, created for the Oglala
and a temporary population of Northern Cheyenne, contained 3,155,200 acres.
For the ceded land the entire Lakota nation received a twenty year extension
of the educational provisions of the 1868 Treaty, thirty new day schools, farm
equipment, $1,000,000 of excess money from ceded land sales, and most
significantly 26,000 head of stock cows and 1,000 bulls.184 The Oglalas’
share of the stock came out to 7,520 cows and 300 bulls.185 The tribe’s
negotiation for such large numbers of cattle revealed their understanding of
the industry’s importance to their future economic stability and cultural
continuity.
Not surprisingly, the cattle industry outside the reservation strongly
supported, if not actually led, the agitation to reduce the Great Sioux
Reservation. Because of the region’s aridity no great land rush occurred
because white farmers feared they could not survive in the region, which left
the majority of land available for the nearby ranching interests.186 The effects
of this enormous land swap further polarized the ranching industry in the
184 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., 1888-1889, Serial No. 2637, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1889), LXXIII.
185 Letter received by Captain Penney from Commissioner D. Browning, March 13, 1895,
General Records, Box 17, RG 75, KC.
186 Schell, History of South Dakota, 247.
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region. For the white ranchers in the region it meant vastly increased
pasturage for their herds. For the Lakota it meant severe restrictions on herd
size and increased pressure from the white cattle ranchers. For example, the
agent reported that during the winter and spring white ranchers still herded
large numbers of cattle onto the reduced reservation in order to obtain free
grazing and avoid taxes despite their access to new lands. The agent wrote
letters to all offending parties requesting that they remove their stock by July
1st, and most complied. However, some small operators ignored the agent’s
requests.187
The farm equipment provided for the tribe in the Sioux Bill of 1888
underscored the government’s determination to create an Indian community of
yeomen farmers. Clearly, the symbol of the independent yeoman farmer as
the foundation of the nation’s economy remained strong despite the industrial
revolution in the latter half of the nineteenth century. For most Americans
land still represented economic freedom and the wellspring of democratic
influence within the United States. It was not until the following decades that
Progressive Era advancements in transportation and communication helped
transform America’s perception of farmers from the backbone of American
democracy to hayseeds and rubes.
Despite the determination of such well-intentioned or unsympathetic
government officials, the tribe’s farming efforts failed in 1887 because of yet
another drought that killed almost all crops on the reservation. The cyclical
climatological patterns of the northern plains brought an abundance of rain in
1888, and the tribe raised over 21,000 bushels of corn, and 6,000 bushels of
187 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., 1888-1889, Serial No. 2637, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1889), LXXIII.
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potatoes.188 Unfortunately, this temporary success only encouraged the
environmentally unrealistic policy of dry farming on the Great Plains. The
unpredictable weather patterns on the plains forced many hopeful sodbusters
to go bust after only a few years, and led to ecological disasters such as the
Dust Bowl on the Oklahoma plains.
The year 1889 was marked by significant events that altered the Oglala
tribe’s reservation economy. One such change occurred because of changing
federal policy pertaining to the beef ration. For the period between 1885 and
1888 the federal government reduced the approved annual beef rations from
8,000,000 pounds189 to only 4,000,000 pounds.190 This reduction occurred in
response to a sharp reduction in the tribal census. Agent McGillycuddy’s
census in 1885 counted 7,649 Indians on the reservation.191 However, the
following year a new agent, Captain J. M. Bell, undertook a far more rigorous
census in the name of efficiency and cost cutting and found only 4,873 Indian
living on the reservation. Agent Bell stated that the Indians, “acknowledge
they had been drawing rations for all their ghosts.”192
This behavior on the part of the Oglala demonstrated that the Oglala
possessed the ability to respond and adapt to the shortages in the beef ration
by manipulating the system for the people’s benefit. If the United States
188 Ibid.
189 Executive Document, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 1885-1886, Serial No. 2379, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1886), 262.
190 Executive Document, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., 1888-1889, Serial No. 2637, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1889), 470-471.
191 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 1885-1886, Serial No. 2379, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1886), 259.
192 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., 1886-1887, Serial No. 2467, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1887), 294.
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government shorted the Indians on its beef issue, why not then exaggerate the
number of Oglala and Northern Cheyenne living near Pine Ridge Agency?
The tactic worked for twenty years, and still the Indians went hungry more
often than not.
The desire to cut governmental spending while increasing efficiency is
one of the central characteristics of the emerging Progressive Era. However,
for the Oglala the timing proved especially bad when one couples the
droughts, blizzards, and impending reduction of the Great Sioux Reservation
in the late 1880s with the new census. This population shift from 1885 to
1886 constituted a 35% drop in tribal population, a fact that agent Bell
believed could save the government $50,000 a year in beef rations alone. Not
surprisingly, the 1887 gross poundage awarded for the beef contracts was
reduced from 6,500,000 pounds to 4,500,000 pounds, a drop of 31%.
The reduction in beef rations meant an end to the Oglala tribe’s
economic security blanket, which remained at four million gross pounds under
contract until the twentieth century. The tribe realized that the United States
remained indifferent concerning its obligation to provide adequate supplies in
a timely fashion. This realization, coupled with growing food shortages and
crop failures, created a broader and more urgent tribal interest in reservation
cattle operations. After a short period of adjustment that saw their herd size
dwindle, the Oglala intensified their commitment to the care and expansion of
their herds. This recommitment to stock raising also considerably affected the
Oglala’s continually shifting cosmological conception of space and place
within a reservation community.
The creation of the Holy Rosary Catholic Mission on Pine Ridge in
1887 led to a fascinating transformation of Oglala spirituality regarding their
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access and connection to Wakan Tanka.193 Historiographically, authors have
portrayed the relationship between Oglala and Catholic religions within either
a dialectical framework or within the sociological themes of “coexistence”
and/or “syncretism.” However, this complex and constantly renegotiated
relationship resists such thematic restrictions.194
One must remember that Oglala spiritual and cosmological beliefs
created an inherently flexible religion willing, if not eager, to adopt new
ceremonies in order to better understand, and thus control, Wakan Tanka.
With the Oglalas’ access to the Great Mystery greatly diminished the tribe
understandably sought new avenues, or conduits, to this power. As a result,
Catholic ceremonies and/or teachings were adopted within a uniquely Oglala
religious context. They were and addition to, or an aggregation with, existing
Oglala cosmology, not a syncretic blending of the two. In other words, the
Oglala practiced their own “religious colonization” of the Catholic faith.
They took from it what resources were useful and compartmentalized them
within their own spiritual framework.195
Black Elk, the Oglala wicaša wakan, or holy man, became an icon of
this religious transformation in numerous studies concerning this religious
193 DeMallie and Parks, Sioux Indian Religion, 121.
194 For a syncretic take on Christian-Oglala-Peyote religions see, Paul B. Steinmetz, Pipe,
Bible, and Peyote Among the Lakota: A Study I Religious Identity (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1990); for more dialectical studies concerning Catholicism and Oglala
spirituality see, Clyde Holler, Black Elk’s Religion: The Sun Dance and Lakota Catholicism
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Raymond DeMallie, ed., The Sixth Grandfather:
Black Elk’s Teachings Given to John G. Neihardt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1984); and Michael F. Steltenkamp’s, Black Elk: Holy Man of the Oglala (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).
195 For a more contemporary examination of the complex relationship between native
cosmologies and Christian proselytizing efforts see, Cornelia Ann Kammerer, “Customs and
Christian Conversion among Akha Highlanders of Burma and Thailand,” American
Ethnologist, Vol. 17, No. 2, (May, 1990), 277-291.
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interaction. He has been portrayed both as the driving force of the Sun
Dance’s longevity, and as a leader in the Catholic church on Pine Ridge who
rejected his shamanistic role. In truth he fit neither role completely. Black
Elk, influenced by a powerful vision as a youth, sought to lead his people by
providing them a sense of power and hope within their cosmological universe.
He did so by seeking alternative connections to Wakan Tanka. He sought to
bring order out of chaos from his own cultural perspective by incorporating
new ceremonies and rituals into his existing “vertical geography.” Black Elk
never remade his spiritual conception of the universe; he merely broadened it
to include Catholic teachings. While the Oglalas’ “vertical geography” helped
maintain their connection to Wakan Tanka and informed their interaction with
the myriad of wakan within the universe, it concomitantly defined their more
terrestrial relationships.196
While the “vertical geography” of the Oglala seemed amorphous, it
found a connection to the physical world through specific geographical
locations. For the Oglala, the Black Hills, or Paha Sapa, occupy an especially
important place within tribal cosmology. Most importantly, it was there that
the tribe emerged upon the earth and became wicaša akantula, or “men on
top.”197 When the Oglala returned to Paha Sapa during the 18th century many
specific geographical locations either reemerged or were incorporated into
both tribal metaphysical beliefs and connections, and temporal rituals and
ceremonies.
196 Ibid.
197 DeMallie and Parks, Sioux Indian Religion, 28.
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For example, as Linea Sundstrom noted in her work, “Mirror of
Heaven,” Inyan Kara Mountain, which is located in the Black Hills, is
spiritually linked to Inyan, who gave of himself to create the world. The
Oglala called this mountain Inyan Kahga, or “Stone Gathering,” and it was
visited by tribesmen annually before each Sun Dance. Furthermore, the
Oglala identified specific geographical points in the Black Hills with
constellations associated with the Falling Star story. In the story, Falling Star
travels to seven “star” villages of Pleiades, or the Big Dipper. However, these
villages’ descriptions indicate clearly that they are simultaneously located in
the Black Hills, which illustrates the duality of Oglala cosmology.198
In order to clearly understand cultural change within the “horizontal
geography” of the Oglala one must distinguish between various aspects within
the tribe’s relationship with the physical world. These include Oglala
perceptions of tribal leadership, identity, their interactions with outside
groups, and finally how the tribe viewed the concept of boundaries. Taken in
turn, each topic provides a more intricate and complete understanding
concerning the evolution of spatial perceptions in Oglala culture.
Within the Oglala’s “horizontal geography,” which occupied the
physical world, power, or wakan, could be possessed by any leader granted a
position of authority. Such individuals were entrusted to carry out and reify
secular, or terrestrial, tribal law and traditions. Because of the tribe’s
equestrian nomadic society these men became mobile centers of power in and
198 Linea Sundstrom, “Mirror of Heaven: Cross-Cultural Transference of the Sacred
Geography of the Black Hills,” World Archaeology, Vol. 28, No. 2, Sacred Geography
(October, 1996), 177-189.
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of themselves, yet because of the tribe’s diffusion and the tiospaye centered
culture they held little compulsory authoritative power. However, the leader’s
role within Oglala society changed as the tribe expanded its territorial claims
through military expansion. Increased military threats from both newly
encountered tribes, and eventually the United States, led to increased power
for tribal war leaders. Once possessed of increased power Oglala chiefs
sought to maintain this power within reservation boundaries.199
However, United States’ allotment policies, promulgated by the Dawes
Act of 1887, threatened the Chiefs’ power by diffusing tribal members over
the reservation. As a result, many tribal leaders sought to create new loci of
power. Chief George Standing Bear, leader of the Corn Creek District,
requested that a sawmill and storehouse be constructed near his village in
order to better supply his people with rations.200 His request demonstrates
both a desire to maintain his close spatial relationship with his followers in
order to maintain political control, and a new secular perception of power in
relation to geographical locations. In short, the tribe’s isolation from the
Black Hills, the center of the Oglala’s “vertical geography,” and the difficulty
they faced in performing traditional ceremonies, resulted in the ascendancy of
199 Price, Catherine, The Oglala People, 1841-1879 A Political History (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1996).
200 Letter received by CIA, General T. J. Morgan from Acting Agent, Captain George LeRoy
Brown, April 19, 1892, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157
(Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NA-DC.
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terrestrial perceptions of power in relation to specific geographical
locations.201
Oglala identity also evolved during the early reservation era. Before
confinement on the reservation the Oglala’s tribal identity focused on
“affirmative” cultural characteristics, such as a shared language, history, and
cosmology. However, several factors led to a shift in tribal identity. First of
all, the isolation of the seven tribes of the Lakota nation from others one
weakened cultural ties. Add to that the spiritual contraction that occurred
from the loss of the Black Hills, the restrictions of Oglala ceremonies, and the
presence of whites within Oglala boundaries, and one finds a shift in tribal
identity to a more “negative” perception of themselves. Cultural identity
became more about “not” possessing the characteristics of whites than about
being Oglala. Being Oglala meant not being selfish, greedy, materialistic, and
honest. Moreover, the creation of reservations and the presence of whites also
affected spatial relationships, and therefore perceptions, concerning other
cultures and tribal boundaries.202
Previous to reservation life the Oglala understood tribal boundaries to
be negotiable and elastic. Tribal enemies might limit movement but only if
they possessed the strength to resist Oglala expansion. The tribe moved to
follow the buffalo wherever they went, and as a result the Oglala often
“renegotiated” boundaries with various tribes on the Northern Plains. Once
201 For a discussion of the dialectical struggle between sacred power and authority and law
see, Michael E. Harkin, “Carnival and Authority: Heiltsuk Cultural Models of Power,” Ethos,
Vol. 24, No. 2, (June, 1996), 281-313.
202 Keith H. Basso, Portraits of the “Whiteman”: Linguistic Play and Cultural Symbols
among the Western Apache (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
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confined, first to the Great Sioux Reservation, and then to Pine Ridge, the
Oglala perception of boundaries evolved. Boundaries emerged as distinct
geographical points, and thus came into sharper focus. Fences and rivers now
confined the tribe within a fixed geographical area. With mobility restricted,
and political power focused on new geographical locations on the reservation,
the world became a much smaller place.
The dramatic changes brought about by reservation life also altered the
Oglala’s perspective concerning the tribe’s relationship to other cultures. As a
nomadic-equestrian tribe the Oglala were especially skilled at avoiding
outside threats before confinement upon the reservation. If attacked, non-
combatants knew to flee while the warriors held the enemy at bay. If
threatened, an entire camp could be ready to move within two hours.
Defensively, the Oglala founded their strategy upon their superior mobility.
Once confined on the reservation ultimate escape became impossible. The
creation of fixed geographical boundaries greatly restricted mobility and thus
diminished the Oglala’s world. Notably, the contraction of the tribes’
physical universe and its reduced mobility provided access within tribal
boundaries to a non-Oglala culture, that of white Americans.
The presence of white men, either as agents of the United States
government or as “white husbands,” greatly influenced tribal diffusion on
Pine Ridge. Those Oglala more willing to accept federal Indian policies
tended to congregate nearer to white power centers, namely reservation and
district headquarters. Those most ardently opposed to cultural
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accommodation removed themselves from the watchful eyes of federal agents
by following traditional strategies of evasion.203 This resulted in the growing
power and influence of accommodationist groups within the tribe nearer areas
of resource distribution. A growing full blood-mixed blood dichotomy
emerged on Pine Ridge as descendents of “white husbands” eagerly sought
out positions of economic and political power near the reservation agencies.
The first two decades of the reservation era significantly altered Oglala
concepts of space and place. Geography became a “fixed” concept as the
reservation restricted horizontal dimensions of space. The willingness of
some Oglala leader’s to settle in one place, take allotments, and seek symbols
of power demonstrated a significant evolution in Oglala concepts of horizontal
space. The power gained from Paha Sapa was no longer accessible and
ceremonies proved incapable of restoring order. As a result, power shifted
from the wakan of traditional places, accessed by a shamans’ intercession, to
newly created power centers on the reservation. This transformation of
physical power centers demonstrated the ascendancy of “horizontal
geography” over that of “vertical geography” concerning secular powers of
authority and law. Moreover, this period blurred Oglala perceptions of their
own identity while it simultaneously brought the tribal sense of boundaries
into sharper focus.
The introduction of Christianity led not to a dialectical struggle
between Lakota cosmology and Christianity so much as to an incorporation of
203 Hannah, “Space and social control in the administration of the Oglala Lakota (“Sioux”),
1871-1879,” 412-432.
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aspects of Christian belief within the tribes’ spiritual worldview. During this
period the Oglala maintained their desire to create order out of chaos by
gaining access to Wakan Tanka, or the great mystery, through selected
individuals’ personal connection to and/or ability to control the spiritual
realm. Within this cosmology Christianity acted not a replacement to Lakota
religion, nor did a blending of the two occur. Instead, Christianity presented
an opportunity to access the power of Wakan Tanka through an alternative
conduit. Several leaders such as Red Cloud freely incorporated Catholicism
into their religious beliefs while concomitantly refocusing their efforts to
recreate the tribe’s political economy. Red Cloud and other leaders still
urgently sought to develop a self-sustaining communally owned cattle herd in
order to maintain Oglala cultural continuity.
While tribal members increased its interest in the cattle business, the
previously mentioned reduction in the beef rations hindered the tribe’s ability
to dramatically enlarge its operation despite the cattle provided by the 1888
treaty. In 1889 the number of tribally owned cattle stood at 10,968 head204,
but by 1891that number dropped to 7,982.205 This decrease occurred because
the Oglala often slaughtered their stock animals in order to survive, such as in
1890 when the tribe was forced to eat 700,000 pounds of their own stock
cattle to make it through the winter.206 Clearly, the sharp reduction in beef
rations created a shortage of food for a large portion of the tribe, which
necessarily adversely affected its own cattle industry. However, by 1897 the
204 Executive Document, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial No. 2725, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1890), 156.
205 Paul M. Robertson, “The Power of the Land,” 56.
206 Executive Document, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong., 2nd sess., 1890-1891, Serial No. 2841, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1891), 50.
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number of Indian stock rose sharply to 40,051 head, an increase of over five
hundred percent in seven years.207 This expansion in the herd size
demonstrates the productivity of the land when utilized for the care and
raising of cattle by an active and determined group of cattlemen.
Unfortunately, it also demonstrated the mixed-bloods’ and “white husbands’”
political and economic ascendancy on Pine Ridge as they came to dominate
reservation cattle operations.
While this increase in cattle numbers helped some members of the
tribe to achieve economic independence, the majority of the Oglala failed to
reap the benefits from this growing industry. “White husbands,” mixed
bloods, and a small number of “progressive” full bloods grew to dominate the
cattle industry on the reservation. Nonetheless, this renewed interest in
raising cattle in order to gain economic self-sufficiency demonstrated that the
Oglala clearly understood the importance of cattle to both the regional
economy and their own independence. The tribe’s dream remained very much
alive.
Unfortunately, the cultural fragmentation that emerged by 1889
prevented the Oglala from fully reaping the benefits of the growing economy.
While cattle numbers on the reservation increased greatly, only a small
percentage of the Indian population gained economic independence through
this industry. “White husbands” and mixed bloods, which constituted only ten
percent of the Lakota population on Pine Ridge in 1889, owned a
207 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 1897-1898, Serial No. 3641, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1897), 271.
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disproportionate percentage of the cattle that legally grazed tribal lands.208
Moreover, events later revealed that many of the larger cattle interests on the
reservation rejected the associations created by kinship relationships and
reciprocity. The Oglala’s goal of maintaining political, social, and economic
customs and connections weakened under the various obstacles faced by the
tribe during the 1880s. For example, by 1880 “white husbands” and mixed
blood cattle owners joined the Wyoming Stock Growers Association. By
1898 they joined together to form a stock association to protect brands, kill
wolves, and work together for one others mutual benefit.209
The fact that they created a stock association and worked for their
mutual benefit, and not the tribe’s, indicates that to some degree they accepted
the American ideology of capitalism and its focus on obtaining wealth to a
significant degree. Moreover, the concept of protecting individual brands
demonstrates a strong belief in personal property and material accumulation, a
belief not in tune with practices of kinship relationships and reciprocity, nor
the generosity of the giveaway. That year the stock growers on Pine Ridge
sold 2,000,000 pounds of beef to the United States to help the government
meet its beef ration obligations to the rest of the tribe, and branded over 8,000
calves in the spring. The reservation agent was so optimistic about the future
of the cattle industry that he predicted the yearly production of steers would
soon double.210
Yet during the same year he also noted that of the 6,400 Indians living
208 Executive Document, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial No. 2725, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1890), 152.
209 Lee and Williams, Last Grass Frontier, 76-77.
210 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 55th Cong. 3rd sess., 1898-1899, Serial No. 3757, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1898), 276, 610.
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on the reservation, only twenty percent lived off their own labor, and the other
eighty percent survived on government rations.211 This economic situation
prevented many tribal members from participating in the emerging reservation
economy specifically, or the regional market economy in general. For
example, larger and better-established white ranches out produced smaller
reservation operation. They provided larger amounts of beef to market while
at the same time possessing greater access to the markets because of the
Indian Agent’s control over Oglala herds. Moreover, the cattle business
requires an extensive investment in time and capital in order to compete
successfully. Larger operations, both on and off the reservation, possessed
greater ability to pay for both shipping costs to distant markets and repair
costs inherent with the business. Full-blood Oglala cattle owners with smaller
herds found it almost impossible to either maintain sustainable communal
herds or to compete in the regional cattle market when faced with competition
from “white husbands” and mixed bloods on the reservation and off-
reservation cattle outfits. Unfortunately, more governmental institutional
controls concerning Oglala cattle operations arose soon after the division and
downsizing of the Great Sioux Reservation.
A shift in governmental policy pertaining to managing and harvesting
cattle spotlighted the year 1889 as a significant date for the Oglala. As noted
at the beginning of this paper, the preferred method of the Oglala for
procuring and processing the issued beef was the traditional hunting method
used to kill buffalo. Cattle were turned loose from corrals after being weighed
and then hunted down and shot from horseback. The fact that the Oglala
211 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 55th Cong. 3rd sess., 1898-1899, Serial No. 3757, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1898), 276, 610.
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maintained their traditional harvesting and processing method for over twenty
years demonstrates how cattle were used by the tribe as a tool for retaining as
much of their tribal identity and practices as possible. However, the local and
federal officials never warmed to this method of slaughter. As early as 1874
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asked agent J. J. Saville if a more efficient
method could be found to dispatch the animals.212 However, the practice of
killing government issued beef from horseback continued for two decades.
For example, in June of 1889 a young visitor to the reservation named Will S.
Hughes gave this account of a beef issue at Pine Ridge
The boss farmer and his interpreter would enter the small house; at a
command the cattle started thru the shute (sic) and the interpreter
called the two names for each animal turned loose, until 500 long
horned steers had been released. The big flat was covered with
chasing, shooting Indians, until it sounded like a battle was taking
place. After the firing had ceased Mr. Baredy took us out on the
prairie where the slaughtering was being done. The first scene we
witnessed was two squaws and two old men who were hurriedly
ripping the hide from a big long horn. Four or 5 dusky children were
eagerly watching the procedure. In fact it seemed that the 2 old ‘gals’
were doing the work. As the hide came off, meat was cut off in pieces,
the papooses eagerly picking up clotted blood from under foot, eating
it with apparent relish. The old bucks secured a kidney each, and
would cut off huge bites and chew like a Virginia planter would a
hunk of tobacco. The whole thing was (a) bit sickening to a
tenderfoot.213
This scene, seemingly barbarous to whites whom witnessed it, demonstrated
the Oglala’s resolve to retain as much of their nomadic equestrian way of life
was possible.
However, in 1889 policies pertaining to the handling and harvesting of
tribal cattle changed dramatically. The government issued four new
regulations regarding the slaughter of cattle: no cattle could be killed without
212 Letter received by Agent Saville from Commissioner E. P. Smith, April 9, 1874, General
Records, Box 2, RG 75, KC.
213 Hall, Roundup Years, 172.
131
the agent’s permission, no stock issued for breeding could be killed, cows or
heifers could not be killed unless proven barren, and no permits would be
issued to kill steers less than three years old. These rules served two practical
purposes. The first regulation promoted the growth of the reservation cattle
industry dominated by squaw men and mixed bloods. If the small herd
owners were not allowed to butcher and eat their beef they had two choices,
either attempt to compete with the larger outfits or sell their cattle to them.
Either way the larger herd owners enjoyed the advantage.
The second purpose aimed at putting an end to the seemingly barbaric
practice of hunting cattle as well as dancing and feasting. Once the agent
possessed the power to decide if cattle could be slaughtered, and when, he
also held the power to decide the method and eventual use of the beef. The
Oglala found it more difficult to gather in large numbers and maintain social
connections through feasting and dancing, practices the assimilationist United
States government strove to forever destroy. This is evidenced by the
religious practice of the Sun Dance being outlawed in 1883. Because the tribe
continued to dance after the law’s promulgation sterner methods arose to
combat this threat to assimilation. The Oglala, along with all other plains
tribes, were forced to either abandon the Sun Dance or practice the ritual
without the Agent’s knowledge. Moreover, the practice of “hunting” cattle
issued by the government lasted only another year.214
1889 also found new regulations concerning the handling of cattle.
These policies stated that during the annual spring roundup, held in
coordination with non-reservation cattle outfits, all calves must be branded
214 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial No. 2725, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1890), 156.
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with individual brands, not tribal bands.215 This branding policy further
alienated the full bloods whom at times joined their small herds together in
order to compete with larger cattle interests on the reservation. By forcing the
bands to divide their cattle the government promoted the importance of the
individual and the accumulation of personal property over that of the tiospaye
or the tribe as a whole. With these new regulations in place the Oglala Lakota
on Pine Ridge faced dramatic challenges to their socially driven economic
practices of kinship relationships and reciprocity as the foundation of their
tribal economy.
Both socially and economically the Oglala reached a significant
turning point in the tribe’s history in 1889. The Sioux Bill of 1889 cost the
Lakota over nine million acres of productive land and created separate
reservations for each band of the Lakota. The United States’ reduction of beef
rations ended the Oglala complacency and sparked the beginning of a true
reservation economy centered on the cattle industry. And most importantly,
changes in federal policy regarding the care and handling of the tribally
owned cattle made it increasingly difficult to maintain more familiar
economic practices. These events made 1889 one of the most pivotal and
culturally significant years in Oglala tribal history. The tribe still maintained
its cultural identity; however, by attempting to both adapt to and adopt the
ideals inherent in market capitalism the Oglala experienced wrenching
economic changes that carried significant social and political implications.
Following the Dawes Act of 1887 and the subsequent Sioux Bill of 1889 tribal
leaders on Pine Ridge Reservation struggled to thwart allotment and its
215 Ibid.
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deleterious effects for the next 15 years.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Boundaries and Barbed Wire: The Transformation of Oglala Culture,
1890-1906
The year 1890 exists as a landmark in both western and Native
American history. It stands as a monument to both American cultural
transformation during the nineteenth century and as the last burning moment
Native Americans spent at the forefront of the American consciousness.
During the early 1890s Native Americans underwent a metamorphosis within
Anglo-American cultural perceptions. Once militarily defeated, the threat
posed by Indian cultures dissipated, as did their apparent relevance to the
broader political and economic discussions within the United States. As a
result Native Americans seemingly disappeared within the kaleidoscope of
American culture.
For most the year 1890 marked the end of Indian resistance to Euro-
American expansion and dominance. For some it meant an end of sorts, for
others it offered the promise of a bright future. The more romantic or
nostalgic at heart point to it as the end of the frontier. They find it an end to an
era when great men carved a life for themselves and their families out of a
vast wilderness, and the beginning of a more oppressive bureaucratized
America. Others eagerly point to these years as a positive turning point in
American History. A time when the United States first moved towards the
power and greatness it achieved in the twentieth century.
Historiographically for the Lakota, these years came to represent a last
resistance and an ultimate defeat in their struggle for power and autonomy on
135
the northern Great Plains. The Ghost Dance and Wounded Knee seemed a
last desperate gasp for the tribe before it settled meekly into reservation life.
Undoubtedly, for many Lakota the Ghost Dance provided hope toward a
cultural rebirth and its failure proved culturally and psychologically
wrenching. Nonetheless, despite the bitter losses at Wounded Knee and the
end of the Ghost Dance many Lakota continued to actively pursue viable
economic strategies in order to succor cultural continuity and independence
within the reservation environment during this notable time period.216
For the Oglala, the dramatic reduction in land resources promulgated
by The Sioux Bill of 1889, coupled with increased institutional controls,
presented significant new obstacles for the tribe. Moreover, the dramatic loss
of land and resultant economic and mobility restrictions led to the
development of new understandings regarding spatial relationships. This
pertained both to Oglala perceptions concerning “boundaries,” and spatial
proximity to loci of power both within the Oglala community and in regards
216 Native American studies predominantly look to 1890 and the Wounded Knee Massacre as
the final resistance by tribes against United States imperialistic expansion. While the Lakota
are specifically viewed as terminally effected by this event, historians of the west mark
Wounded Knee as an example of the end of universal Native military actions and autonomy,
and to a greater degree, their relevance within the broader historiographic context of
American history. For works that speak specifically concerning the “end” of the Lakota see,
Robert M. Utley, The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963); Robert M. Utley, The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull (New
York: , 1993); George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937); George E. Hyde, Spotted Tail’s Folk: A
History of the Brulé Sioux (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961); James C. Olson,
Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965). For Native
American studies presenting the same theme in a broader context see, Robert M. Utley, The
Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1984). For a different perspective on Wounded Knee see, Jeffrey Ostler’s work that
brilliantly revisits both the events and causes of the Wounded Knee Massacre within the
larger context of colonialism and American expansion in, The Plains Sioux and U.S.
Colonialism From Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004). While Ostler’s work reexamines and recontextualizes Wounded Knee it is
important to note that his work chooses this event to mark its end as well.
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to the tribe’s relationship with off-reservation power centers. Despite
developments such as these, many Oglala leaders refocused their efforts to
establish a self-sustaining and economically supportive cattle herd in order to
create a reservation culture founded on familiar political and social systems.
However, other members of the tribe seemed more eager to accept
American institutional controls and guidelines and energetically moved
toward accommodation with an increasingly intrusive federal government.
Not surprisingly, those most eager to conform to United States policies
consisted primarily of mixed blood Oglala and “white husbands.” Control
over reservation resources such as rations, fence wire and other supplies, and
most importantly, land, hinged on the outcome of the struggle between two
increasingly divided factions on Pine Ridge.
While the center of the debate pertained to land and its use and
ownership its effects ultimately rippled throughout the Oglala tribe in several
significant ways. Cultural aspects affected included tribal cohesion, tribal
social and economic structure, and power relationships both within the tribe
and in regards to the federal government. Those seeking greater
accommodation with the federal government seemed willing to fundamentally
alter social relationships within the tribe by accepting American economic and
social models presented by Agency personnel. They also created and
strengthened connections, or bonds, with reservation and regional power
centers by accepting these models.
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Economic and political power on Pine Ridge Reservation lay predominantly
with Agents and their acting District Farmers. Regionally, off-reservation
cattle interests proved a valuable economic resource for the growing number
of mixed bloods and “white husbands” who made up and increasingly large
portion of the more accommodation minded tribal members. Not surprisingly,
from 1890 to 1906 the debate concerning tribal land usage and ownership
focused predominantly on allotment.
Allotment and Accommodation
Winter on the northern plains traditionally meant a time of relaxed
activity for the Oglala. They tended their horse herds and occasionally
hunted, but for the most part they settled down and rode out the winter by
surviving on stored meats and vegetables. It was rarely a time of decisive
activity. However, by 1890 conditions for the Oglala no longer resembled
those of a decade ago, and for two tribal members decisive activity flowed
from the point of a pen. In January 1890 both George Sword, Captain of
Agency Police, and Fast Horse, Lieutenant of Agency Police wrote letters to
the Honorable J. W. Noble, Secretary of the Interior, requesting surveyors be
sent to Pine Ridge so allotment might commence. Fast Horse stated he knew
nearly 300 ready to take their land, and that he worried over present
conditions on the reservation because “one (Oglala) has as much right to the
land as another.” He went on to note that while The Sioux Bill of 1889
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allowed five years for allotment he believed it could be done in less than three
if surveyors completed their work that coming summer.217
These letters provide a glimpse into the two most significant
developments on Pine Ridge Reservation between the years 1890 and 1906.
During these years disagreements arose within the Oglala community
concerning the future of both the growing Oglala cattle interests and the
necessity of accommodation with an increasingly intrusive American culture.
George Sword and Fast Horse represent a small, vocal, and yet increasingly
powerful segment of the Oglala tribe. In 1891 these two men drafted a
petition, signed by 131 heads-of-households who represented 515 tribal
members, which again called for “a survey to be made in order that we may
declare our election and settle on the land we have selected.” These men,
hoped to take their land in severalty by applying for their allotments under the
agreement of the Sioux Bill Act of March 2, 1889. Clearly, a significant
portion of the tribe envisioned a future that did not include commonly owned
or shared reservation land used to run large herds of both communally and
individually owned cattle. During the next fifteen years these two competing
viewpoints strove to realize their vision for the tribe.218
However, in the early 1890s the tribe still struggled to combat off-
reservation cattle trespass, maintain familiar socio-economic practices, and
217 Letter received by Honorable J. W. Noble, Secretary of Interior from Fast Horse,
Lieutenant of Police, January 20, 1890, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine
Ridge, Box 157 (Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC, and Letter receive by Noble
from George Sword, Captain of Police, February 4, 1890, ibid.
218 Petition dated March 31, 1891, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge,
Box 157 (Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC. Of particular personal interest, among
the names elegantly written on the petition was that of George W. Means, this author’s great
grandfather.
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create a stable economy. Government inspectors noted that the Oglala cattle
industry might become self-sufficient if allowed to utilize their resources
without competing with trespassers. The tribe continued to sell cattle to the
government for the beef issue and often hunted them from horseback.
However, that policy continued to come under attack as brutal in nature and
by the end of that year disappeared.219
Meanwhile, George Means and his fellow petitioners moved
energetically to facilitate the allotment process. Over the next several years
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs received many letters asking that surveys
be completed so allotment might commence. The Bissonett family declared
their desire for allotments in June 1891. The Acting Agent, Captain Charles
G. Penny, noted at the time “these people are all mixed bloods, but well
disposed and reasonably progressive.”220 The push to survey the reservation
proved effective. Surveyors arrived in the summer of 1891 but their progress
proved to be too slow for some tribal members.221
In February of 1892 Special Agent George LeRoy Brown sent a letter
to the CIA on behalf of “progressive” Indians who want the White River
219 Letter from Frank C. Armstrong, U.S. Indian Inspector, to J.W. Noble, SOI, March 22,
1890, Box 9, Index to Correspondence Received from the Office of Indian Affairs, Indian
Warehouse & Special Agent, 1896-ca. 1906, General Correspondence, RG 75, NARA-KC.
220 Letter received by CIA, from Acting Agent, June 2, 1891, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-
147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157 (Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC.
221 Letter received by CIA from George Chandler, Acting Secretary, August 11, 1891, Special
Cases, 1821-1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157 (Allotments in severalty), RG 75,
NARA-DC. Chandler directed, as commissioned, the Commissioner of the General Land
Office to survey 15 townships on Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. The surveyors completed
several townships by the time of the August letter.
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Valley and Medicine Root District surveyed for their allotments.222 The
Oglala in question urgently requested surveys as soon as possible because the
Brulé at Rosebud were getting their allotments completed first because their
land was surveyed.223 Moreover, a second petition calling for immediate
allotment arrived at the CIA’s desk in January of 1892. The petition, again
organized by George Sword and Fast Horse, contained 184 names, 53 more
than the first.224
However, for many Oglala allotment remained a confusing prospect.
Chief George Standing Bear of Corn Creek District expressed his uncertainty
regarding allotment in a letter to Agent Brown in March of 1892. Chief
Standing Bear referred to himself and his people as “desiring to become
settled progressive people” but asked to meet with the agent to clarify several
topics. He noted a preference for the $3 cash payment to annuity goods or
rations, but feared the loss of all three if allotted. George worried because
“some of the Indians said that any Indians taking land in allotment under
severalty law will be deprived of rations and that he has to pay taxes on his
land yearly and finally his lands be taken.” Despite these fears he reiterated
222 The OIA adopted the title “Acting Agent” to refer to those Army officers employed as
agents because of security concerns on the reservation. Daniel T. Royer, known as “Young
Man Afraid of His Indian” by the Oglala, was relived on January 8, 1891 following Wounded
Knee. During the following months temporary responsibility for the agency fell upon F. E.
Pierce on Jan. 13, Capt. Charles G. Penny on Feb. 5, and Capt. George LeRoy Brown on
October 27, with Brown being named Acting Agent on December 1, 1891. Captain Charles
G. Penny assumed command again on July 24, 1893, Appendix B, Agents/Superintendents at
Pine Ridge to 1917, NARA-KC.
223 Letter received by CIA, General T. J. Morgan, from Acting Agent, Captain George LeRoy
Brown, February 20, 1892, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157
(Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC.
224 Letter received by Commissioner of Indian Affairs, General T. J. Morgan, from Acting U.
S. Indian Agent, Captain George LeRoy Brown, dated January 6, 1892, Special Cases, 1821-
1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157 (Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC.
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his desire to become an American citizen but hoped that “those Indians who
have no intelligence” might not pull the “progressives” down. The reservation
debate concerning allotment clearly affected George. Those factions desirous
of preventing allotment seemed to play upon the fears of those more
benevolently inclined toward the program.225
George Standing Bear continued to foster a relationship with Agent
Brown in order to move allotment forward. In an April letter George Standing
Bear again stated his desire for allotment and also asked for a new sawmill
and storehouse. He wanted future ration issues stored in Corn Creek District,
and also declared his desire for a new method of killing government issued
beef. Chief Standing Bear seemed so eager to accept newly implemented
government controls that when Acting Agent Brown forwarded the letter to
the CIA Brown stated that Chief Standing Bear and his followers were
“among the most progressive on the reservation.”226 In fact, Acting Agent
Brown conferred the same sentiments about Judge Fast Horse and Judge
Grass after they again called for their allotments as soon as possible.227 The
focus of these men’s communications dealt predominantly with allotment;
however, these letters reveal other factors affecting both tribal unity and
control over economic and political power.
225 Letter received by Captain George LeRoy Brown, Acting Indian Agent, from George
Standing Bear, Chief Corn Creek District Camp, March 1892, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-
147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157 (Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC.
226 Letter received by CIA, General T. J. Morgan from Acting Agent, Captain George LeRoy
Brown, April 19, 1892, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157
(Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC.
227 Letter received by CIA, General T. J. Morgan from Acting Agent, Captain George LeRoy
Brown, May 11, 1892, Special Cases, 1821-1907, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Box 157
(Allotments in severalty), RG 75, NARA-DC.
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As Fast Horse, George Standing Bear and likeminded Oglala actively
sought allotment they found themselves increasingly tied to the agents of the
American federal government in an effort to gain political and economic
power on Pine Ridge. First, when these men wrote letters they revealed a
familiarity with the culturally imposed system of power relationships and the
disposition to work within that system. Fast Horse and the others realized the
value and power of writing inherent within the increasingly invasive power
structure of the United States. As a result they wrote letters and promulgated
petitions to both local and federal agents of the government. Their familiarity
with agency bureaucracy led them to attempt access through new avenues of
communication rather than meet with Agents and District Farmers in more
traditional councils that depended upon the word and influence of the
representative federal agents. Moreover, Grass and Fast Horse accepted
positions as tribal judges. These positions were created to promote
assimilation by controlling native behavior. To work as a part of federally
created institutional controls demonstrated a willingness to accept a
significant level of cultural change in order to further one’s own agenda.
These men sought control of the growing tribal cattle interests and ownership
or access to the most valuable land on the reservation.
Furthermore, George Standing Bear’s request for a sawmill and
storehouse indicated an attempt to reposition a reservation power center
within the sphere of his control or influence. The proximal location of a
storehouse near Chief Standing Bear’s encampment might provide him with
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the ability to manipulate the distribution of the rations in order to both
consolidate and bolster his position as Chief. As a matter of course he seemed
willing to drastically alter the more familiar Lakota mode of production,
which involved the harvesting of buffalo/government issued steers from
horseback. Those Oglala who sought to maintain their nomadic equestrian
way of life by establishing communally and individually owned herds of cattle
grazed on commonly controlled land depended upon the continuation of pre-
reservation social and economic connections. They believed that continued
alterations to their pre-reservation kinship relationships and economic patterns
meant eventual cultural extinction. As the 1890s moved forward the two
camps economic visions solidified, polarized, and moved forward within an
American cultural framework.
The Oglala who sought allotment clearly understood that if they
utilized the emergent American institutional controls to gain legal claim to the
most productive reservation lands they might claim control of the tribe’s
economic development. Their efforts to establish relationships with agency
personnel and control reservation resources demonstrated an intimate
knowledge of administrative technologies employed by their federal
bureaucratic supervisors.228 This knowledge proved invaluable in gaining the
Agent’s permission both to buy cattle from other Indians and to sell it to the
government as part of the tribe’s beef ration. Not surprisingly, much of the
228 “Administrative technologies” is a term defined as a “system for the surveillance and
control of the everyday lives of the Lakota people” created within the reservation system by
bureaucratically penetrating the population, in Thomas Biolsi’s Organizing the Lakota: The
Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1992), 7.
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insights concerning the machinations of the American bureaucratic system
emanated from mixed blood Oglala and their white fathers. One of the most
successful of these mixed blood reservation cattlemen was William Denver
McGaa.
W. D. McGaa’s rise to prominence on Pine Ridge Reservation is a
uniquely fascinating tale in western history. His father, William McGaa laid
claim to being one of the west’s most colorful characters. William McGaa’s
true name and ancestry appeared both uncertain and rather nefarious. He used
the name Jack Jones as readily as William McGaa and sometimes claimed to
be the bastard son of either an English Baronet or a Lord Mayor of London.
He worked primarily as a mountain man and trader, but gained his greatest
notoriety concerning his efforts for the St. Charles Company, where he played
a central role in its incorporation and early development. Not insignificantly
the St. Charles Company served as a prominent organizing force in the city of
Denver’s early growth and eventual incorporation during the early years of the
Colorado gold rush. 229
Ironically, William’s marriage to a Lakota woman both opened the
door for his success in Denver and also proved his ouster. His Lakota wife
proved an important connection to Cheyenne and Arapahoe communities
during his time as a trader in and around Denver during the 1850s and 1860s.
However, in the early 1860s Denver’s increasingly influential white society
proved far less accepting of the colorful William McGaa and his Lakota
229 William McGaa is a notable character in Elliot West’s, The Contested Plains: Indians,
Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 184-
185.
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wife.230 The concept of race as a categorical weapon for both social and
economic division and exploitation pockmarked the landscape of the west
during the expansion of the United States. One’s claim to “whiteness” helped
define one’s social standing and access to economic and political recourses
and power. Conversely, one could be stained by the taint of perceived racial
deficiencies pertaining to one’s closest associates.231
As a result, William McGaa found himself ostracized both socially and
economically because of his marriage to an Indian woman because Indians
occupied the lowest social rung within the emergent community of Denver.
Nonetheless, before his death on December 15th, 1867 William indelibly
marked his place in Colorado history when he became the father of the first
child born within the newly established city.232 On March 8, 1859, William’s
Lakota wife gave birth to a son. The young babe was appropriately named
William Denver McGaa.233
Over a decade after his father’s death W. D. McGaa followed his
surviving family north to the Great Sioux Reservation in 1879 where his
mother’s heritage proved an asset.234 His maternal grandmother’s brother was
230 Ibid, 185-201.
231 For a brilliant and nuanced examination of how language, perception, power, and beliefs
shaped categories of whiteness and class see, Neil Foley’s, The White Scourge: Mexicans,
Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1997). Foley’s work carefully depicts the complexities and nuances of racial negotiations
pertaining to perception of “whiteness” as they related to increased machinations of regional
capitalistic involvement and changing relations to land ownership and use.
232 For the date and place of William McGaa’s death see, Page 3 of Hazel L. Cuney’s,
Ancestor Chart, Biography M1312, McGaa, William, Western History Collections, Denver
Public Library.
233 West, The Contested Plains, 185.
234 See, April 29, 1925 “Scions of Denver McGaa, Early-Day Resident Here, Now Leaders
Among Sioux” in Biography M, McGaa, William, and Family, Clipping files, Western
History Collections, Denver Public Library.
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Chief Day, an important leader among the Oglala.235 Attracted by new
economic opportunities, created by recent treaty negotiations with the Lakota,
the McGaa family headed north with several of William’s former trapping and
trading compatriots. Men such as Batiste “Big Bat” Pourier, John Provost,
Antoine Janis, and the Richard, Morrison, and Shaugreau families quickly
became “white husbands” on the reservation. Their mixed blood children
were often W. D. McGaa’s closest companions and friends, and they
eventually controlled the majority of cattle production on Pine Ridge.236
Pine Ridge offered an economic and political sanctuary of sorts for
“Denver Bill” and his fellow Colorado expatriates. Marginalized from
participation in Denver’s burgeoning economic growth because of their ties to
Native American communities they found greater opportunities and societal
influence available on the reservation. “White husbands” enjoyed both the
economic opportunities presented on Pine Ridge and the political buffer the
tribe provided between state and federal powers. However, this does not
mean they escaped the negative stereotyping and condemnation of racism all
together. Many of the white government employees working and living on
Pine Ridge possessed rather vitriolic perceptions concerning Indian/white
miscegenation.
For example, George P. Tower, a clerk at Pine Ridge, referred to
“white husbands” as “squaw humpers” in an official letter to Lieutenant Guy
235 See, “Lovie McGaa, 100: the memories are clear,” February 16, 1984, The Rapid City
Journal, in Biography M, McGaa, William, and Family, Clipping files, biography, Western
History Collections, Denver Public Library.
236 See, “My Tepee Life” by He-Wan-Jee-Cha, Indian, Tribes, Dakota, Clipping files,
Biography M, McGaa, William, Western History Collections, Denver Public Library.
147
H. Preston pertaining to vouchers for cattle received by the agency. While
“white husbands” faced social opprobrium from white neighbors they
concomitantly enjoyed access to a growing reservation cattle industry. Both
politically and economically insulated from the machinations of a
disapproving white society these “white husbands” and their descendants
significantly shaped the direction of Oglala culture during the next several
decades.237
When the McGaa family arrived in 1879 the reservation cattle industry
was small but quickly growing. The tribe claimed ownership of 2,500 head of
cattle after a government issue of 500 cows and heifers and 22 bulls, all at
least ¼ blood American stock. The Indian Agent, V.T. McGillycuddy, noted
that the stock was “well cared for” with only a loss of 5 or 6 head despite
predictions they would be slaughtered and eaten. Moreover, the tribe saved
over 100 cows from the summer beef issue and he recommended “a large
issue of stock the coming season.”238
However, McGillycuddy’s report also pointed to both cultural and
economic fragmentation on the reservation as early as 1879. He referred to
the beginning of the struggle for control of both the reservation’s economy
and resources when he stated
the squaw-men assume that by marriage they have all the rights of
full-blooded Indians, and they endeavor to exercise these rights not
237 Letter received by Lieutenant Guy H. Preston from George P. Tower, clerk, August 28,
1893, Box 1, Vouchers for Open Market Purchases from Indians June 4, 1883-October 31,
1901, Pine Ridge Agency, Record Group 75, NARA-KC.
238 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1879-1880, Serial 1910, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1880), 145, 355.
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only in possession of cattle themselves, but also in ranging and
pasturing upon Indian reservations large herds belonging to other
white men; and when the removal of such cattle is attempted by the
agent, the squaw-men claim property in them under fictitious bills
of sale.239
Clearly, the presence of a growing population of “white husbands”
dramatically affected the economic conditions on Pine Ridge by competing
with Oglala for both cattle and grazing.
That same year Agent McGillycuddy noted political wrangling within
the tribe when it dispersed in order to pursue stock raising and agricultural
interests. He found that within a year of his arrival at Pine Ridge the number
of band chiefs rose from 11 to 30 as a result of this dispersal. Tribal leaders
such as Red Cloud gained considerable power when the tribe consolidated
both in order to militarily resist American expansion and then as the Oglala
settled near the agency during the decade following the 1877 Treaty. The
scattering of the Oglala population threatened their power. McGillycuddy
believed leaders such as Red Cloud resisted economic change because it
meant a dramatic reduction in the Chief’s quotidian influence concerning
tribal matters. The McGaa family arrived during an unsettled and contentious
economic period. Their timing proved rather propitious.240
During the reservation’s economic and political period of instability
W. D. McGaa carved a significant niche for his family on Pine Ridge. In
1881 he found work as a herder on Pine Ridge. He rose to the position of
Chief Herder in 1883 and held the post for a year and a half. He stated in a
239 Ibid, 104.
240 Ibid, 162-163.
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1906 interview, which took place at Batiste Pourier’s place, that he lost that
job because he refused to use a “cold iron” when branding government issued
beef. A “cold iron” referred to insufficiently heated branding irons unable to
sear the stock’s flesh and thus leave a permanent mark. Because a “cold” iron
brand wore off quickly any cattle so marked reverted to the previous owner’s
possession, as only their brand remained visible. The government often
contracted for large herds, sometimes as large as 6,000 head, to meet its treaty
obligations. These herds were to last seven to nine months and be rounded up
as needed, which left sufficient time for the reservation brand to disappear on
cattle branded thusly.241
W. D. McGaa claimed that during the first two years he rode herd the
Chief Herder used a “cold” brand that marked only the hair of the issued
cattle. By the time many of the issued steers faced their ultimate fate their
F.O.F. reservation brand no longer remained legible. The reservation stock
inspector employed by the Wyoming Stock Growers Association either
unwittingly or in collaboration with agency employees cut the cattle out of the
herd because they seemingly belonged to off-reservation outfits. These cattle
often were resold to the government several times until eventually shipped to
the stockyards in Chicago. According to McGaa such dealings remained the
“rottenest…he ever saw.” When McGaa attained the position of Chief Herder
he stated he branded his cattle well, and therefore lost his job. He noted that
the excuse the agency used to fire him focused on 11 head of cattle his wife
241 See, “Interview with Wm. Denver McGaa. At Batiste Pourier’s, November 8, 1906,” Reel
2, Eli S Ricker Collection, Western History Collections, Denver Public Library.
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owned. Supposedly, anyone who owned cattle could not hold a government
position.242
Despite this occupational setback W. D. McGaa increased his
holdings. He gained the position of Boss Farmer at Manderson in Wounded
Knee District in 1892; the policy against government employees owning cattle
conveniently forgotten or overlooked. In the eight years following his
dismissal as Chief Herder McGaa dramatically increased his herd. In January
1893 he possessed a herd large enough to sell 44 steers to the government for
$1,509. Not surprisingly, by 1901 “Denver Bill” rated a story in the Omaha
World-Herald, which described him as “a wealthy stockman now,” and noted
he “branded more calves last spring than any other man on the Pine Ridge
agency.”243 In fact, between 1892 and 1906 W. D. McGaa personally sold
406 head in sixteen separate sales to the agency for $14,000. During a time
when most Oglala sold one or two head, probably recent government issued
stock, in open market purchases called for by the agency McGaa averaged
over 25 head sold per transaction. Moreover, these sales do not include cattle
“Denver Bill” shipped and sold in the stockyards of Omaha and Chicago.244
W. D. McGaa’s family and his old friends from Colorado also fared
rather well at Pine Ridge. His fellow émigrés to Pine Ridge, Batiste “Big Bat”
242 See, “Interview with Wm. Denver McGaa. At Batiste Pourier’s, November 8, 1906,” Reel
2, Eli S Ricker Collection, Western History Collections, Denver Public Library.
243 See, “Denver’s First White Baby,” March 17, 1901 Omaha World-Herald, Biography-M,
McGaa, William, and Family, Clipping files, biography, Western History Collections, Denver
Public Library.
244 See, Box 1, Vouchers for Open Market Purchases from Indians June 4, 1883-October 31,
1901; Box 2, Vouchers for Open Market Purchases from Indians November 1, 1901-March
24, 1910; and Box 3, Vouchers for Open Market Purchases from Indians 1903 through 1906,
Pine Ridge Indian Agency, RG 75, NARA-KC.
151
Pourier, Antoine Janis and the Morrison’s and Shaugreau’s, found the
economic atmosphere to their liking as their names appeared many times
along side “Denver Bill’s” in the vouchers recording cattle sold to the agency
by “Indians.”245 The names Pourier, Janis, Richard, Morrison and Shaugreau,
as well as the Craven’s, appeared on voucher for sale of beef to the agency 65
times between June of 1893 and June of 1906. (The Craven’s were in-laws of
“Denver Bill’s.” His sister Jessie married Cornelius Augustus Craven owner
of the Open Buckle Ranch on Pine Ridge, the “–D” was one of the first brands
on the reservation.)246 These transactions totaled 529 head, an average of
more than eight cattle per sale, total weight of which came to over half a
million pounds of beef. During this same period the average number of cattle
sold per transaction by the vast majority full blood Oglala numbered either
one or two head. Why the discrepancy between “white husband”/mixed blood
and full blood numbers per sale? Opportunity and willingness to sell offer the
best explanations.247
Full blood Oglala who hoped to maintain cultural continuity held a
very different vision concerning cattle. Previously, the introduction of the
horse fundamentally altered the Lakota’s more egalitarian society as
ownership and control over large herds emerged as the most visible
demonstration of status within the tribe. The killing or removal of most of the
tribes’ horse herds, coupled with the truncation of warfare as an avenue of
245 Ibid.
246 See, M1312, pp. 4-13, (Letter and Report on C. A. Craven), McGaa, William, and Family,
Clippings files, biography, Western History Collections, Denver Public Library.
247 Ibid.
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increased social status, forced dramatic alterations concerning concepts of
masculinity and power.
As a result, most full bloods hoped to integrate cattle into their socio-
economic relations to replace both the horse and buffalo as conduits to status
and prestige. While they also desired to grow their herds quickly they did so
for very different reasons. They hoped to regain their economic independence
by establishing tribal herds sufficiently large enough to provide sustenance for
the entire tribe indefinitely. Moreover, cattle offered a chance to maintain, or
reinstitute, hierarchical symbols tied to status and prestige. As horse herd
numbers once helped to define a man’s societal standing, so too might cattle.
The sale of their cattle seemed at odds with that goal; moreover, they not only
were less familiar with the machinations of the American capitalistic economy
they found no easy access to regional/national markets in any case. As
previously noted Indian Agents increased quotidian control of Oglala
economic decisions greatly hindered the tribes’ off-reservation economic
interactions.
Conversely, to “white husbands” and their mixed blood progeny, cattle
represented a means to an end, not an end unto itself. These men sought an
alternative to tribal concepts of manliness and social status based previously
upon warfare and the economic provision of one’s Tiospaye. “White
husbands” and their descendants perceived concepts of success as tied to the
accumulation of property. Ownership and control of land seemed to offer
access to economic and political influence both on the reservation itself and
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within a larger regional context. Materially, the purpose of building a cattle
operation rested in its ability to provide an income for the immediate family.
Concern for the Oglala tribe as a whole either ranked as a secondary
consideration or possibly as none at all. The import placed upon the pursuit of
profit and power, coupled with the “white husbands” considerable advantage
in matters pertaining to the regional/national market, provided increased
incentives to grow larger herds quickly and then to sell excess cattle to
market. The McGaa family is just one notable example of this method of
operation.248
While mixed bloods and “white husbands” moved toward reshaping
tribal cultural infrastructures through their influence on the Oglala cattle
industry their families found other conduits to power on Pine Ridge through
permanent government employment. Government employment offered not
only steady pay and a certain level of economic security; it offered access to
the reservation power centers such as schools, Pine Ridge Agency itself, and
the District Farmers offices. The proximity to loci of power afforded
opportunities to influence reservation policy by presenting opinions on
various reservation projects or debates to either District Farmers or the
reservation Agent. Moreover, these positions often provided varying degrees
248 James F. Brooks artfully delineates the significant influence capitalism possessed
concerning the alteration of patrimonial societies of the southwest borderlands. The
Comanche socio-economic infrastructure changed from a loose confederation of egalitarian
family units called numunahkahni, to more hierarchical bands under more powerful leaders.
These leaders gained prestige through the acquisition of the “cultural capital” of warfare,
hunting, and more significantly, the capture and possession of both horses and captives.
Brooks notes that as the Comanche gained in power because of their growing trade in horses
and slaves they also became more vulnerable to broader economic developments beyond their
control. See Chapter Two, “Los Llaneros,” of Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and
Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2002).
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of control over tribal members seeking rations, a redress of grievances, or an
education. Not surprisingly, both reservation Agents and District Farmers
sought to employ “progressive” Indians inclined to both support and
administer government policies. As a result both mixed blood and white
women and men filled most government positions on the reservation.
For example, from June 30, 1887 to June 30, 1889 the employment
records at Pine Ridge listed the following male employees: A.W. Means-
butcher; J.T. Darr-Chief Herder; William Twiss-Assistant Chief Herder; Two
Two-herder; Charles Giroux-herder; Pumpkin Seed-watchman; Charles Cuny-
interpreter; P. Wells-telegraph operator; Edgar Fire Thunder-laborer; Frank
Twiss-laborer; Amos Long Hill-laborer; Frank Galligo-laborer; L.W. Brewer-
laborer; Robert Bissonette-laborer; William Vlandry-laborer; and Charles
Means-laborer. With the exception of Two Two and Pumpkin Seed they are
all either whites or mixed bloods.249 This occurred despite the fact that mixed
bloods comprised only 503 persons out of a reservation population of 5,609,
which is just less than nine percent.250
This is not to say full bloods did not still have access to wage labor on
the reservation. The same ledger that listed reservation employees also noted
“Indians” earned $4 for every cord of wood supplied to the agency. On
December 31, 1887 the agency paid $1,037 for 259 ¼ cords, and on
249 See Ledger titled, “Receipts & Disbursements, Red Cloud—Pine Ridge Agency, 7-2-75 to
6-25-94,” Cash Book-July 1875-1894, A Record of Receipts and disbursements, Pine Ridge
Reservation was know as Red Cloud Reservation until January 1, 1879, RG 75, NARA-KC.
The butcher, A. W. Means is yet another of this author’s relatives, as was laborer Charles
Means.
250 Executive Documents, House of Representatives, Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889-1890, Serial 2725 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1890), 152.
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September 29, 1888 “Indians” pocketed $2,100 for 525 cords of wood.
Another $900 entered the possession of “Indians” that same day for 150 tons
of hay at $6 per ton. Moreover, the agency paid “Indians” $2,229.40 for
hauling 445,880 pounds of freight (50 cents per 100 lbs) from Brooksville,
Nebraska to Pine Ridge Agency on March 31, 1888.251 Despite these seasonal
occupations it is clear that government jobs predominantly went to mixed
bloods or white men. This occupational condition further bolstered mixed
bloods’ and white women’s economic, social, and political influence on Pine
Ridge.
One need look any farther than “Denver Bill’s” sister, Jessie “McGaa”
Craven, to illuminate both the preference of Agent’s to hire either whites or
mixed bloods and the many and surprising avenues available to influence
reservation development. As noted earlier, Cornelius and Jessie Craven
established one of the earliest cattle outfits on the reservation, the Open
Buckle Ranch. The ranch’s open buckle brand, -D, belonged among the first
recorded on Pine Ridge. In a letter to her son Ben, written on June 16, 1941,
she recounts how her husband, born in Burlington, New Jersey, made his way
west to Abilene, Kansas. From there he joined a large Texas outfit headed to
for Wyoming and years later bought “a little bunch of young cows” in Fort
Collins, Colorado in 1876. He herded them to Cheyenne, where he already
had a few cows, and branded them with the Open Buckle brand. C.A. Craven,
251 See Ledger titled, “Receipts & Disbursements, Red Cloud—Pine Ridge Agency, 7-2-75 to
6-25-94,” Cash Book-July 1875-1894, A Record of Receipts and disbursements, Pine Ridge
Reservation was know as Red Cloud Reservation until January 1, 1879, RG 75, NARA-KC.
For a brief examination of freighting and other Lakota reservation economic opportunities
see, Ostler, The Plains Sioux, 135-146.
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as Jessie called him, soon received a government contract to supply beef first
at Fort Robinson, and later at Pine Ridge. Jessie and C.A. later established an
outfit near Kyle, South Dakota on Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. 252
It was at Kyle that Jessie recalled gaining her position as schoolteacher
at Kyle Indian Day School in the early 1890s.253 The Agent, Captain George
LeRoy Brown, frequently stopped by their home and on one occasion insisted
Jessie accept the position of schoolteacher at Kyle. She refused at first, but
Brown promised to build her a cottage near the school in which she and
Cornelius could live, any style she desired, if she might acquiesce. Most
likely overwhelmed by his generosity and persistence she agreed. It was here
she made the acquaintance of two of America’s most notable historical
figures.
One day at around noon she received three visitors at the school,
Agent Brown, Reverend Charles Cook, and a Mr. Theodore Roosevelt. The
future President of the Untied States asked Mrs. Craven if he could see some
of the children’s work and hear them sing. Jessie eagerly granted his requests
and after hearing two “school songs,” a hymn and “America,” the children
were dismissed. Following their time at the school Captain Brown and
Reverend Cook returned to the agency; however, Mr. Roosevelt stayed on for
a week with Jessie and Cornelius. This notable week took on more
significance when Mr. Herbert Welch from Germantown, Pennsylvania also
252 See, M1312, pp. 4-13, (Letter and Report on C. A. Craven), McGaa, William, and Family,
Clippings files, biography, Western History Collections, Denver Public Library.
253 The exact dates are not mentioned, but Agent Brown occupied the position of Indian Agent
at Pine Ridge Reservation between December 1st, 1891 and July 24th, 1893.
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came to call on the Craven’s.254 Imagine welcoming two of the nation’s most
noted reformers into one’s home, discussion must have sparkled.
Undoubtedly, the intimate group setting led to discussions concerning Indian
education and reform; however, the gathering itself reveals much more
concerning reservation social and economic machinations and hierarchy.255
The two noted guests, whose national influence within Indian affairs
was considerable, forged their perception of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation
from their visits to schools, district farm stations, and Pine Ridge Agency.
They looked for examples of “progressive” Indians and found them at the
school in Kyle. It must have done their hearts good to hear the Indian children
singing a hymn and the song “America.” However, access to these powerful
men was offered predominantly to mixed bloods and “white husbands.” As a
result any discussions concerning the reservation’s future offered only one
“Indian” perspective, which undoubtedly favored the mixed blood/“white
husband” faction.
As their connections to power strengthened, those who favored
allotment continued their aggressive demand for immediate allotment. For
example, Iron Crow asked Acting Agent Brown to write the CIA concerning
his desire for allotment. In the letter Brown described Iron Crow as being an
Indian, “who has a trading store on the Upper Wounded Knee, and is one of
254 For an insightful examination of the larger political and cultural contexts behind Indian
schooling, and a glimpse into the influences of Herbert Welch on Indian education and reform
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see, David Wallace Adams, Education
for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995).
255 See, M1312, pp. 4-13, (Letter and Report on C. A. Craven), McGaa, William, and Family,
Clippings files, biography, Western History Collections, Denver Public Library.
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the leaders among the progressive Indians on this reservation, requests me to
write to you in regard to the further survey of this reservation.” Apparently,
the survey was supposed to have been done during the previous summer.256
Despite the advantage of possessing a more direct avenue to power the
“progressive,” full blood, and mixed blood/“white husband” minority faced
increasingly powerful resistance to their push for allotment. In March of 1894
Red Cloud and other Oglala leaders sent a petition of their own to the CIA
stating their strong opposition to allotment.257 Later that summer a new
Acting Indian Agent sent a letter to the CIA supporting Red Cloud’s socio-
economic position. Agent Charles G. Penney told the CIA that he received a
petition with 1,258 names and “they are now, almost to a man, very positive
in the opinion that their land should not be allotted to them in severalty, but
that they, as a community, should have a title in fee simple to all the land of
their reservation.” He went on to note that not ten percent of the tribe now
wants allotments.258
The CIA in reply asked Agent Penney’s opinion on the matter. His
reply powerfully summed up the majority of the tribe’s socio-economic
strategy for reservation existence.
I have never had but one opinion on this subject. That is; that the
allotments of land in severalty, on this reservation, to the Ogalalla
(sic) Indians will be speedily followed by the reduction of these
people to a condition of starvation and beggary. The only chance
for them is that they keep their entire reservation intact; that they
take up small holdings along the streams for homesteads, and that
256 Letter to CIA from Acting Agent Brown, February 25, 1893, Box 157 (Allotments in
severalty), SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
257 Letter to CIA from Red Cloud and others, March 26, 1894, Ibid.
258 Letter to CIA from Acting Agent Charles G. Penney, August 25, 1894, Ibid.
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they retain the whole reservation in common as stock range. Any
other policy will result in their speedy extinction. My
recommendation, therefore, is that the title to the reservation be
vested, permanently, in these Indians, as a community, and that
they be not required, now or hereafter, to take their lands in
severalty allotments.259
Not surprisingly, Penney’s recommendation remained unheeded and the
federal government continued to enforce spatial and institutional controls and
promote an assimilationist agenda.
In the spring and summer of 1896 new Acting Agent W. H. Clapp sent
three letters to the Additional Farmers employed on the reservation
delineating his desire to press for further control over the Oglala. His first
communiqué reminded the Farmers that Indians were not allowed to move
from one farming district to another without his permission.260 The next letter
gave permission for old bulls and oxen from the September roundup owned by
Indians to be held until inspected and then sold. Clapp stated that old bulls no
longer valuable for breeding may be killed by their owners from time-to-time
for food with special permission from the farmer after inspection, but not to
abuse the policy.261 The Agent’s next note told the Additional Farmers that no
issue or business would be done with painted Indians or educated Indians with
long hair from that time on.262 Moreover, Clapp stated the following year that
only large holders of cattle would be permitted to sell their stock off-
259 Ibid.
260 Letter to “Additional Farmers” from Captain W. H. Clapp, acting agent, March 10, 1896,
Box 740, Ledger titled, “Circulars to Farmer Employees,” March 10, 1896-July 21, 1900,
Vol. 1, COPIES OF CIRCULARS AND LETTERS TO FARMERS AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES-March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Vol. 1-4; 1896-1906, Administrative Records,
RG 75, NARA-KC.
261 Ibid, August 19, 1896.
262 Ibid, September 18, 1896.
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reservation for a higher price, all others could only sell to the government. He
did so because he knew the railroads required a full car load, but his judgment
favored mixed bloods and “white husbands.”263
That same summer a letter went out to the Additional Farmers of each
district stating the amount of beef each could sell to the government for the
beef issue. (See Table No. 5). But what is revealing is that Agent Clapp told
the Farmers to give preferential treatment to full bloods and small holders.
This clearly demonstrates that such an economic disparity existed between full
bloods and mixed bloods/”white husbands” that such an allowance needed to
be made.264
Table No. 5: “Amount of Beef each District May Sale”
Wakpamni District 160,000 lbs July 26, 1897
White Clay District 200,000 July 27, 1897
Wounded Knee District 217,000 July 28, 1897
Porcupine District 130,000 July 29, 1897
Medicine Root District 153,000 July 30, 1897
Pass Creek District 140,000 July 31, 1897
As the turn of the century neared conditions on the reservation
changed little. The vast majority of the tribe remained bitterly opposed to
allotment, one letter form Agent Clapp to the CIA claimed 95% opposed
263 Ibid, May 15, 1897.
264 Ibid, July 18, 1897.
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allotment.265 Roundups continued with the usual claims of off-reservation
cattle rustling that involved branding FOF stock with brands from such outfits
as the Sheidley Cattle Co. and the Keystone Land and Cattle Co., all proud
members of the Western South Dakota Stock Growers Association.266
Cattle trespass continued as a significant impediment to tribal
utilization of their resources and mixed bloods and “white husbands” steadily
increased their control over reservation stock. In fact they also moved to
solidify their claim to the best lands on the reservation, both for their cattle
and their desired allotments. In the summer of 1899 Charles Turning Hawk, a
full blood, wrote the CIA and asked, “whether the full bloods have a prior
right over mixed-bloods and squaw men in selecting allotments, or if all are
on an equal footing…the mixed bloods and squaw men have fenced in all the
most fertile lands on the reservation.”267 Then in December of 1899 Agent
Clapp requested that his Farmers provide lists of all mixed bloods and “white
husbands” in their district who owned large numbers of cattle.268
Captain Clapp’s request identified a new reservation policy concerning
the rampant trespass of off-reservation cattle on Pine Ridge and the Agent’s
recognition that many mixed bloods and “white husbands” worked in
265 Letter to CIA from Major William Clapp, Acting Indian Agent, March 22, 1898, Box 157
(Allotments in severalty), SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75,
NARA.
266 Bob Lee and Dick Williams, Last Grass Frontier: The South Dakota Stock Grower
Heritage (Sturgis: Black Hills Publishers, Inc., 1964), 195.
267 Letter to the Honorable W. A. Jones, CIA , from M. K. Sniffen, Indian Rights Association,
May 11, 1899, Box 157 (Allotments in severalty), SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Special Cases,
1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
268 Letter to Additional Farmers from Acting Agent Clapp, December 18, 1899, Box 740,
Ledger titled, “Circulars to Farmer Employees” March 10, 1896-July 21, 1900, Vol. 1,
COPIES OF CIRCULARS AND LETTERS TO FARMERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES-
March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Vol. 1-4; 1896-1906, Administrative Records, RG 75, NARA-
KC.
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partnership with outfits like Keystone. They claimed ownership of the
trespassing cattle with fictitious bills of sale and were paid handsomely in
return. For example, Jack Red Cloud reported to the Reservation Agent that
Paul Crier and Lip, and mixed bloods Bill Randall and Louis Mousseau were
collecting money from outside cattlemen whose cattle had “drifted” over to
the reservation. Jack Red Cloud said that Crier and Lip each received $50 and
the mixed bloods $100.269 What resulted was a $1 tax on every head of cattle
over 100 owned by any Indian, mixed blood, or “white husband” on the
reservation. It was hoped that by taxing the larger herd owners they might
be more reluctant to work in collaboration with off-reservation cattle outfits
and that their growing stranglehold on the reservation herds might loosen.270
An outstanding example of the growing domination of the mixed blood/“white
husband” faction on Pine Ridge is revealed in a 1901 report from Pass Creek
District. Farmer Boesl reported that full bloods possessed the ability to sell
only about 215,000 pounds of beef that fall and winter, but numerically
smaller mixed bloods and “white husbands” owned enough cattle to sell
1,015,000 pounds. That is almost five times as many cattle to market.271 This
269 Letter to J. J. Boesl, Farmer Allen, SD, from Agent John R. Brennan, January 19, 1903,
Box 740, “Letters to Farmers and Employees, From November 1900 to April 4, 1904”:
Signed by J.R. Brennan, Vol. 3, COPIES OF CIRCULARS AND LETTERS TO FARMERS
AND OTHER EMPLOYEES-March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Vol. 1-4; 1896-1906,
Administrative Records, RG 75, NARA-KC.
270 For a recollection in Agent John Brennan’s own words see, Reel 2, pages 85-91 of Eli S.
Ricker Interviews, Records of interviews with Indians [microfilm] 1904-1909, Western History
Collection, Denver Public Library, Copyright owned by the Nebraska State Historical Society,
Lincoln, Nebraska.
271 Letter to Agent Brennan from Farmer Boesl at Pass Creek District, April 11, 1901, Box
740, “Letters to Farmers and Employees, From November 1900 to April 4, 1904”: Signed by
J.R. Brennan, Vol. 3, COPIES OF CIRCULARS AND LETTERS TO FARMERS AND
OTHER EMPLOYEES-March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Vol. 1-4; 1896-1906, Administrative
Records, RG 75, NARA-KC.
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is especially remarkable considering the demographic breakdown revealed by
a census in 1900. There were 5,334 full bloods, 1,530 mixed bloods, and 368
“white husbands,” for a total of 7,232. This meant that a little over 25% of the
tribe owned almost 80% of the cattle available for market.272
It is important to note that with increased institutional controls
concerning the care and disposition of cattle full bloods turned increasingly
toward the sale of their stock as their preferred avenue toward self-sufficiency.
This transformation occurred rather quickly as pasturage became harder to
acquire and familiar socio-economic kinship relationships and techniques
resource procurement and processing became forbidden. The local cattle
market offered by the federal government for the beef issue, and the towns of
Omaha and Chicago, afforded the tribe its best chance to sustain the
momentum of the cattle industry and provide enough income to achieve self-
sufficiency. When the 1904 tax lists from the farming districts appeared no
full bloods appeared on the list of 30, but W.D. McGaa now owed the Agency
$232, which meant he ran a reported herd of 332 head.273
The next year found McGaa and Richard Stirk complaining to Agent
Brennan that some residents of Porcupine District were killing their beef.
When McGaa and Stirk confronted the “Indians” they refused to show the
hide from the beef, but always seemed to have a large supply at their places.
272 Letter to Farmers in Charge, from Special Agent in Charge, James E. Jenkins, August 31,
1900,”Circulars and Notices to Farmers”: Volume 2, COPIES OF CIRCULARS AND
LETTERS TO FARMERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES-March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Vol.
1-4; 1896-1906, Administrative Records, RG 75, NARA-KC.
273 Letter to B.J. Gleason Farmer Porcupine District, from Agent John Brennan, July 1, 1901,
ibid.
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McGaa and Stirk requested a special detective assigned to examine the hides
of the beef, and McGaa was willing to pay for it himself so there would be no
cost to the Agency.274 Despite these losses old “Denver” Bill managed to at
least maintain his herd size because in the spring of 1905 Agent Brennan
reported him long overdue in paying his 1904 tax of $250.275
1904 marked a particularly notable year for two events other than Mr.
McGaa’s unpaid taxes. That year the federal government finally appointed an
Allotment Agent for the reservation and the issue of leasing emerged as the
next significant obstacle in the path of Oglala economic independence.
Apparently, resistance to allotment may have diminished in at least one
district on the reservation as Farmer James Smalley of Medicine Root District
noted that, “a very large majority of them want their land allotted.”276
However, it should be noted that Farmer Smalley may have overstated
the Oglala’s desire for allotment. The apparent willingness of tribal members
in other districts did not mirror the eagerness reported by Agent Smalley. At
Wounded Knee and White Clay Districts the Agency Farmers found it almost
impossible to get signatures for a petition asking for allotment. Clearly,
strong resistance remained concerning allotment but once the federal
274 Letter to George C. Dawson, Assistant Farmer, Porcupine District, From Agent John
Brennan, October 26, 1905, “Letters to Farmers & Employees”: From April 9, 1904 to
October 1906, Vol. 4, COPIES OF CIRCULARS AND LETTERS TO FARMERS AND
OTHER EMPLOYEES-March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Vol. 1-4; 1896-1906, Administrative
Records, RG 75, NARA-KC.
275 Letter to George C. Dawson, Additional Farmer, Porcupine District, From Agent John
Brennan, January 12, 1905, ibid.
276 Letter to U.S. Indian Agent Pine Ridge from James Smalley, District Farmer at Medicine
Root District, May 20, 1904, Box No. 157 (Allotments in severalty), SC-147 Pima to Pine
Ridge, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
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government took decisive action by naming an Allotment Agent the work
moved quickly.277
The President appointed Charles H. Bates as Special Agent to allot
lands in severalty to Indians on Pine Ridge on May 5, 1904.278 All that stood
in the way now was the signature of the Secretary of Interior and work its way
down the chain of command. The wheels of bureaucracy turned slowly
however, and Mr. Bates languished in limbo for weeks. However, on June
21st the allotment process received a considerable boost from Thomas F.
Marshall, U.S. Congressional Representative from North Dakota. Marshall
wrote the CIA and stated that he wished that Charles Bates would soon be
appointed as Allotting Agent for Pine Ridge. His interest arose from the fact
that his son had signed on with Bates as a chainman and wished to make his
required arrangements quickly. A little over a week later the CIA wrote the
Assistant CIA and stated that Bates needed to be assigned to Pine Ridge
immediately. Not surprisingly, on August 1, 1904, Charles H. Bates officially
assumed the position of Allotting Agent for Pine Ridge by order to Acting
Secretary Thomas Ryan.279
277 Petition at Wounded Knee District, Pine Ridge Agency, S.D., June 27, 1904, and Petition
at White Clay District, Pine Ridge Agency, S.D., July 6, 1904, Box No. 157 (Allotments in
severalty), SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
278 Letter to the Honorable, The Secretary of the Interior, from A. C. Tonner, Acting
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 22, 1904, Box No. 157, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge,
Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
279 See the three letters, Letter to Hon. W. A. Jones, CIA from Thomas F. Marshall, U.S.
Congressional Representative from North Dakota, June 21, 1904, and Letter to Hon. A.C.
Tonner, Asst. CIA from W. A. Jones, CIA, June 30, 1904, and Letter to CIA from Thomas
Ryan, Acting Secretary, August 1, 1904, Box No. 157 (Allotments in severalty), SC-147 Pima
to Pine Ridge, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
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Charles Bates assumed his task might proceed rather quickly,
especially after noting jubilantly that Red Cloud accepted his allotment in
December of 1904.280 He believed that opposition to allotment would
crumble once Red Cloud seemed willing. However, Allotting Agent Bates
would remain on Pine Ridge for many years as he wrangled with recalcitrant
holdouts and dealt with land disputes that inevitably arose. Mr. Bates
difficulties sprang from an extremely determined work of the full blood
majority who steadfastly opposed allotment. Agent Brennan vividly detailed
the obstacles the Bates faced in reports to the CIA. Brennan noted that
petitions for allotment came predominantly from mixed bloods and “white
husbands” who sought to gain control of the best lands on Pine Ridge.281
Agent Brennan also stated that a general council was held and the full
bloods resisted allotment because they owned few horses or cattle but wanted
more, and the land was suitable only for raising stock not farming. He
astutely noted that he believed that “if the land is allotted to them in the near
future…in one year after this is done the average full blood would no have a
thing on earth left except his allotment, out of which he could not possibly
make a living.” Brennan believe it unfair to allow mixed bloods to fence in
and lay claim to the best lands on the reservation and then run their stock “(the
280 Letter to CIA from Charles Bates, U.S. Allotting Agent, December 13, 1904, ibid.
281 Letter to the Honorable, The Secretary of the Interior, from A. C. Tonner, Acting
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 22, 1904, Box No. 157, SC-147 Pima to Pine Ridge,
Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
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greater portion of which is owned by this class) run at large over unallotted
lands belonging to full bloods, which no doubt would be the case.”282
However, the CIA, ignoring the 9th section of the act of March 22,
1889, which stated that allotment shall not be compulsory without the consent
of the majority of the adult members of the tribe, believed this condition might
only get worse and allotment should move ahead. Moreover, he stated that
mixed bloods had a right to take up individual land as soon as possible so
improvements might be made. He also said that since very few make a living
on the reservation, except those few who own 100 head of cattle, they would
not be worse off with allotments. If the full bloods do not participate in
allotment and their condition worsens it is their own fault. It never occurred
to the CIA that the full bloods possessed a very different economic strategy,
nor would it have made a difference if he did. The government believed it
knew what was best for the tribe and proceeded accordingly. Unfortunately,
conditions continued to worsen as a new challenge arose concerning the
viability of creating a reservation cattle based economy.283
On almost the same day that Allotting Agent Bates heard of his
appointment a petition signed by over 500 Indians made the rounds on Pine
Ridge. The petition contained names of Indians who desired to lease “excess”
pasturage on the reservation to outside interests. President of the Oglala
Council, Chief Kills A Hundred, originally presented the petition to the
282 Ibid, 4.
283 Ibid, 4-6.
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Additional Farmers on the reservation. It then found its way to the desk of
Agent John Brennan.284
He noted that Chief Kills A Hundred later protested the matter and
asked the petition be held. Moreover, the Department of the Interior was loath
to permit grazing permits without majority consent, and 500 names did not
constitute a majority. Agent Brennan also stated however, that leasing pasture
for 20,000 to 30,000 head of cattle was in the best interest of the tribe. He
believed it unwise, and that “if they cannot be made to see their own best
interests in the matter and to consent to the grazing of outside cattle on the
reservation, it is deemed impolitic to force the system upon them.” For the
Oglala Lakota the fifteen years following the Sioux Bill of 1889 marked
perhaps their most significant cultural turning point. Once allotted, the tribe
no longer possessed the physical and spatial ability to maintain both their
previous social connections and economic strategies.285
Those Oglala who promoted allotment seemingly moved away from
the tiospaye as social foundation of the tribe. Traditionally, the tiospaye
comprised an extended family unit who lived and traveled together and
provided economic support while maintaining social connections. Allotment
sought to end these “tribal,” and thus objectionable, manifestations by
establishing self-supporting and independent family units modeled on that of
the Jeffersonian yeoman farmer.
284 Letter to Additional Farmers from Agent John Brennan, July 29, 1904, “Letters to Farmers
& Employees”: From April 9, 1904 to October 1906, Vol. 4, COPIES OF CIRCULARS AND
LETTERS TO FARMERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES-March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Vol.
1-4; 1896-1906, Administrative Records, RG 75, NARA-KC.
285 Ibid.
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By accepting allotment George Sword and George Means, Fast Horse,
and many others willingly weakened tiospaye economic and social
connections in favor of the personal interests of themselves and their
immediate families. Their familiarity with bureaucratic machinations and
regional economic developments provided them with an advantage toward the
implementation of their economic agendas. The more power they gained from
their relationship the more they were obligated to accept further demands for
accommodation. Moreover, allotment exacerbated a growing tribal division
between full blood Oglala seeking cultural continuity and mixed blood/white
husband more accepting of cultural accommodation. However, the dreams
and goals of Red Cloud and other Oglala Chiefs remained surprisingly intact
despite mounting obstacles. For the next fourteen years many Oglala sought a
different path. They strove to regain both their economic footing and the
socio-political infrastructure that served the tribe so well before reservation
life.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Allotment and Leasing:
Resource Alienation and the End of the Dream, 1905-1920
By 1905 the Oglala political economy faced serious challenges. Over
eighty-percent of the reservation population depended solely upon
government rations and annuity payments. Tribal efforts to freely develop
both communally and individually owned cattle herds remained unmet. The
reduction of the Great Sioux Reservation in 1889 constituted both a
considerable loss of land and a physical and spatial separation from other
Lakota tribes. This resource disenfranchisement occurred simultaneously
with increased economic interference from the federal government.
Remarkably, during the decade and a half following the Sioux Bill of 1889,
which allowed for reservation allotment, the tribe successfully resisted its
implementation. The year 1905 found that the previous threats of allotment
and leasing of tribal lands to outside cattle operations found new strength.
Both old challenges and new impeded the creation of cattle herds owned and
controlled by the Oglala Nation. Nonetheless, Oglala leaders continued to
determinedly pursue this economic strategy in the face of increased obstacles.
Not surprisingly, the impetus for the leasing of “excess” or commonly
held lands on Pine Ridge Indian Reservation originated from an off-
reservation source. In 1902 Henry Bradley of Chamberlain, South Dakota
requested that he be allowed to lease two townships in the Pass Creek district
on Pine Ridge. The request was written to Agent John Brennan,
commissioned as U.S. Indian Agent at Pine Ridge in 1900. He held the post
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for 17 years, far longer than any other Pine Ridge agent. Agent Brennan
seemed an honest man determined to execute his duties to his best ability. He
played a central role in events that led to the seminal period in Oglala
history.286
Agent Brennan raised a question in a meeting with the District Council
that centered on the tribe’s interest in leasing their land to off-reservation
cattlemen. He found no support for the proposal despite his stated opinion
that the land went to waste because no cattle other than trespassing herds used
the land. Two years later Mr. Bradley went over the head of Agent Brennan
and wrote directly to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.287 When the CIA
inquired as to the feasibility of leasing the land Brennan replied that he
thought it a good idea. However, he stated that Bradley misled the CIA
regarding the northern boundaries of the reservation and that the petition from
Chief Kills A Hundred was most likely forged.288
Previously it appeared Agent Brennan opposed the leasing of
reservation lands to off-reservation cattle outfits. During his first four years as
Indian Agent on Pine Ridge he came to understand the economic factionalism
and disparity that existed on the reservation and each group’s economic
agenda. The year before he read Chief Lip’s letter to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs that stated the entire tribe opposed leasing. Chief Lip stated
286 Letter to CIA from Agent John R. Brennan, November 3, 1902, Box No. 358, SC-191,
Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
287 Letter to CIA from Henry Bradley of Chamberlain, South Dakota, March 26, 1904, Box
No. 358 (Leases), SC-191 Pine Ridge 1900 to 1907, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75,
NARA.
288 See two letters, Letter to CIA from Agent Brennan, April 11, 1904, ibid; and Letter to CIA
from Indian Agent John Brennan, May 2, 1904, ibid.
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that “the agreement of 1889 says that Indians shall do things in common
raising stock cattle.” (Emphasis his) He went on to underline “in common”
twice more when he stressed their desire to raise stock and horses on tribal
lands.289
As a result, Brennan often sought to better the conditions of full bloods
and to loosen the stranglehold enjoyed by mixed bloods concerning the Oglala
political economy. He viewed himself as the caretaker of all the Indians on
Pine Ridge and strove to do what he believed in their best interests. This
paternalistic perception concerning his relationship with the Oglala also led
him at times to decide against the majority and take decisive action. He did so
in 1905 when he unilaterally decided to lease what he believed to be excess
reservation land. He stated it was in the best interest of the entire tribe.290
Brennan knowingly acted against the wishes of the Oglala Council,
which Brennan consistently said was comprised of “old men and non-
progressives.” The Oglala Council, however, represented the vast majority of
Oglala on the reservation. In January of 1905 the Committee of the Oglala
Council, which included John Thunder Bear, Jack Red Cloud, Skunk Bear
Nose, Iron Bird, Moses Red Kettle, Robert American Horse, and George Fire
Thunder, crafted a letter that clearly stated their reasons for opposing leasing.
They sent the letter to Mr. Herbert Welch of the Indian Rights Association in
Philadelphia with the hope that he would contact the CIA and influence him to
289 Letter to CIA from Chief Lip, March 5, 1903, ibid.
290 Letter to CIA from Indian Agent John Brennan, April 14, 1905, ibid.
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end the proposed leasing of their lands. The Council stated their arguments
clearly and their justifications seemed both reasonable and well considered.291
First the Oglala Council stated that “we are opposed to leasing because
it hurt our own stock interests.” Secondly, they pointed to the fact allotment
had already commenced on the reservation and leasing would hurt those who
took allotments. Finally, they expressed a desire to finish the allotment
process before they considered leasing. They also noted that the petitions
circulating on the reservation did not originate with Indians. They were
written to appear such, but they assured Welch that the petitions came from
off the reservation.292 The next month S. M. Brosius, and Agent of the Indian
Rights Association forwarded the letter to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs.293
In March the Oglala Council communicated their opposition to leasing
directly to the Honorable R. E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The
Council both refocused and broadened their justifications for the secession of
leasing. The Council stated as follows.
Our reasons are these:-The President has recommended that we
should take our allotments, and sent Mr. Chas. H. Bates her for the
purpose of allotting us. We have agreed to take our allotments,
and are now taking them as fast as we can. If we are to allow cattle
to eat up our range, what shall we do with the farming implements
that will be furnished us? Do not think that we are opposed to the
leasing, simply because we can say “no”. We have reasons for
opposing such a scheme. We are certain that if our land is leased
that we will suffer from its effect, like the Indians on the other
291 Letter to Mr. Herbert Welch, Indian Rights Association, from the Oglala Council, January
2, 1905, Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Letter to the Honorable CIA, from S. M. Brosius, Agent Indian Rights Association,
February 24, 1905, ibid.
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reservations. It will take from five to ten years to get over its
effect, if cattle are allowed to graze on our land…It plainly specifies
in the treaties that we were to have our allotments, but
nothing was ever mentioned about leasing our lands for grazing
purposes.294
The Council goes on to state that the government needs to enforce the treaties
boundaries as well because “out-parties” both trespassed large numbers of
cattle on the reservation and cut and hauled away large amounts of lumber.
Clearly the Council’s hope was to postpone any discussion pertaining
to leasing until the allotment process reached completion. Moreover, they
appear to understand rather well the perception both Agent Brennan and the
Office of Indian Affairs as a whole possessed concerning such councils. Their
statement that they did not oppose leasing “simply because we can say no,”
demonstrated they wished to be taken seriously. They feared being dismissed
as “old men and non-progressives.” Their mention of “other reservation”
revealed the Oglala possessed a regional and national understanding of Indian
affairs. Oglala leaders strove to prevent further loss of tribal resources needed
for their own economic future. Fortunately, the efforts of both the Oglala
Council and the Indian Rights Association resulted in a delay in the leasing of
Oglala lands.295
Nonetheless, in October 1905 another request to lease reservation land
came to the desk of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. This time a Mr. I. M.
Humphrey of Omaha, Nebraska asked if he could graze 10,000 to 15,000 head
of cattle in the northeast corner of the reservation, the same area previously
294 Letter to Honorable F. E. Luepp, CIA, from the Oglala Council, March 18, 1905, ibid.
295 Ibid.
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coveted by Henry Bradley.296 When the CIA informed Agent Brennan of the
request he replied that such action failed twice in the past two years because
of opposition from the Oglala Council. Once again Brennan noted that he
believed this council, comprised of “older and non-progressive Indians,” did
not understand where their best interests lay. Brennan went on to state that
the Council held back the younger and more progressive males and asked for
permission to promulgate a petition to get leasing approved.297
Brennan received permission from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
to proceed with the petitions early in 1906. His replied that the petition might
take all summer to circulate around the reservation because most Indians lived
30 to 80 miles from Pine Ridge Agency. He requested permission to place
copies of the petitions at the sub-agencies of Porcupine, 25 miles from the
agency; Medicine Root, 45 miles from the agency; Pass Creek, 50 miles from
the agency; Wounded Knee, 18 miles from the agency; and White Clay, 18
miles from the agency, all of which were also at least 18 miles from one
another.298
The petition presented that favored leasing named a price of four cents
an acre, and was supported primarily by mixed bloods. However, in April the
Oglala Council met again and developed a new strategy to stop leasing. They
demanded a price of at least ten cents per acre, with leases to cover at least
100,000 acres and the lessees to fence the areas with a good 4-wire fence, and
other demands. These included being paid cash semi-annually in advance,
296 Letter to CIA from I. M. Humphrey, October 2, 1905, ibid.
297 Letter to CIA from Agent John Brennan, October 11, 1905, ibid.
298 Letter to CIA from Agent John Brennan, February 24, 1906, ibid.
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that the lessees purchase their cedar posts from Indians, all fences and
improvements made during the five-year lease would become Indian property
when the lease expired, that each Indian family living in the district be given
free pasturage of one-hundred head of cattle or horses, with families
maintaining the right to seek allotments in the leased area, and that allotted
Indian have the right to fence their lands to keep out the cattle of the lessee.
Moreover, that Indians were not liable for cattle that died of disease or natural
causes.299
In Agent Brennan’s opinion these demands “practically kills the
proposition” because large outfitters told him they could afford only between
3½ and 4½ cents per acre if required to fence. Again he noted the negative
effect of the Oglala Council in providing income for the tribe from lands they
did not use. In his letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs he rather
condescendingly noted that “older and non-progressive Indians who take it on
themselves to regulate matters of this sort, got busy (emphasis mine) and
called a council. He also asked that a strongly worded letter be sent to the
Oglala Council by the Office of Indian Affairs to impress upon them the fact
that they were “standing in their own light” when they opposed such
propositions.300 Agent Brennan’s statements implied that the Indians
possessed no right to make decisions for the tribe because they lacked
understanding. This paternalistic perspective was prevalent throughout Indian
299 Letter to CIA from Oglala Council, April 12, 1906, ibid.
300 Letter to CIA from Agent John Brennan, April 18, 1906, ibid.
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Policy during the Progressive Era and beyond.301 The debate continued
throughout the summer and into the fall. The Oglala Council conceded to
drop the price from ten cents per acre to nine cents, yet little else changed
during that time.302
As the conflict concerning leasing heated up on Pine Ridge Allotting
Agent Charles Bates confidently continued his work. He reported to work
September 9, 1904 and then preceded strait to work. By February 2, 1905 he
reported making 309 allotments to individual Indians, one each for the agency
and boarding school, and two each for day schools, churches, and timber
reserves. He stated he originally faced strong opposition from full bloods but
once Red Cloud took his allotment his work continued apace.303 He hoped to
complete his work quickly and seek further employment with the Office of
Indian Affairs. Bates reported the next January that he allotted another 815
individual Indians for a total of 1,127. He also allotted five more day schools
and churches and two farmer stations. While he eagerly noted that his
allotment to Red Cloud seemingly cleared the way for the rest of the tribe to
acquiesce to allotment he failed to mention that the vast majority of his
earliest allotments went to mixed bloods and “white husbands” and their
301 For a discussion concerning the origins of federal Indian Policy see, Sheehan, Seeds of
Extinction; the best work so far on Progressive Era attempts to assimilate the Indian is found
in Hoxie, A Final Promise; see also, Adams, Education for Extinction; Margaret Connell
Szasz, Education and the American Indian: The Road to Self-Determination since 1928
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999); Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man’s
Land/White Man’s Law: The Past and Present Status of the American Indian (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995); and for seminal works on the ambivalent relationship
toward Indians in American culture see Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998).
302 Letter to CIA from the Oglala Council, November 14, 1906, Box No. 358, SC-191, Special
Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
303 Letter to CIA from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, February 2, 1905, Box No. 157, SC-147
Pima to Pine Ridge, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
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families. His belief that his work might soon be completed proved ephemeral.
Allotting Agent Bates stayed on Pine Ridge for more than a decade before his
task ended.304
The allotting process slowed in 1906 when the OIA ordered that
“family histories” be completed before the issuance of each allotment in order
to make sure the allottee qualified for allotment. Nonetheless, he pressed on
and completed 647 individual allotments, which brought his total to 1775.305
The following year Agent Bates faced continued resistance from “several
camps of the old, non-progressive and troublesome full-blood Indians.” He
also noted a newly developed problem. Off-reservation families “from
different parts of the country…have discovered they are Indians and are
asking for rights here.” He found they also sought to settle in the southeast
portion of the reservation, which he stated contained mostly mixed bloods on
the best lands on the reservation. Bates believed rightly that those on the roles
in 1904 ought to receive their allotments first.306 The Acting Commissioner
of Indian Affairs replied that full bloods deliberated longer and therefore
needed more assistance, so Agent Bates must be diligent to provide needed
consultation. The Acting Commissioner implied that full bloods lacked the
intellectual capacity and cultural understanding needed to make such
decisions. That the tribe possessed and alternate economic strategy never
occurred to him.
304 Letter to CIA from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, January 15, 1906, ibid.
305 Letter to CIA from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, January 15, 1907, ibid.
306 Letter to CIA from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, December 18, 1907, Folder 99203-07,
Box No. 256, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
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Allotting Agent Bates moved optimistically ahead with his task in
1907. That fall he noted that 447,823 acres of surplus land existed. He
calculated total population to receive allotments, 7,355, and estimated total
allotment acreage at 2,340,849 and then subtracted from the total reservation
acreage of 2,788,672.307 Interestingly, he boldly compiled these estimates
after allotting less than half the tribe. Indian Agent John Brennan facilitated
Allotting Agent Bates efforts when he gained permission to offer allottees 20
heifers in lieu of farming implements listed in the Sioux Bill of 1889, such as
2 milk cows, a set of harness, and a wagon, hoe, pitchfork, axe, and plow.308
By the end of 1908 Agent Bates had allotted 1,202,429 acres of land on Pine
Ridge to less than 4,000 Oglala. He noted that most of 1908’s allottees were
full bloods from the camps along the upper Big White River and White Clay
Creek, which undoubtedly added to his abundant optimism.309
The year 1909 is notable for the creation of Bennett County, which is
land occupying the southeastern quarter of the reservation. Congress
confirmed homestead access under the provisions of the Act of May 27, 1910.
However, it remained a part of Fall River County politically until organized
307 Letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, November
18, 1907, Folder 1382-1908, Box No. 256, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG
75, NARA.
308 Letter to Additional Farmers from Agent John Brennan, December 3, 1907, Ledger titled,
“Letters to Farmers and Employees. From October 2, 1906 to July 23, 1909, Vol. 5, Box 741,
Vol. 5-8, Employees, March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Copies of Circulars and Letters to
Farmers and others, Administrative Records, RG75, NARA-KC.
309 Letter to CIA from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, January 15, 1909, Folder 4569-1909,
Box No. 258, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
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officially in 1912 when Martin, South Dakota was named county seat.310 In
1910 Agent Bates was commissioned with surveying the surplus lands to be
opened to white settlement. He reported 776.76 acres of first class
agricultural lands and 13,940.85 acres of second class agricultural lands
unallotted in size of ten acres and up but widely scattered. He also reported
just less than 154,000 acres of grazing lands remained unallotted. When
Bennett County was organized in 1912 the Oglala tribe had lost a quarter of its
land resource.311
Charles Bates remained on Pine Ridge through 1915. By that time he
allotted 2,408,923 acres to heads of families-640, wives-320, and children-160
acres each. Yet still 738 Oglala remained unallotted over ten years after
Agent Bates started his task. Agent Bates reported that he needed access to
136,000 acres of land, yet only about 20,000 remained that were suitable for
allotment on the reservation. He then requested permission to allot many of
the remaining Oglala in Bennett County as there still remained 106,355.18
acres of land not yet taken up by homestead entry. He noted that most land
was sand hills and suitable only for limited grazing but no other alternative
existed. Bates received permission and attempted to finish his long and
laborious task.312
310 Letter to the Second Assistant Commissioner from Charles Bates, December 27, 1910,
Folder 99960, 1910, Box No. 259, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75,
NARA.
311 Letter to CIA from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, December 17, 1910, ibid.
312 Letter to CIA from Allotting Agent Charles Bates, July 7, 1915, Folder 76318-1915, Box
No. 261, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
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That same year two inspectors arrive on Pine Ridge to investigate
conditions. H. S. Traylor found that over 4,000 Oglala lived solely on rations
received from the federal government. Encouragingly, he stated that Oglala
men earned $14,000 hauling freight and $11,000 more in labor on the
reservation. Oglala also worked as migrant labors in Nebraska picking
potatoes, for which they earned another $12,000 and as showman with various
Western acts for another $13,000 earned. Most tribal income however
derived from selling cattle to the government for the beef issue, which brought
$43,953 to predominantly mixed bloods and “white husbands.” In his report
he noted the prosperous were mostly mixed bloods. Inspector Fred S. Cook
found that the economic disparity between mixed bloods and full bloods
occurred because “the mixed blood Indians can, without permit, purchase
from the full bloods their live stock (sic) such as cattle and horses.” This
occurred because issued heifers as allotment benefits were traded to mixed
bloods before they arrived! Cook stated that it was safe to say that mixed
bloods owned 60% to 70% of the livestock on the reservation.313
Cook related that cattle numbers on the reservation were down because
of a hard winter and a significant reduction in rations allowed led many
Oglala to either eat their cattle or starve. Inspector Cook also revealed that
mixed bloods and “white husbands” served as a conduit for the sale of Oglala
cattle to off-reservation whites. This was especially a problem with “white
husbands” because they did not require a permit to sell their stock. Clearly,
313 Report to CIA from Inspectors H. S. Traylor and Fred S. Cook, July 7, 1915, Folder 00-
1915, 2 of 2, Box No. 46, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
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allotment failed to create assimilated and self-sufficient Oglala yeoman
farmers.314
The insidiousness of allotment was exacerbated by the Burke Act of
1906, which allowed the Secretary of the Interior, who controlled the Office
of Indian Affairs, to issue fee simple patents to “deserving” Indians. (One
such “competent” Indian was Eugene C. Means, who received his application
for half of his allotment in September of 1909.)315 The Dawes Severalty Act
of 1887 began a process that transferred over one-hundred million acres of
land from Indian ownership through treaties to white ownership. The original
act called for a 25 year trust period before Indians gained fee simple patents
for their land. Policy makers believed within that time Native American
landowners could turn their land into a productive enterprise and thus gain
self-sufficiency. The Burke Act did away with the 25 year trust period.
“Competent” Indians now received a fee simple title to their land immediately
if so deemed by the OIA. What occurred on Pine Ridge was further resource
loss as those Indians deemed “competent” often sold their land either to
whites or other Indians.316
In August of 1917 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Cato Sells,
directed W. S. Coleman to investigate reports that concerned Indians losing
their allotments as soon as they received fee simple patents. Coleman’s report
314 Ibid.
315 Letter to Farmer Boesl, from Agent John Brennan, September 3, 1909, Ledger titled,
“Letters to farmers and employees from July 26, 1909 to August 13, 1910, Box No. 741,
Circulars and Letters to Farmers and Employees, 1909-1910, Vol. 6, Copies of Circulars and
letters to farmers and other employees, March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Administrative
Records, RG 75, NARA-KC.
316 For an examination of the effects of the Burke Act see, Fowler, Arapahoe Politics, 1851-
1978; Meyer, The White Earth Tragedy; and Biolsi, Organizing the Lakota.
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found that out of 778 tribal member granted fee simple patents “a considerable
majority of patented lands have been alienated by the Indians, principally to
the white land buyer.” He went on to report that only the “best element” of
the reservation received their patents. Yet it was these “best element” Indians
that seemed to have fallen victim to mortgage swindles when they found they
could not repay their loans and had to sell their lands. He also noted they did
not receive market value for their lands. Despite this, Coleman said that the
tribesmen “lost nothing” in regard to their income accept the lost value of
their lands and the Indians were in the same condition as before. He also
noted that leasing income was about to increase dramatically because large
tracts of 150,000 to 250,000 acres were being leased that summer. He happily
reported that the reservation would hold its largest population of cattle in its
history. Unfortunately for the Oglala, the cattle belonged to someone else.317
Petitions both for and against leasing to off-reservation cattle
operations circulated around Pine Ridge throughout the spring and summer of
1906; however, many outside cattle outfits continued to gain access to tribal
resources by skirting the law.318 Two cattlemen, Mr. Hibbs and K.T. Johnson,
were reported to Agent Brennan as trespassing cattle in Pass Creek District
during the summer of 1908. Brennan instructed instructions to J. J. Boesl, the
District Farmer, to tell them to remove their stock and if they did not then hold
317 Report to Cato Sells, CIA, from W. S. Coleman, Subject: Conditions Among Indians Who
Have Been Granted Patents in Fee, September 9, 1917, Folder 87995-17, Box No. 47, Pine
Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
318 See Petition, both for and against leasing, March 29, 1906, and April 20, 1906, Box No.
358, SC-191 PR 1900-1907, Special Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
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the stock and make them pay damages.319 That fall Agent Brennan ordered all
District Farmers to prevent Indians from selling issued stock to “white
husbands” because these men then turn around and sell the stock to large
cattle companies off-reservation. He reiterated that transactions between
Indians and “white husbands” needed his approval and he forbad this
practice.320
Nonetheless, “white husbands” and mixed bloods continued to
facilitate the pirating of reservation resources to off-reservation cattle interests
through familiar schemes. In June of 1909 Agent Brennan again contacted
District Farmer J. J. Boesl, who came under suspicion of collaboration with
outside interests, to make sure trespassing stock was removed. He stated that
many allotted “white husbands” and mixed bloods in southeastern Pine Ridge
graze large numbers of alien stock in return for either cash or a share of the
profits from the sale of the cattle. Boesl was ordered to make sure all cattle
had either the owner’s individual brand or the FOF brand, and that all owners
possessed a complete bill of sale.321
That same month Brennan noted that off-reservation cattlemen gained
support from financial institutions in surrounding communities. Brennan sent
a letter to Chief Special Officer William E. Johnson stating that James Wilde
bought stock on the reservation without a permit and that the Pennington
319 Letter to J. J. Boesl, Farmer, Pass Creek District, from John Brennan, Agent, November 5,
1908, Ledger titled, “Letters to Farmers and Employees. From October 2, 1906 to July 23,
1909, Vol. 5, Box 741, Vol. 5-8, Copies of Circulars and Letters to Farmers and other
Employees, March 10, 1896-April 9, 1914, Administrative Records, RG 75, NARA-KC.
320 Letter to Additional Farmers from Agent John Brennan, November 11, 1908, ibid.
321 Letter to District Farmer J. J. Boesl, from Agent John Brennan, June 1909, ibid.
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County Bank of Rapid City, South Dakota provided the money he needed to
make the purchases. He asked if Mr. Johnson might tell the bank to be more
careful in their lending operations in the future.322
Brennan noted that the problem might be in the administrative process
involved in selling of Indian cattle. He noted that both the seller and the buyer
were required to obtain permits, which led to confusion. He wondered if Pine
Ridge should adopt the system used at neighboring Rosebud Indian
Reservation. Rosebud employed a superintendent of livestock that oversaw
all such transactions, and no buyer is listed on the permit. This would allow
the Indian to sell his cattle to the highest bidder instead of one purchaser. He
asked for District Farmer B. J. Gleason’s opinion on the matter. However,
Pine Ridge policy did not change.323
Indian Agent Brennan continued to believe raising stock offered the
Oglala their best opportunity to achieve self-sufficiency and stated that by
now every Indian on the reservation should own a good sized bunch of cattle.
He called on his District Farmers to issue less permits for the selling of issued
heifers by newly allotted tribesmen. Moreover, he derided the farmers for
allowing the Indians to sell or kill female cattle of breeding age. He called on
them to allow Indian to sell only older cattle no longer useful for breeding,
and steers over two-years old. Brennan’s well-meaning yet stridently
322 Letter to Chief Special Officer William E. Johnson, from Agent John Brennan, June 26,
1909, ibid.
323 Letter to District Farmer B. J. Gleason, from Agent John Brennan, September 30, 1910,
Ledger titled, “Letters to farmers and employees. From August 13, 1910 to May 8, 1911” Vol.
8, Box No. 741, Vol. 5-8, Copies of Circulars and Letters to Farmers and other Employees,
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paternalistic view of the Oglala prevented him from seeing the existing
contradictions in his own policies.324
He promoted both Allotment and Leasing as being in the best interest
of the tribe. Brennan did so predominantly because he believed the tribe
needed the resources, either material or monetary, in order to survive.
However, he fundamentally disenfranchised the tribe, both full blood and
mixed blood, from its greatest resource by supporting and implementing these
policies. He revealed his condescension and ignorance toward Native
American society when he stated the following. “Many of the Indians think
the only thing in life worth while is to kill a cow and dance the Crow dance or
some other fool dance. (Emphasis his) They should be weaned away from this
habit as much as possible.” Infants need weaning, and that is how he
perceived the Oglala Lakota.325
The Progressive Era ideal of creating a better society for all, including
minorities, came with a price. One needed to conform to American ideals of
citizenship, which meant individual land ownership and taking part in a
market driven consumer economy. No room existed within this cultural
landscape for communally owned cattle herds being harvested by nomadic
equestrian hunters, even if that provided them their best chance at economic
independence. Furthermore, the federal government counted upon Native
Americans’ dependency upon material support as a weapon to enforce
assimilation. Ironically, the espoused desire to create independent yeoman
324 Letter to George C. Dawson, District Farmer Porcupine, from Agent John Brennan,
February 9, 1911, ibid.
325 Ibid.
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farmers wilted under regional political and economic pressure to divest the
tribe from its land and Indian policies that demanded increased control over its
wards.326
Not surprisingly, the complicity of mixed bloods and “white
husbands” in aiding off-reservation cattle interests to trespass continued
unabated. In August of 1911 Indians complained about large numbers of
cattle being brought onto the reservation. Again, the accusations included
mixed blood and “white husband” collaboration with outside cattle outfits.
Brennan, ever the champion of his wards in such cases, ordered all residents
with more than one-hundred cattle to provide a complete bill of sale. He
threatened expulsion from the reservation for any offending parties caught
with cattle branded other than with their individual mark or the Pine Ridge
Reservation FOF.327 Brennan told Farmer Boesl that Mr. Reynolds of Lusk,
Wyoming and Mrs. D. W. Whitcomb of Moorcroft, Wyoming were
trespassing large numbers of cattle on the reservation. Farmer Boesl was to
prevent Mrs. Whitcomb from removing her cattle until she paid grazing fees
of one-dollar per head. Brennan also told Farmer Boesl to let Reynolds
remove his cattle but be sure to fine him as well, if he refused to pay then
326 Hoxie, A Final Promise; see also, Adams, Education for Extinction; Margaret Connell
Szasz, Education and the American Indian: The Road to Self-Determination since 1928
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999); and Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red
Man’s Land/White Man’s Law: The Past and Present Status of the American Indian (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995).
327 Letter to J. J. Boesl, Pass Creek District Farmer, from Agent John Brennan, August 4,
1911, Ledger titled, “Letters Addl Farmers”: Farmers & Employees From May 9, 1911 to
January 24, 1912, Circulars and letters to Farmers and Employees 1911-1912, Vol. 9, Box
No. 742, Vols. 9 through 11, 1911 (end)- 1913 (part), Copies of Circulars and Letters to
Farmers and Other Employees March 19, 1896-April 9, 1914, Administrative Records, RG
75, NARA-KC.
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confiscate his stock. Strangely, Brennan eagerly sought to both promote
Oglala cattle herds while simultaneously pushing for allotment and leasing
and he never considered the inherent contradiction.328
Supervisor of Farmer, Charles Davis inspected Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation in the summer of 1913. He drew special attention to the disparity
of cattle numbers owned by mixed bloods and “white husbands” and full
bloods. Of the 22,479 cattle owned by residents on Pine Ridge, the mixed
blood/“white husband” segment herded 16,298, with only 6,181 owned by full
bloods. Davis believed policy needed to change in regard to the ability of
mixed bloods and “white husbands” to purchase issued heifers and bulls from
full bloods. He questioned why their cattle numbers remained low when one
considered that the government issued almost 22,000 head of breeding stock
during the five previous years. Davis went on to state that cattle issued
directly to individuals led directly to cattle being siphoned off-reservation. He
called for an end to the beef ration, and wondered why it was necessary.
Overall, he described a crumbled reservation political economy that left the
majority of its residents in a state of poverty.329
When Mr. Davis’ report reached the desk of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, along with other complaints, Indian Agent John R. Brennan
stood accused of inadequate supervision of Pine Ridge. Brennan denied the
charge. He provided evidence to support his competency in a rather extended
letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in January, 1916. Agent Brennan
328 Ibid.
329 Letter to CIA from Supervisor of Farming Charles L. Davis, September 3, 1913, Folder
00-1913, Box No. 45, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
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described the poor condition of the reservation when he arrived. He noted that
in 1900 every Indian’s name appeared on the ration roll and most “were still
wearing blankets.” Agent Brennan called the OIA’s attention to his
tremendous responsibility of running a 3,000,000 acre reservation with 30,000
head of stock. By 1907 he removed over 4,000 Oglala from the ration roll and
noted that they made a living with little governmental assistance. That
number remained constant through 1915.330
Agent Brennan drew attention to the fact that during his administration
of the reservation allotment began in 1904 and was almost completed, and that
leasing of unused Indian lands provided increased income for the tribe.
Furthermore, he argued that the reservation economy was not a total disaster.
He referred to the reports of inspectors Cook and Traylor, which showed
about 6,000 head of cattle were sold and shipped to market every year by
Indians. Moreover, the tribe killed, with permits, between 600 and 800 head a
year that, coupled with the sale of horses, brought annually to the reservation
about $400,000. Brennan also supplied a segment of the Superintendent of
Livestock’s report concerning Pine Ridge, which reported 14,253 cows and
heifers and 198 excellent breeding bulls of Hereford and Shorthorn stock on
Pine Ridge.331
While Brennan’s self-defense proved effective, he stayed on until
1917, he failed to note, or understand, the deepening economic problem facing
Pine Ridge. With allotment completed and Oglala lands being leased with
330 Letter to CIA from Agent John Brennan, January 6, 1916, Folder 24968-14, Box No. 46,
Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
331 Ibid, pages 23,24.
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increased frequency the tribe faced economic ruin. Mixed bloods and “white
husbands,” who found themselves threatened by decreased access to grazing
lands, turned against leasing. William “Denver Bill” McGaa’s own son
William Jr. signed a petition against leasing.332 It is also important to
understand that as the tribe’s access to pasturage decreased so to did the size
of their herds. Supervisor Davis counted 22,479 head of Indian owned cattle
in 1913. Yet just two-years later inspector Long found only 14,253, a
decrease of over 8,000 head of stock! Fittingly, in one of Agent Brennan’s
last acts as Indian Agent for Pine Ridge he purchased 40 bulls and 800 heifers
to create a cattle herd for the timber reserve in Bennett County.333
A little over one-year later, in May, 1918, a new Agent named Henry
M. Tidwell wrote the Western South Dakota Stock Growers Association.
Agent Tidwell asked that Pine Ridge Indian Reservation’s membership in that
organization be renewed, for 6,000 head! Moreover, he noted that a “large
number of cattle (was) coming to the reservation under leases executed during
the past year and…large shipments…will be made this fall.” The tremendous
drop in Indian owned cattle during this period occurred for two primary
reason. One was related to the demand for more canned beef for the soldiers
of World War I. Under pressure from Agent Brennan, Special Agent in
Charge C. L. Ellis, and Agent Tidwell, and influenced by a chance to make
money, most Indian owned reservation cattle were sold at market. This left a
332 Petition, against leasing, March 29, 1906, Box No. 358, SC-191 PR 1900-1907, Special
Cases, 1821-1907, RG 75, NARA.
333 Letter to CIA, from Agent John Brennan, January 30, 1917, Folder 121702-1916, Box No.
573, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
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vacuum eagerly filled by off-reservation cattle companies.334 The second
reason for the drop in cattle numbers was related to a previously discussed
problem, that of the mixed bloods and “white husbands” who sold reservation
stock they purchased from full bloods to off-reservation cattle operations.
Combined these two factors led reservation cattle numbers to plummet.335
By 1919 the dream of self-sustained communally owned cattle herds
that could provide sustenance for all Oglala tribal member had nearly died.
Agent Tidwell reported that mixed bloods who ran cattle faced economic
disaster because of overwhelming numbers of leased cattle on Pine Ridge.
Before the war mixed bloods grazed their cattle on large portions of unused
allotted lands. As the war continued and tribally owned cattle numbered
decreased off-reservation cattlemen greatly increased their demands for access
to grazing lands on Pine Ridge. Convinced by Agents to lease their lands for
promised remuneration, more and more allotted lands came under the control
of outside cattle companies such as the Newcastle Land and Cattle Co. and the
Matador Land and Cattle Co.336
One individual who faced numerous complaints from Oglala cattlemen
was W. D. McKeon, who leased 460,000 acres of Pine Ridge Reservation.
McKeon’s apparent disregard for Oglala cattlemen and his terse nature led to
a general council meeting of Pine Ridge Indians on August 20, 1919.
334 Letter to Mr. F. M. Stewart, Secretary, Western South Dakota Stock Growers Association,
from Agent Henry Tidwell, May 9, 1918, Folder 40611-1918, ibid.
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According to witnesses McKeon allowed his cattle to eat alfalfa and hay
planted by Indians, cross over to areas he did not lease, and when confronted
about his misdeeds he barked at the Indians and refused to listen to them.337
At the time McKeon ran 12,000 head of cattle and 11,000 sheep on his leased
lands. Despite the meeting McKeon continued to lease tribal lands, and
probably remained a prickly neighbor. Amazingly, even the weather turned
against the tribe. A drought in the summer of 1919 led Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Cato Sells to request more land be leased so off-reservation
cattlemen could provide for their herds! It is clear that when Agent Brennan’s
decided to lease Oglala lands he put a final nail in the coffin of the tribe’s
political economy.338
A census commenced on Pine Ridge in 1920. Inspector John W. Bale
counted 7,237 residents on the reservation, 4,199 full bloods and Indians of
more than ½ blood, and 3,036 mixed bloods of ½ or less blood quantum.339
His method of counting meant that most likely, mixed bloods now constituted
a majority of reservation population. Today, mixed bloods make up a
concerted majority of Pine Ridge residents. Bale found that “it is estimated
that from 20 to 25% of the Indians of the Pine Ridge Reservation live on their
allotments, but very few of these are engaged in cultivating same, other than a
337 Proceedings of the Council of the Pine Ridge Indians with E. B. Linnen, Inspector on
August 20, 1919, Folder 95443-1919, Box No. 575, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files,
1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
338 Letter to Agent Henry Tidwell from CIA, August 8, 1919, Folder 59484-19, Box No. 137,
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339 Inspection Report of John W. Bale, Inspector, November 30, 1920, Folder 97973-20, Box
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garden, as the lands are largely leased.”340 This also mirrors today’s economic
conditions on Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.
When the Oglala entered the reservation era they intelligently,
dynamically, and determinedly sought to recreate their culture within the vast
boundaries of The Great Sioux Reservation. The tribe increasingly centered
its political economy on the establishment of communally owned cattle herds
pastured on communally owned lands. They hoped to maintain their
equestrian culture as they followed and hunted these herds from horseback
like they did with buffalo during previous decades. Both environmental
conditions and their own historical experiences led the tribe to choose this
path. Unfortunately, both the American government and the American people
were not willing to suffer a mounted, well-armed, and independent Oglala
Nation. The federal government set out to assimilate the Oglala within an
increasingly homogenous American culture. As a result the tribe faced
continued challenges that prevented the fulfillment of their economic strategy.
Moreover, federal policies evolved to ultimately preclude the tribe
from the achievement of its goal. Increased institutional control dramatically
limited Oglala economic freedom and led to a tribal division based largely
upon blood quantum. Subsequent treaties or Congressional acts greatly
reduced the tribal land base. Finally, American Progressive Era ideals
concerning Native American land use and citizenship, in combination with a
340 Inspection Report of John W. Bale, Inspector, November 30, 1920, Folder 97982-20, Box
No. 264, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, NARA.
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land starved regional Anglo cattle industry, acted to effectively disenfranchise
the tribe from its land through first allotment and then leasing. The ultimate
result of American paternalistic machinations for the Oglala was economic
poverty and political impotence. The year 1920 marked a significant turning
point in Oglala history. The tribe lost a long and determined struggle to
maintain cultural continuity and economic, and thus political, independence.
However, while the tribe still experiences extreme poverty, a mixed blood-full
blood dichotomy, and a lack of political freedom to this day, they remain truly
and uniquely Oglala.
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CONCLUSION
Between 1750 and 1920 the Oglala Lakota experienced significant
changes to their political economy as they chose to center their economic
foundation on two great ungulates of the plains. First, the Oglala migrated
west and left behind a wooded landscape crisscrossed by abundant streams
and rivers to enter the expansive Great Plains. In doing so they soon sought to
harvest the energy of the greatest resource available within the immense
thermodynamic system of the northern Great Plains, that of the Bison, bison,
or buffalo.
As Wi the sun warmed the earth, Maka, they together brought forth
immeasurable fields of grass on the northern Great Plains. Tatanka, the
buffalo, then consumed the grass and grew strong and numerous. As their
numbers grew, the buffalo dispersed widely in order to equally partake in the
Earth’s abundant bounty. Conflict arose when the buffalo people met the
Lakota people upon their return to the plains, and a war ensued. However, the
White Buffalo Woman made peace between the two peoples, buffalo and
man. As a result the Oglala Lakota undertook a buffalo centered culture that
brought them both abundance and great power. It also brought great
change.341
As the tribe faced new environmental situations and cultural
challenges it adapted well. With the acquisition of the horse the Oglala’s
spatial mobility increased greatly. As a result the seven tribes of the Lakota
Nation spread across the plains to follow the widely scattered buffalo herds
341 Walker, Lakota Belief and Ritual, 50-52.
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and to provide their horses with fresh fodder. As the tribes became less
spatially and physically connected to one another the Oglala found their socio-
political structure evolving. The tiospaye and band strata became the most
significant tribal political structure, which allowed increased socio-political
flexibility to deal with this liminal period in tribal history.
As Richard White revealed in his seminal article, “The Winning of the
West,” the two expansionist powers of the United States and the Lakota
Nation soon came into conflict over control of the northern Great Plains.
Through the tribe’s own efforts, and unforeseen circumstances, the Lakota
emerged as the dominant native power on the northern plains by the mid-
nineteenth century. However, the intermittent wars between the United States
and the Lakota following the “Grattan Massacre” of 1854, which lasted until
1877, soon left the Oglala Lakota confined within a reservation boundary.
Nonplussed, the Oglala strove to adapt to this new situation, with their
ultimate goal being cultural continuity within a rapidly changing and
experientially new reservation system.342
As buffalo numbers rapidly dropped Oglala leaders realized the
necessity of establishing a new economic strategy. The Oglala turned to cattle
as their best economic option partially because of their unfamiliarity with
agricultural pursuits, their environmental conditions, and their observation of
American regional economic pursuits. Most importantly however, cattle
afforded the tribe their best chance to maintain cultural continuity and their
342 White, “The Winning of the West,” 319-343; and Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of
Plains Indian Horse Culture,” 833-862.
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equestrian nomadic way of life. Cattle moved predominantly to the center of
Oglala political economy following the Treaty of 1877. Oglala leaders sought
to establish herds of cattle that might be owned on a tribal, tiospaye, or
individual level. With sufficiently large herds established the Oglala might
then pursue their nomadic equestrian way of life in a true pastoral manner as
they moved about with their horse and cattle herds. Men could then hunt from
horseback in the traditional manner of a buffalo hunt. As the Oglala bands
shifted to a true pastoral social structure they sought to simultaneously
maintain both familiar socio-economic kinship connections and political
structures of power. However, United States Indian policy neither recognized
nor tolerated Native American culture as a viable option for continued
existence within larger American culture.343
Ultimately, federal officials in Washington, D.C. decided on a policy
that involved the complete cultural assimilation of Native America tribes.
This meant native culture needed to end once and for all in order for Indians
to elevate their societies and take their place in America as productive
citizens. For these officials this meant turning Indians into yeoman farmers
couched in the ideals of individualism, Christianity, and materialism. As all
attempts to turn Oglala men into productive farmers failed in the face of
environmental and cultural reality the federal government made some
343 For works detailing the difficulties Native Americans faced in establishing a new
reservation economy see, Frederick Hoxie, “From Prison to Homeland: The Cheyenne River
Reservation Before World War I,” in The Plains Indians of the Twentieth Century, Peter
Iverson, ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 55-75; Iverson, When Indians
Became Cowboys, 52-85; Svingen, The Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, 1877-1900,
28-45, 56-86; Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 3-34; Meyer, The White Earth Tragedy, 137-
172; Hoxie, Parading Through History, 266-95.
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allowances toward the notion of Oglala stock herds. However, this meant
proceeding within an American stockman’s cultural context. Cattle must be
individually branded and owned, and each Indian needed to own their own
plot of land.344
The contrasting ideas pertaining to stock raising led the Oglala to
continually adapt to new conditions and relations to both American Indian
policy and power. Full blood tribal members dynamically and determinedly
resisted the increased intrusion of American institutional controls over their
political economy. For many this meant physically and spatially distancing
themselves from federal observation and judgment. Away from the prying
eyes of Indian Agents and District Farmers the Oglala killed and ate beef
when possible, acts which required permission, and lived as they pleased.
Unfortunately, by removing themselves from proximal loci of power the full
blood Oglala provided “white husbands” and mixed bloods an opportunity to
establish relationships with federal employees and thus gain greater access to
power.
What resulted was a growing dichotomous relationship between Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation full bloods and increasingly powerful mixed bloods
and “white husbands.” The latter, more familiar with American institutional
workings and marketplace machinations moved to consolidate their socio-
economic and political power on the reservation. By continually nurturing
their relationships to agency personnel and remaining in active contact with
344 Hoxie, Final Promise; Adams, Education for Extinction; Connell Szasz, Education and the
American Indian.
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policy makers in our nation’s capitol the mixed blood/“white husband”
minority soon dominated the Pine Ridge cattle operation. Moreover, this
reservation faction eagerly supported federal policies of allotment and leasing.
Undoubtedly, the mixed bloods and “white husbands” who established a
relationship with agency personnel found themselves forced to accommodate
to any new federal policy in order to maintain their connections to power.
This process was exacerbated by a federal government determined to punish
“blanket” Indians and reward “progressives.”345
Ultimately, the Oglala goal of maintaining their political and social
structures through the creation of an economic foundation built upon cattle
ended because of increased institutional controls and resource
disenfranchisement. By the 1880s Indian Agents possessed control over vital
economic processes such as who could buy, sell, or butcher cattle on the
reservation. The threat of allotment moved the Oglala to vehemently resist
the privatization of land and pasturage on Pine Ridge. The tribe required
access to as much grazing area as possible in order to grow their cattle
numbers sufficiently in order to provide for the entire tribe’s needs.
Moreover, American federal assimilation policy proved unmanageable
when coupled with profound intra-tribal factionalism and economic disparity
345 For examination of Indian blood and identity see, Lewis, “Reservation Leadership and the
Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy,” and, Strong and Winkel, “‘Indian Blood.’” For an
examination of Progressive Era ideology and its influence on federal Indian policy see, Steven
J. Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era (New York: Hill and Wang,
1998); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983); and, Alan Brinkley.
“In Retrospect: Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform: A Reconsideration” Reviews In
American History 13(September, 1985): 462-480. For a look at the effect of Progressivism o
Native Americans see, David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians
and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,
1995); and Hoxie, A Final Promise.
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between full bloods and the mixed blood/“white husband” union. Full bloods
constituted over three-quarters of the reservation population before 1900, yet
they only owned approximately one-fifth of Indian owned reservation cattle.
Still those tribal members who supported the concept of both communally
owned cattle and land fought to reinforce tribal identity through social,
economic, and political structures developed within the tribe’s nomadic
equestrian society developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Finally unsuccessful, these leaders next strove to prevent leasing of
tribal lands to off-reservation cattle operations following the turn of the
century. Unfortunately, during WWI the tribe sold most of its herd for the
war effort at the forceful recommendation of the federal government and its
agents. With few cattle remaining on Pine Ridge leasing moved apace
through the machinations of the off-reservation cattle operations eager to
utilize tribal lands. The Newcastle Cattle Company by itself leased nearly
two-thirds of Pine Ridge Reservation lands by 1920. In the years immediately
following WWI economic conditions on Pine Ridge emerged that mirror those
of today. The vast majority of the tribe found themselves economically
prevented from utilizing the greatest resource the reservation offered, land.
The Oglala failed to achieve economic self-sufficiency and as a result faced
the hegemonic control of the United States federal government. By 1920
conditions of economic impotence and poverty arose. This pernicious
situation remains relatively unchanged today.346
346 Folder 28114-1920, 2 of 2, Box No. 48, Pine Ridge, Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG
75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, NA.
201
What does the Oglala tribe’s political economy reveal concerning
larger historiographic issues? Perhaps most importantly it demonstrates a new
avenue for both exploring and understanding a native perspective pertaining to
the planning and implementation of Native American economies within a
reservation setting. The Oglala did not passively and ignorantly approach
reservation existence wondering what was to become of them. Nor did they
merely react to changing circumstances and events. During the decades
before the creation of the Great Sioux Reservation Oglala culture prospered.
The tribe’s political economy proved equal to all challenges that emerged
during the Lakota Nation’s dramatic expansion and rise to power. Not
surprisingly, the Oglala turned inward to seek answers concerning their future
within reservation boundaries.
The Oglala did not see the United States of America as their economic
foundation and fount. The tribe’s negotiation for annuities and rations during
treaty councils did not imply Oglala economic passivity. The tribe clearly
articulated a desire to establish large herds of cattle on their reservation in
order to fully provide for their needs. In the process of making this decision
the tribe carefully observed their environmental reality, Anglo regional
economic enterprises, and societal condition in order to formulate an active
and forward thinking economic strategy. Moreover, they did so from a unique
historical perspective, one in which farming played no role. The Oglala did
not sway from their goals despite unimaginable obstacles placed in their path
by both the federal government and tribal factionalism. Only complete
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economic truncation from reservation resources finally ended the tribe’s hope
of cultural autonomy.
This study further demonstrates that historical perception of
reservations as economic, political, and social islands that were isolated and
awash in the United States of America’s “sea to shining sea,” is unfounded.
The Oglala Lakota both influenced and were influenced by regional and
national events and processes. Western cattlemen and politicians strove to
acquire access to reservation land and in doing so greatly informed tribal
economic development. Yet their regional economic system focused
primarily upon the establishment of large cattle operations. This process
undoubtedly influenced the Oglala’s economic strategy for when the buffalo
disappeared. Furthermore, Progressive Era ideals coupled with Jeffersonian
concepts concerning an individual’s relationship with the land largely shaped
both national and reservation Indian policy. Most notably, the governmental
demand for steers to fulfill their beef ration obligations facilitated the
establishment of the regional cattle industry on the northern Great Plains.
This dissertation also asks historians to more closely examine concepts
pertaining to spatial and physical relationships to power and evolving Native
American perceptions of both physical and spiritual space. As the Oglala
migrated to the vast expanses of the Great Plains, and then entered reservation
confinement, their understanding of distance and space evolved. Boundaries
between the Oglala and other cultures became more clearly delineated
geographically with the establishment of the Great Sioux Reservation in 1868.
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This process continued and concepts of boundaries sharpened with first The
Treaty of 1877 and finally with the Sioux Bill of 1889, which created Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation.
Another important evolution occurred concerning Oglala spatial and
physical relations to outsiders. Spatial and physical relationships to outsiders
changed as first white agents, and then mixed bloods and “white husbands”
came to live among the tribe. These groups did not share Oglala concepts of
kinship connections as a foundation for economic and political actions. This
meant that for the first time the tribe suffered the presence of outsiders who,
for the most part, failed to consider the Oglala’s perspective concerning what
was in their own best interests. Concomitantly, these outsiders possessed
considerable power over the tribe. This fundamentally altered Oglala
economic and political structure. For example, centers of power became fixed
as agency and district farms appeared on the landscape. I believe that the
theme of spatial and physical perceptions deserves closer consideration in
future Native American studies.
My desire is that this study will lead others to rethink both tribal and
reservation history. It is important to break free of preconceptions concerning
Native American political economies during the liminal years following
confinement to reservations. The Oglala intelligently, consciously, and
determinedly set out to recreate their world within the expansive boundaries
of the Great Sioux Reservation and then the more spatially confining Pine
Ridge Reservation. While the tribe’s dream of economic independence and
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political autonomy remained unmet, their hope of maintaining their cultural
identity succeeded. Today the tribe remains fundamentally, uniquely, and
proudly Oglala Lakota.
Interestingly, like the moon as it traverses the sky, Oglala history may
yet come full circle. A contemporary effort to repatriate buffalo to the
reservation gives tremendous hope to the future of the tribe. The Village
Earth “Adopt-A-Buffalo” program actively seeks individuals from all over the
world to fund the cost of returning buffalo to Pine Ridge. On March 22, 2007,
the group acquired 2120 acres on Pine Ridge in order to expand the buffalo
population carrying capacity. Each year more buffalo expand the Red Cloud
Tiospaye herd near Slim Butte. It is well that this is so, for as Jesus Christ
never appointed a specific date for His return, so to did the Paiute prophet
Wovoka never declare when the rebirth of Native American culture might
return. A bright future lay ahead for the tribe as it seeks to reconnect with
what was lost.347
347 For an examination of the larger movement to reintroduce buffalo to the Great Plains see,
Ernest Callenbach, Bring Back the Buffalo!: A Sustainable Future for America’s Great Plains
(Washington, D.C., 1996); For information concerning Village Earth see their website,
www.villageearth.org/pages/Projects/Pine_Ridge/index.php; and for a broader examination of
the attempt to return buffalo to Indian reservations visit the Inter Tribal Bison Cooperative
webpage, http://itbcbison.com/.
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